Thoughts on the Market

Oil Shock Hits the U.S. Consumer

March 18, 2026

Oil Shock Hits the U.S. Consumer

March 18, 2026

A prolonged oil disruption is pushing gas prices higher. Arunima Sinha from our U.S. and Global Economics team joins Head of U.S. Policy Strategy Ariana Salvatore to discuss what that means for consumer spending, inflation expectations and the U.S. midterm elections.

 

Important note regarding economic sanctions. This report references jurisdictions which may be the subject of economic sanctions. Readers are solely responsible for ensuring that their investment activities are carried out in compliance with applicable laws.

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Transcript

Arunima Sinha: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Arunima Sinha from Morgan Stanley's U.S. and Global Economics teams.

 

Ariana Salvatore: And I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of U.S. Policy Strategy.

 

Arunima Sinha: Today – what are the implications of the ongoing oil disruption for the U.S. consumer?

 

It's Wednesday, March 18th at 10am in New York.

 

Ariana, let's start with where we are in week three of this particular oil disruption and what you are thinking about in terms of what the paths to resolution could look like.

 

Ariana Salvatore: Yeah. Great place to start. So, I would say before we get into what the resolution could look like, we need to think about how long could this conflict possibly last? And that's the most relevant question for investors as well. And there I would say there's very little conviction just because of the uncertainty associated with this conflict. But I'm keeping my eye on three different things.

 

The first is a clearer prioritization of the objectives tied to the conflict. The Trump administration has laid out a number of different goals for this conflict, some of which are shorter in nature than others. The second thing I think we're looking at – that's really important – is traffic at the Strait of Hormuz. And there, the Trump administration has spoken about insurance, you know, naval escorts – all of these things that we think will take some time to really come to fruition. And at the time that we're recording this, it seems that we're still getting about low single digit number of tankers through the strait on a daily basis. So that's the second thing.

 

The third point I would make is any type of escalation is really critical here. So, whether it's vertical – meaning different types of weapons used, different types of targets being hit. Or horizontal escalation, broadening out into different proxies and, and more so throughout the region. Those are really important indicators, and right now all of these things are pointing to a slightly longer-term conflict than I think most people expected at the start.

 

Now, in terms of what that means for markets, for domestic gasoline prices, all these are really important questions that I'm sure we're going to get into. But what we should note is that the president has spoken about a number of policy offsets to mitigate those price increases, ranging from the Treasury actually loosening up some of the sanctions on Russia to sell some oil. You know, we've heard some talk of invoking the Jones Act waiver. That's a temporary fix.

 

On net, we think that these policy offsets are not going to really be enough to mitigate that supply loss that we're getting. That's a 20 million barrel per day loss. Some of these efforts mainly will, kind of, target about 7 or 8 million barrels per day. You're still in a deficit of about 10 to 13 [million]. And that's really meaningful for markets, for consumption as you well know, and everything else in between.

 

Arunima Sinha: That's really helpful perspective, Ariana. And it's also a useful segue to think about the note that we jointly put out a few days ago. And just thinking about what this means for the U.S. consumer. And there, I think there's the first point to start with is that the consumer is now going to be living through the third supply shock in about five years. So, after COVID, after tariffs, here comes the next. And I think this particular oil shock is going to be somewhat different from tariffs in the sense that this is going to hit consumers at the front end and directly. This is not something that is going to have to pass through business costs. And some of them could be absorbed by businesses and not fully passed on to the consumer. So, I think that's an important point.

 

The second point here is that in terms of the share of spending of gasoline out of total spend, we are at pretty low numbers. We're somewhere in the 2 to 3 percent range. So, it could give a little bit of a cushion. So, the longer-term average can be somewhere about 4 percent. So, there could be some cushion. But we know that consumers have already been stretched by, sort of, several years of high prices.

 

And so, the way that we thought about what some of the channels could be for how higher oil prices, which translate into higher gas prices, could matter for the consumer. I think there are, sort of, three to identify.

