Thoughts on the Market

The AI Divide Between the U.S. and Japan

July 9, 2026

The AI Divide Between the U.S. and Japan

July 9, 2026

Robert Feldman and Michael Gapen discuss how AI could reshape growth, labor markets and productivity in the U.S. and Japan.

Morgan Stanley Thoughts on the Market Podcast

Transcript

Robert Feldman: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Robert Feldman, Senior Advisor at Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities in Tokyo.

 

Michael Gapen: And I'm Michael Gapen, Morgan Stanley's Chief U.S. Economist

 

Robert Feldman: Today, we'll discuss why the U.S. and Japanese economies may react differently to the AI productivity test.

 

It's Thursday, July 9th at 8 am in Tokyo.

 

Michael Gapen: And 9 am in New York.

 

Robert Feldman: AI is the biggest theme around the world right now, but AI will play out differently in different economies. Take the cases of the U.S. and Japan. In the U.S., it's already a catalyst in investment, imports, productivity, and the labor market outlook.

 

But here in Japan, it's seen as a savior for an economy with an intense labor shortage, low unemployment, and very little room to raise labor force participation.

 

Mike, in the U.S., AI's contribution to real GDP growth will rise from about 0.05 percentage points in 2024 to an estimated 0.43 percentage points in 2027.

 

What does that mean for markets?

 

Michael Gapen: Well, Robbie, I think it, it means a number of things, but, you know, I'm an economist, so the answer is always, "It depends." I think the real crux of the issue over time in the U.S., and therefore what it means for financial markets, is ultimately whether AI is labor replacing – and pushes the unemployment rate higher. Or it acts like a more traditional general-purpose technology that's labor augmenting.

 

So, if, that's the case, meaning it looks similar to the internet and digital era, then it would mean faster output growth, stronger productivity growth, but still an economy that's running at or near full employment. That would be very beneficial in our estimation for risk assets, equity markets, credit markets, and it would probably mean that we stay in an interest rate environment that's certainly higher than it was during the post GFC period.

 

But if – AI is a very different technology than we've seen in the past, and it displaces labor, and we get increases in the unemployment rate as AI diffuses through the economy. Then it could be very different for markets. Maybe returns to capital and equity markets are supported, but that might be more narrowly for technology stocks and not broader, say, consumer discretionary stocks.

 

So, the answer, of course, is it depends. We don't know. And I think, ultimately, we come down on the side of thinking that AI will not create dystopian outcomes in the labor markets, that employment will hold up.

 

So, we have a fairly constructive view, perhaps an optimistic view. And we think, ultimately it'll benefit markets greatly, similar to what we saw from the mid-90s to the early 2000’s.

 

Robert Feldman: Well, in your model, you have a particular variable that captures the speed of diffusion. But your baseline has AI spreading twice as fast as the internet did. But without that rise of employment. Is that really manageable? And if it's not, what economic indicators would warn us, if we're crossing into the danger zone?

 

Michael Gapen: This is really the tricky part as, as you know. We have a new technology. We have to model how it diffuses through the economy. And I would say I think there's an argument here that penetration rates and usage rates are very different than what economists think about diffusion, which is how the production process is reshaped because of this new technology.

 

And so most economists look at the internet and digital era and think it took 20-25 years to fully diffuse. Mass penetration in maybe 10 years, but full diffusion in more like 20-25 years. And so, each innovation cycle tends to happen more rapidly.

 

So, I do think AI will spread more rapidly. And even by saying it spreads twice as fast as the internet did still means that it'll take roughly a decade, maybe 10-12 years for this to fully diffuse. So, our argument here would be that that is enough time for a flexible economy and a flexible labor market, like we have in the U.S., to rebalance labor.

 

But if we're wrong, then Robbie, what I think you will see is that as AI rolls through, it diffuses faster. And what we would see then is increases in rates of job separation and layoffs that would overwhelm the labor market's ability to reallocate workers.

 

So, I think we would see two things – or three things: scale layoffs, a rise in the unemployment rate, and probably a significant amount of underemployment. Those who get rebalanced may be rebalanced into work that's not, say, consistent with the skill of that worker. So, I think we would see a very disrupted labor market in the process.

 

But if it takes a decade, maybe 10-12 years, we think ultimately the U.S. economy is flexible enough to rebalance labor without large scale layoffs.

 

Robert Feldman: Now, people are afraid of a lot of things, but one other thing is that AI might create new kinds of jobs, new kinds of tasks, have different impacts on people's wealth, and different responses from policymakers as well.

 

How do these knock-on effects change the AI labor story?