 

The first one is that it is really just a hit to your real purchasing power because this is a type of good that is actually really hard to substitute away from. And you could look through some of it, at the start. So maybe in the first month you don't react very much. You pull down on some savings; you take out a little bit of short-term credit.

 

But the longer it lasts, the bigger the consumption response is going to be. And the second channel then to identify is – you start to build up some precautionary savings motives because there's this uncertainty that's also lasting for some time. And what do you pull back on? You'll typically pull back on discretionary types of spending.

 

And so, we sized out this impact to say that if oil prices were to be about 50 percent higher and they last for two to three quarters, it could hit real personal spending growth by about 40 [basis points] after 12 months. And most of that is really just coming from the impact on good spending, specifically through durable goods.

 

So, there could be some meaningful impact to real consumer spending in the U.S., if this shock were to go on longer. And the last point I would just say is, you know, how do inflation expectations move? Because that's an important point for the Fed and it's an important point for just people who are thinking about their spending decisions over the next year or so.

 

And one interesting thing I think came out in the University of Michigan survey that came out this Friday; and this was a preliminary survey. About half of it was conducted before the conflict started, and half of it was after the conflict started. And what we saw was that inflation expectations in the year ahead, so the 12-month-ahead expectations that had been trending down, paused.

 

So, they are no longer trending down. And, in its release, the University of Michigan noted that for the responses that were collected after the conflict started, inflation expectations did tick up. And interestingly, the strains were the most for the bottom income cohort. So, they saw a bigger uptick in inflation expectations. They actually also saw a bigger uptick in their unemployment expectations over the next year.

 

Ariana Salvatore: So, Arunima, if I can ask, we've been talking a lot about the K-shape economy this year, right? So, consumption really being led by the upper; let's call it the upper income cohort. When we think about this translation to consumption, like you said, more of the stresses on the lower income side, how do you square that with the economic impact that you guys are expecting?

 

Arunima Sinha: The way that I would square it is the longer it lasts and the greater the, sort of, uncertainty in asset markets – that might actually begin to weigh on the upper income consumer as well. So that might make some of those wealth effects less supportive, than what we have seen, over most of 2025. Just given where consumption has been running in terms of its pace.

 

So not only might we see a bigger strain on the lower-income cohorts as we see this shock lasting longer, we might actually see some pressures not through the direct spending channel on gas, but really just, you know, how it's impacting their balance sheets.

 

Ariana Salvatore: And that's a really important point because it also, to me, resonates with the concept of affordability, which has been a really key political topic for the past few months, I would say.

 

And the way we're thinking about this is, like I mentioned, there are limited policy offsets that can be used to mitigate the potential increase in domestic gasoline prices. And that matters a lot for the midterm elections. Typically voters don't really rank foreign policy as a top issue when it comes to their choice for candidates – in midterm elections and elections in general.

 

But once you see that feed through to, you know, inflation, cost of living, job expectations, that's when it starts to really matter for people. And what we've been saying, it's not a perfect rule of thumb, but looking back at the past few elections. If gasoline prices here in the U.S. are something like $3 a gallon, that tends to be pretty good for the incumbent party. [$]4 [a gallon], let's say it's a little bit more politically challenging. And [$]5 [a gallon], you know, is when you kind of get into that even more challenging territory for the administration and for Republicans in Congress.

 

So again, not a perfect benchmark, but something that we'll be keeping an eye on too as this conflict evolves.

 

Arunima Sinha: Ok! So, we'll be keeping an eye on how that oil disruption plays out and matters for the U.S. consumer.

 

Ariana Salvatore: Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share thoughts on the market with a friend or colleague today.

 

 

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Our co-heads of Securitized Products Research Jay Bacow and James Egan discuss the impact of upcom...

Transcript

Jay Bacow: It is March and there's some madness going on. I'm Jay Bacow, here with Jim Egan, noted Wahoo Wa fan.

 

James Egan: Hey, it looks like Virginia's going to be back in the tournament this year, hoping for a three seed, looking like a four seed. It's the first year that my son is really excited about it. So, hoping we can win a few games.

 

Jay Bacow: Let's hope they don't lose the first game and make him cry like you did a few years ago. But …

 

Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Jay Bacow, co-head of Securitized Products Research at Morgan Stanley.

 

James Egan: And I'm Jim Egan, the other co-head of Securitized Products Research at Morgan Stanley.

 

Jay Bacow: Today, with everything going on in the world, we thought it'd be prudent to discuss the U.S. mortgage and housing market.

 

It's Thursday, March 12th at 10:30am in New York.

 

James Egan: Jay, as you mentioned, there is a lot going on in markets right now, but hey, people need to live somewhere. And those somewheres remain pretty unaffordable. But this administration has been very focused on affordability, and we also have some updates on what is clearly the most exciting part of the housing and mortgage markets – regulation. What's going on there?

 

Jay Bacow: Look, nothing gets me more excited than thinking about the regulatory outlook for the mortgage market. We've been focusing a lot on what's happening in D.C. with possible changes that could be helping out affordability, changes to the investor program, changes to the policy rate.

 

But Michelle Bowman, who is the Vice Chair of Supervision, has been recently on the tape saying that we could get an update and a proposal for the Basel Endgame by the end of this month; and that proposal for the Basel Endgame is likely to make it easier for banks to hold loans on their balance sheet.

 

It's going to give banks excess capital and the combination of these, along with some other changes that are going to be coming from the Fed, the FDIC and the OCC around: For instance, the GSIB surcharge that our banking analysts led by Manan Gosalia have spoken about – it's really going to help out the mortgage market in our view.

 

James Egan: Alright, so freeing up capital, helping the mortgage market. When we think about the implications to affordability specifically, what do you think it means for mortgage rates?

 

Jay Bacow: Right. So, it's important that [when] we think about the mortgage rate, we realize where it's coming from. The mortgage rate starts off with the level of Treasury rates, and then you add upon that a spread. And the spread is dependent among a number of different factors. But one of the biggest ones is just the demand. And one of the reasons why mortgage rates have been so high over the previous four years was (a) Treasury rates were high, but also the spread was wide.

 

And we think one of the biggest reasons why the spread was wide is that the domestic banks, who are the largest asset type investor in mortgages – they own $3 trillion of mortgages – basically weren't buying them over the past four years. And one of the reasons they weren't buying was they didn't have the regulatory clarity.

 

And so, if the banks come back, that will cause that spread to tighten, which will likely cause the mortgage rate to come down. That is presumably, Jim, good about affordability, right?

 

James Egan: Yes. And I want to clarify, or at least emphasize, that affordability itself has been improving. Over the course of the past four to five months at this point, we've been close to, if not at the lowest mortgage rate we've seen in three years. And when we think about what that has practically done to the monthly principal and interest payment on homes purchased today.

 

Like that monthly payment on the median priced home is down $150 over the past year. That's about a 7 percent decrease. When we lay in incomes – or when we layer in incomes to get into that actual affordability equation, we're at our most affordable place since the second quarter of 2022.

 

So yes, big picture, this is still a challenge to affordability environment. But it's not as challenged as it's been over the past three years.

 

Jay Bacow: All right, so affordability improving. It's still challenged though. What does that mean for home prices then?

 

James Egan: So, when we think about the home price implication of mortgage rates coming down; of mortgage rates coming down in an environment where incomes are going up – we're thinking about demand for shelter, purchase volumes and supply of that shelter. And demand really has not reacted to the improved affordability environment.

 

That's not unusual. Normally takes about 12 months for affordability improvement to pull through in terms of increased transaction volumes. But we do think that the lock-in effect that we've talked about in detail on this podcast in the past, that is going to play a role here.

 

Mortgage rates end of February finally hit a five handle, really, for the first time in three years. They're back above that now with the volatility in the interest rate markets. But from 4 percent to 6 percent, mortgage rates is effectively an air pocket. We don't think you're going to get a lot of unlocking at these levels.