 

Michael Gapen: Yeah. That's right. I think you make a very good point there that I think it's easy to fall into what an economist would call a partial equilibrium trap. So, for example, we look at occupations exposed to AI task replacement, and we say, "Wow, if all these tasks are replaced, we might lose 10 million workers or 20 million workers."

 

But that's too simplistic, in our view. Because as you note, AI may destroy some tasks or replace some tasks, but it's also going to create new ones. So, it may eliminate some types of occupations but create others.

 

And in addition, if people are, say, laid off because of AI, you get a loss in labor market income for the economy. But AI will likely create returns to capital, say, stronger equity performance, and that's an indirect wealth effect.

 

So, our model kind of, looks at, say, three wedges or three horse races in the economy then. It's about the speed of diffusion of AI against the ability of the labor market to rebalance. It's task destruction or task replacement versus new task creation. And then third, it's we might have weakness in labor market income in the short run, but there are indirect wealth effects.

 

So, thinking about it this way in a richer general equilibrium context, these feedback effects matter a lot. So, the combination of if the labor market's disrupted, we get easing in monetary policy, maybe a fiscal response. There are new tasks, new jobs that are created for workers to rebalance to over time. And overall demand in the economy gets held up because wealth effects can offset some lost income.

 

All of that is extremely important in our view that ultimately the U.S. economy can rebalance and handle the AI diffusion in a manageable way.

 

We could be wrong, of course, but our main point here is you have to think about this in a richer context. You can't just simply, say, stack up workers and occupations and say, "Oh, we're going to lose a lot of employment." That's not the way innovation waves have worked in the past. We don't think they're going to work that way in the future.

 

Robert Feldman: Mm-hmm. That's fascinating because the situation in the United States is so different from that in Japan, largely because of the demographic situation.

 

Here in Japan, the key element is how much AI can ease the labor shortage. In fact, in some labor-intensive jobs now, we're seeing 6 percent wage increases, and that's great. As long  as productivity rises fast enough that price hikes aren't necessary.

 

Michael Gapen: So Robbie, in your scenarios for Japan, the same 10 percent productivity gain can lead to very different outcomes. Deflation and weaker employment in one case. More inflation, higher wages, and more employment in another.

 

What do you think drives the difference?

 

Robert Feldman: Mm-hmm. Well, the crucial element really is the flexibility of goods and labor markets. With high flexibility, you get higher GDP, higher employment, and moderate inflation. With low flexibility, you may get a bit higher GDP, but employment plunges, and there's deflation of both prices and wages – more in wages.

 

Now, in Japan, over the last two decades, we've seen monopoly power in key markets go down. For example, agriculture and energy. Labor markets are more flexible too, but lifetime employment system still applies to about two-thirds of the economy. And that deters people from trying to find better jobs and even from acquiring the skills needed for a new job.

 

Michael Gapen: What conditions are needed for AI to be additive to Japan's economy?

 

Robert Feldman: We need more reskilling. Japan is lucky because people are healthy, and they want to work into their 70s and beyond. But acquiring the skills to remain productive is a challenge, even though Japan's workforce is well-educated and still has a strong work ethic.

 

So, to sum up, in the U.S., the race is between diffusion and absorption. But in Japan it's between labor scarcity and productivity. Is that fair?

 

Michael Gapen: It is fair, and we come down on the side of optimism. We think diffusion will happen fast, but it'll happen at a pace that the U.S. economy can handle.

 

So, we come down having a positive view overall. We do not lean in the direction of dystopian labor market outcomes.

 

Robert Feldman: Mm-hmm. I agree with that as well for Japan. So, Mike, thanks for taking the time to talk.

 

Michael Gapen: Great speaking with you, Robbie-san.

 

Robert Feldman: And thanks for listening, everyone. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

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With voters focused on prices and the economy, our Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore...

Transcript

Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Morgan Stanley's Head of Public Policy Research.

 

Michelle Weaver: And I'm Michelle Weaver, Morgan Stanley's U.S. Thematic Strategist.

 

Ariana Salvatore: Today, we'll be talking about the consumer and what recent data could imply for the midterm elections.

 

It's Wednesday, July 1st at 10am in New York.

 

Last week, Mike Zezas and I caught up on the consumer while he was down at our Consumer Captains Conference. This week, Michelle, I want to talk to you about what your data are saying and get into the implications of all of this for the midterm elections.

 

So, maybe we start with the AlphaWise data. What are our surveys picking up when it comes to how the consumer feels about the outlook in the aggregate?

 

Michelle Weaver: We run a monthly proprietary survey of around 2,000 U.S. consumers, and it's diversified by age, gender, and region, and we ask questions around sentiment, spending plans, and other special topics. Our survey recently showed a continued gradual recovery in consumer confidence in the U.S. economic outlook.

 

We're not off to the races by any means, but we did see the net outlook score improve to -10 percent, up from -14 percent a month ago and a low of -18 percent two months ago, when concerns around oil prices were at their peak.

 

Overall, more consumers feel negatively about the economy versus positively, hence that net score is negative. But we are seeing signs of improvement, so things are improving on a rate of change basis.

 

Ariana Salvatore: That makes sense given the MOU that was signed between Iran and the U.S. Now, looking forward, what does the survey tell us about spending plans?

 

Michelle Weaver: Broadly, consumer spending plans remain stable. They expect to spend more on essentials categories. This includes things like groceries, gas, and household items, while they're expecting to spend less on discretionary categories. We saw the weakest spending intentions within the consumer electronics category, and consumers are not likely to see much price relief in that category. Many consumer electronics makers are now taking their prices up because of the high price of memory chips that goes into those products.

 

Ariana Salvatore: One of the most important components of the survey is the question that you ask on top areas of concern. What are you guys seeing there?

 

Michelle Weaver: Inflation is still the number one concern for consumers, and we actually saw the percent of consumers citing it among their top concerns tick up again last month. So, now that's at 60 percent, up from 59 percent last month, and a low of 53 percent in January. People are also worried about the U.S. political environment. That was cited by 42 percent of consumers, up from about 39 percent last wave. Concern around geopolitical conflicts rounds out the top three, but that level's been pretty stable around 25 percent.

 

But Ariana, can consumers expect any relief on prices from the policy front? Consumers got a nice boost from tax refunds. Is there anything else in the pipeline?

 

Ariana Salvatore: So, we've gotten this question a lot into the midterm elections, and our view is basically that there are a number of obstacles in the way of something like another reconciliation package to give direct stimulus to consumers, whether that's procedural, whether it's the political perception.

 

One of the most important is actually the deficit concerns, right? So, we don't expect something additional for the consumer through the legislative angle, aside from what we've already seen, like the Road to Housing Act. And that's also against a backdrop of what we've been seeing on the economic side and what your data is reflecting, which is that the consumer sentiment metrics are actually ticking up slightly from their lows. And that, of course, maps directly onto what our U.S. econ team has been saying.

 

Their view is that the consumer story in 2026 has turned more neutral. Real consumption growth is still expected to decelerate to about 1.7 percent. That's below last year, but again, not falling off a cliff. The core dynamic is that the One Big Beautiful Bill Act had this fiscal boost from last year, tax refunds running about 17 percent higher year-over-year, but the oil shock basically mitigated that and essentially neutralized the fiscal impulse.

 

But that's not hitting everybody equally. Goods spending tends to bear the brunt. Our econ team estimates that the oil shock takes 30 basis points off consumption entirely from goods rather than services. Low- and middle-income households are most exposed since energy makes up over 8 percent of spending for the bottom income quintile versus under 5 percent for the top.

 

And that broadening out story from just the high-income consumer driving spending is probably going to be a little bit delayed just given the oil shock.

But maybe let's drill in a little bit more on that income bifurcation. How does that manifest in your view across spending intentions?

 

Michelle Weaver: Mm-hmm. Overall, short-term spending intentions – so spending plans over the next month – are net +20 percent this month. That's still above the historical average of around +16 percent, but it is down somewhat from 23 percent last month. And the divergence is really driven by income. Upper-income consumers remain meaningfully more optimistic, while lower-income households are still under stress.

 

So, we're still seeing the K economy very much in place. And the economy and inflation are almost always top issues for voters. How are you expecting the dynamics we've been talking about to impact the midterms?

 

Ariana Salvatore: So, data are showing an uptick, obviously, which should on net benefit Republicans all else equal, albeit off a low base. And that's because there are other data points to consider here. So, things like the generic ballot, things like historical precedent, things like the presidential favorability ratings – all of those things are painting a more constructive backdrop for Democrats heading into November.

 

But also, to put a finer point on it, we're seeing the AlphaWise data that you're citing reflected across other surveys as well. So, we saw the UMich data from last week show the year ahead inflation outlook drop to 4.6 percent from 4.8 percent. And of course, that's a reflection of the expectation that gas prices are going to moderate into November too.

 

Now, on that front, it's about rate of change, right? So, not the absolute level. But again, I would just remind our listeners that this is one factor in the context of many.

 

So, net-net, we definitely still see a slight advantage for Democrats heading into November, especially when we drill into some of the trends that we've been seeing across the primaries.