 

So we think that transaction volumes will pick up. We're calling for 3 to 4 percent growth in purchase volumes this year. But they've been largely flat for two to three years at this point. And more importantly, any improvement in affordability that comes from a decrease in mortgage rates is going to lead to commensurately more supply alongside that growth in demand – which is going to keep home prices, specifically, very range bound here.

 

The pace of growth is slowed to about 1.3 to 1.5 percent right now. We've been here for four or five months. We think we're pretty much going to stay here. We we're calling for 2 percent growth, so a little bit acceleration. But we think you're in a very range bound home price market.

 

Jay Bacow: All right, so home prices range bound, affordability improved. But still has a little bit of room to go. Some possible tailwinds from the deregulatory path that will make homes being a little bit more affordable. Fair amount going on.

 

Jim, always a pleasure speaking to you

 

James Egan: And always great speaking to you too, Jay. And to all of our regular listeners, thank you for adding us to your playlist. Let us know what you think wherever you get this podcast. And share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

 

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Our analysts Andrew Sheets and Martijn Rats discuss why a prolonged disruption of oil flow through...

Transcript

Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.

 

Martijn Rats: I'm Martijn Rats, Head of Commodity Research at Morgan Stanley.

 

Andrew Sheets: Today on the program we're going to talk about why investors everywhere are tracking ships through the Strait of Hormuz.

 

It's Wednesday, March 11th at 2pm in London.

 

Andrew Sheets: Martijn, the oil market, which is often volatile, has been historically volatile over the last couple of weeks following renewed military conflict between the United States and Iran.

 

Now, there are a lot of different angles to this, but the oil market is really at the center of the market's focus on this conflict. And so, I think before we get into the specifics, I think it's helpful to set some context. How big is the global oil market and where does the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz fit within that global picture?

 

Martijn Rats: Yeah, so the global oil consumption is a little bit more than a 100 million barrels a day. But that splits in two parts. There is a pipeline market and there is a seaborne market. And when it comes to prices, the seaborne market is really where it's at. If you're sitting in China, you're buying oil from the Middle East, all of a sudden, it's not available. Sure, if there is a pipeline that goes from Canada into the United States, that doesn't really help you all that much.

 

Andrew Sheets: So it's the oil on the ships that really matters.

 

Martijn Rats: It's the oil on ships that is the flexible part of the market that we can redirect to where the oil is needed. And that is also the market where prices are formed. The seaborne market is in the order of 60 million barrels a day. So, only a subset of the 100 [million]. Now relative to that 60 million barrel a day, the Strait of Hormuz flows about 20 [million]. So, the Strait of Hormuz is responsible for about a third of seaborne supply, which is, of course, very large and therefore, you know, very critical to the system.

 

Andrew Sheets: And I think an important thing we should also discuss here, which we were just discussing earlier today on another call, is – this is a market that could be quite sensitive to actually quite small disruptions in oil. So, can you give just some sense of sensitivity? I mean, in normal times, what sort of disruptions, in terms of barrels of oil, kind of, move markets; get investors' attention?

 

Martijn Rats: Yeah, look, this is part of why this situation is so unusual, and oil analysts really sort of struggle with this. Look normally, at relative to the 100 million barrels a day of consumption, we care about supply demand imbalances of a couple of 100,000 barrels a day. That becomes interesting.

 

If that, increases to say 1 million barrel a day, over- or undersupplied, you can expect prices to move. You can expect them to move by meaningful amounts. We can write research; the clients can trade. You have a tradable idea in front of you. When that becomes 2 to 3 million barrels a day, either side, you have major historical market moving events.

 

So, in [20]08-09, oil famously fell from over 100 [million] down to something like 30 [million], on the basis that the oil market was 2-2.5 million barrel day oversupplied for two quarters. In 2022, we all thought – this actually never happened, but we all thought that Russia was going to lose about 3 million barrel day of supply. And on that basis, just on the basis of the expectation alone, Brent went to $130 per barrel. So, 2-3 [million] either side you have historically large moves. Now we're talking about 20 [million].