 

Michelle Weaver: And what are some of those trends you've been picking up from the primaries?

 

Ariana Salvatore: So, the first thing I would say is that we're cautious to extrapolate too much from primaries to the general election, but really maybe two key points here. The first is turnout seems to be an early indicator in favor of Democrats. So, enthusiasm is up. We're seeing more participation and more engagement relative to prior elections.

 

The second point I would make is that the primaries have been showing a mixed bag in terms of candidates for November. So, in some states like New York and Colorado, you saw more progressive candidates win their races. And all else equal, that could translate to more of what we call a fragile instead of a cohesive majority come November.

 

So, think more political noise around fiscal deadlines, things like appropriations and the debt ceiling. But of course, we still have less than 50 percent of the primaries, so plenty to watch heading into the fall.

 

Michelle, thanks for taking the time to talk.

 

Michelle Weaver: Thanks for having me.

 

Ariana Salvatore: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

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Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson explains that gains in the stock market are e...

Transcript

Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S.  Equity Strategist. 

 

Today on the podcast I’ll be discussing the changing equity market leadership.

 

So, let’s get after it.


Something is happening in plain sight but still isn’t fully appreciated by investors. The market’s leadership is changing. And as usual, by the time everyone agrees that it’s happening, the easier money will probably have already been made.

 

 

Putting those together, the setup looked like a classic early cycle. Revenue growth returning on top of lean cost structures leads to strong operating leverage and well above trend earnings growth.

 

Fast forward to today, and that’s exactly what has happened. The median stock in the S&P 1500is now growing earnings at a double-digit pace, the fastest since the post-COVID boom. Revenue growth has returned, with the median stock growing its top line by 7 percent .  That is not a narrow growth story. That is a rolling recovery showing up where many investors still aren’t looking.

 

For much of this year and particularly the past few months, most investors didn’t want to hear that story. The Iran conflict pushed oil sharply higher. Rate-cut expectations turned into hike expectations. Faced with these headwinds, investors crowded back into the AI trade especially semiconductors and memory in particular. To be clear, the earnings revisions in semiconductors have been spectacular. The move wasn’t irrational. But when something becomes the most owned, most loved, and most obvious area of the market, it becomes harder to surprise on the upside.

 

That’s where I think we are now. The hyperscalers have started to underperform, and that may be an early warning sign for semis, which are the key beneficiaries of the AI spending boom. Earnings revisions breadth for semis is pressing against historical extremes. Again, this does not mean the AI cycle is over. But it does mean that the rate of change may be peaking, and when price momentum starts to fade in a crowded trade, it can lead to significant set-backs. It can also give other parts of the market room to breathe. In short, the broadening trade is back!

 

The equal-weighted index and small caps are outperforming again. More importantly, the groups we have been recommending – Consumer Discretionary Goods, Transports, and Regional Banks – have already started to show relative strength over the past six weeks, even though positioning and sentiment remain neutral to negative. That’s the kind of combination I like: better price action, improving earnings, and investors still skeptical.

 

One reason I’ve been more constructive on the consumer than others is that I’ve also been more bearish on oil. That view was not dependent on a grand deal between the U.S. and Iran, although that obviously helps. The signals were already there. The Brent-WTI spread narrowed, and energy stocks began underperforming from the day the conflict started. The market was telling us something before the headlines confirmed it. And longer term, I think the conflict has put the world on notice: this choke point around the Strait of Hormuz must be solved. It’s no longer a risk the world is willing to tolerate. New routes, new supply, and new energy strategies are likely coming. Necessity is the mother of invention, and I would not underestimate the world’s ability to adapt.

 

A less problematic oil backdrop helps the broadening trade. So does the Fed, at least on rates. The June FOMC meeting told us two things: forward guidance is going to be diminished, and the reaction function is now focused more squarely on inflation. My view is that falling energy prices, peaking tariff-related inflation, and contained services and housing inflation keep the Fed on hold rather than hiking this year. If that’s right, lower than expected real rates could be a positive surprise for equities and another tailwind for the broadening of performance.

 

The key variable to watch at this point is liquidity. This Fed is unlikely to be as proactive with balance sheet support, just as the real economy needs more capital for capex and markets are dealing with more equity and credit supply. That’s the near-term real risk, especially for popular momentum trades.

 

Bottom line, the market may look choppy and even weak at the index level, over the next month, but the message underneath is improving. Earnings are broadening, oil is falling. The shift is already under way with crowded momentum trades wobbling, and the under-owned areas of the market starting to lead. Investors can either wait for it to become more certain – or position before it becomes obvious and fully priced.

 

Thanks for tuning in; I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out!

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