 

Andrew Sheets: And I think that's what's so striking. I mean, again, I think investors, people listening to this, they can do that arithmetic too. If this is a market where 2 to 3 million barrels a day have caused some of the largest moves that we've seen in history, something that's 20 [million] is exceptional. And I think it's also fair to say this type of closure of the Strait [of Hormuz] is something we haven't seen before.

 

Martijn Rats: No, which also made it very hard to forecast, by the way. Because the historical track records did not point in that direction, and yet here we are. The historical track record – look, you can look at other major disruptions historically.

 

The largest disruption in the history of the oil market is the Suez Crisis in the mid-1950s that took away about 10 percent of global oil consumption. This is easily double that. So really unusual. If you look at supply and demand shocks of this order of magnitude, you can think about COVID. In April 2020, for one month, at the peak of COVID, when we're all sitting at home. Nobody driving, nobody flying. Yeah, we lost very briefly 20 million barrels a day of demand. Now we're losing 20 million barrels a day of supply. So, look, the sign is flipped, but it's in the same order of magnitude. And yeah, these are unusual events that you wouldn't actually, sort of, forecast them that easily. But that is what is in front of us at the moment.

 

Andrew Sheets: So, I think the next kind of logical question is if shipping remains disrupted, and I'd love for you to talk a little bit about, you know, you're sitting there with satellite maps on your screen tracking shipping, which is – a development. But, you know, what are the options that are available in the region, maybe globally to temporarily balance this supply and create some offset?

 

Martijn Rats: Yeah. So, like of course when we have a big disruption like this one, of course the market is going to try to solve for this. There are a few blocks that we can work with. I'll run you through them one by one, including some of the numbers. But very quickly you arrive at the conclusion that this is; this puzzle – we can't really solve it.

 

Like in 2022, the market was very stressed. We thought Russia was going to lose 3 million barrels a day of supply, but we could move things around in our supply demand model. Russia oil goes to China and India. Oil that they buy, we can get in Europe, we can move stuff around to kind of sort of solve a puzzle.

 

This puzzle is very, very difficult to solve. So, through the Strait of Hormuz, 15 million barrels a day have crude, 5 million barrels a day of refined product, 20 million barrels a day in total. What can we do?

 

Well, the biggest offset, is arguably the Saudi EastWest pipeline. Saudi Arabia has a pipeline that effectively allows it to ship oil to the Red Sea at the Port of Yanbu, where it can be evacuated on tankers there. That pipeline has a capacity of 7 million barrels a day. We think it was probably already flowing at something like 3 million barrels a day. So, there's probably an incremental 4 [million] that can become available through that. That's the biggest block, that we can see of workaround capacity, so to say.

 

After that the numbers do get smaller. The UAE hasa pipeline that goes through Fujairah that's also beyond the Strait of Hormuz. We think there is maybe 0.5 million barrel a day of capacity there. Then you're basically, sort of, done within the region, and you have to look globally for other sources of oil.

 

If there are sanctions relief, maybe on Russian oil, you can find a 0.5 million barrel day there. Here, there and everywhere. 100,000 barrels a day, 200,000 barrels a day. But the numbers get…

 

Andrew Sheets: It’s still not… So, if you kind of put all of those, you know, kind of, almost in a best-case scenario relative to the 20 million that's getting disrupted.

 

Martijn Rats: If you add another one or two from a massive SPR release, the fastest release from SPR…

 

Andrew Sheets: That's the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

 

Martijn Rats: Yeah, exactly. Earlier today, we got an announcement, that the IEA is proposing to release 400 million barrels from Strategic Reserve across its member countries. That is a very large number. But – and that is important. But more important is how fast can it flow because the extraction rate from these tanks is not infinite. The fastest ever rate of SPR release is only 1.3 million barrels a day. Now, maybe the circumstances are so extraordinary, we can do better than that and we can get it to 2 [million]. But beyond that, you're really in very, very uncharted territory.

 

So maybe in the region, work around sanctions relief, SPR release, we can probably find like 7 million barrels a day out of a problem that is 20 [million]. You're left with another 13 [million]. The 13 [million] is four times what we thought Russia would lose. So, you're left with this conclusion: Look, this really needs to come to an end.

 

Andrew Sheets: And the other rebalancing mechanism, which again, you know, when we come back to markets and forecasting, this is obviously price. And, you know, you talk about this idea of demand destruction, which I think we could paraphrase as – the price is higher so people use less of it and then you can rebalance the market that way.

 

But give us just a little sense of, you know, as you and your team are sitting there modeling, how do you think about, kind of, the price of oil? Where it would need to go to – to potentially rebalance this the other way.

 

Martijn Rats: Yeah, that price is very high. So, what it's a[n] really interesting analysis to do is to look at the historical frequency distribution of inflation adjusted oil prices.

 

You take 20 years of oil prices. You convert it all in money of the day, adjusted for inflation, and then simply plot the frequency distribution. What you get is not one single bell curve centered around the middle with some variation around the midpoint. You get, sort of, two partially overlapping bell curves.

 

There is a slightly larger one, which is, sort of, the normal regime. Lower prices, 60, 70, 80 bucks. There's a lot of density there in the frequency distribution, that's where we are normally. What's interesting is that actually, if you go from there to higher prices, there are prices that are actually very rare in inflation adjusted terms.

 

Like a [$] 100-110. In nominal terms, we might feel that that has happened. In inflation adjusted terms, these prices are extremely rare. They are way rarer than prices that live even further to the right. [$]130, 140.

 

The oil market has this other regime of these very high prices. If you go back in history, when did those prices prevail? They always prevailed in periods where we asked the same question. What is the demand destruction price? And yeah, to erode demand by a somewhat meaningful quantity, yeah, you end up in that regime. These very high prices, like [$]130. And it's… It's not a gradual scale. You sort of at one point shoot through these levels and that's where you then end up.

 

Andrew Sheets: It's quite, quite serious stuff.

 

Martijn Rats: Well, yeah. Also, because we can casually say in the oil market, ‘Oh, demand erosion has to be the answer.’ But we don't erode demand in isolation. Like, you know, diesel is trucking. Yeah, jet is flying. NAFTA is petrochemicals.

 

Andrew Sheets: These are real core parts of economic activity.

 

Martijn Rats: It's all GDP.

 

Andrew Sheets: So maybe Martijn, in conclusion, let me give you a slightly different scenario. Let's say that the conflict goes on for another couple of weeks, but then there is a resolution. Traffic goes back to normal. Walk us through a little bit of what that would mean. You know, kind of how long does it take to get back to normal in a market like this?

 

Martijn Rats: Yeah. So, if you say, weeks, I would say that is an uncomfortable period of time actually.

 

Andrew Sheets: Feel free to use a slightly different scenario.

 

Martijn Rats: If you say days. Let's say next week something happens, the whole thing comes soon to end. Look, then we will have logistical supply chain issues. But look, we can work through that.

 

There is at the moment somewhat of an air pocket in the global oil supply chain. There should be oil tankers on their way to refineries for arrival in April and May that currently are not. So, we will have hiccups and things need to be rerouted and we draw on some inventories here or there, but… And that will keep commodity prices tense, I would imagine. The equity market will probably look through it.

 

We'll have a month or six weeks, not more than two months, I would imagine of logistical issues to sort out. Look, of course, if that, you know, doesn't happen, then we're back in the scenario that we discussed. But yeah, look, that that's equally true. If it's short, we can sort of live with a disruption.

 

Andrew Sheets: It's fair to say that this is a situation where days really matter, where weeks make a big difference.

 

Martijn Rats: Oh, totally. Look, the oil industry has built in various, sort of, compensatory measures, I think. You know, inventories along the supply chains. But nothing of the scale that can work with this. I mean, this is truly yet another order of magnitude.

 

Andrew Sheets: Martijn, thank you for taking the time to talk.

 

Martijn Rats: My pleasure.

 

Andrew Sheets: And thank you as always for your time. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving review wherever you listen. And also tell a friend or colleague about us today.

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