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Form ADV Part 2A – Disclosure Brochure

March 15, 2014

This Brochure provides information about the qualifications and business practices of The Roosevelt Investment Group, Inc. (Roosevelt Investments). If you have any questions about the contents of this brochure, please contact Kathryn Mogan, Compliance Manager, at (646)452-6700. The information in this brochure has not been approved or verified by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission or by any state securities authority.

Roosevelt Investments is a Registered Investment Adviser. Registration of an Investment Adviser does not imply any level of skill or training.

Additional information about Roosevelt Investments also is available on the SEC's website at www.adviserinfo.sec.gov.

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Item 2: Material Changes

This item discusses only material changes made to this brochure since our last annual update, dated March 31, 2013. The following material changes have been made and further described in the brochure.

RSTIX: On November 30, 2013 the Roosevelt Strategic Income Fund (RSTIX) was closed.

Heckman Global Advisors: As of January 31, 2014 we no longer maintain any affiliation with Heckman Global Advisors including the international strategies.

During the Third Quarter of 2013, Adam Sheer and David Sheer were named Co-Chief Executive Officers and James Rogers was named the President. Arthur Sheer, previously the Chief Executive Officer, remains the Chief Investment Officer and Co-Chairman of the Board.

Item 3: Table of Contents

Item 4: Advisory Business

Description of Advisory Firm

Roosevelt Investments is a Manhattan-based Investment Adviser, registered with the Securities and Exchange commission. We trace our origins to the advisory firm P. James Roosevelt, Inc., which began in 1971.

Here is a summary of important dates in our history.

1971	P. James Roosevelt, a cousin of former President Theodore Roosevelt, founded the Investment Advisory firm, P. James Roosevelt, Inc.
1990	Sheer Asset Management is founded by Arthur Sheer.
1993	P. James Roosevelt, Inc., changes its name to The Roosevelt Investment Group, Inc.
2002	The Roosevelt Investment Group, Inc. merges into Sheer Asset Management. The newly combined firm retains the Roosevelt name and Arthur Sheer as the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Investment Officer, and controlling shareholder.
2005	Roosevelt Investments acquires the advisory firm, Ehrlich Meyers Associates, bringing aboard Robert Meyer as a portfolio manager.
2011	Roosevelt Investments expands fixed income offerings with the addition of Howard S. Potter, a senior fixed income portfolio manager with over 30 years of experience.
2013	Roosevelt Investments announces changes to its executive management team. Adam J. Sheer and David L. Sheer are named Co-Chief Executive Officers and James C. Rogers, CIMA has been appointed President. Arthur H. Sheer remains the Chief Investment Officer and Co-Chairman of the Board.

As of December 31, 2013, our Assets Under Advisement were approximately $4.71Billion. This figure consists of:

- $2,663,229,196managed on a discretionary basis;

- $127,555,437managed on a non-discretionary basis;

- $1,924,783,864in *Advisory-Only-Assets* which are assets in the UMA Programs where we only provide investment models.

Our Approach to Investing

Roosevelt Investments' approach to investing is founded on our internal research. We believe that our team of research professionals allows us to find hidden investment opportunities for our clients.

In conducting our research, we use a broad spectrum of information, including without limitation financial publications, annual reports, prospectuses, regulatory filings, company press releases, corporate rating services, inspections of corporate activities, and meetings with management of various companies. Our investment professionals also use third-party research providers and data services to supplement their own research.

Using this research, our portfolio managers implement various strategies for our clients' portfolios. Our chief investment strategies and services include:

Domestic Equity Strategies: actively managed strategies that break away from the traditional mold of style box investing and pursue a flexible approach. These strategies look for both stocks that are out of favor and considered undervalued (Value), as well as stocks with under-appreciated growth potential (Growth). Furthermore, investments in international companies may be made, though these products predominantly purchase stock of domestic companies.

These strategies typically employ our **Thematic process**, which is a synthesis of top-down and bottom-up methods. Through this forward-looking approach we seek to capitalize on the undercurrents of structural, economic, political, social, demographic, and/or industry-specific change. Once identified, this perspective is constantly reviewed and acts as a framework for further investment analysis.

Additionally, these strategies employ our **Active Risk Management process**, whereby risk is defined in terms of capital preservation and not as deviation from a benchmark. The goal of this process is to provide protection in down markets. Our opinion of both the risk in the market and inherent in our portfolio, determined by the results of various models and the evaluation of key economic data, might signal to us that it would be appropriate to implement any one or a combination of risk tools that may include but are not limited to:

- Flexibility in the deployment of cash (Max 30%), TIPS ETFs, Zero-Coupon Treasury (Strips) ETFs, precious metal-related securities, and inverse and leveraged-inverse ETFs
- Natural Hedges
-

Fixed Income Strategies: Include both global and domestic actively managed multi-sector fixed income strategies across the risk/return spectrum. Our **Active Risk Management** and **Thematic** processes may be used in our global fixed income strategy, but not typically employed in our domestic fixed income strategies.

Our Domestic Equity and Fixed Income strategies are available as separately managed accounts. Furthermore, the All Cap Core equity strategy is available as a mutual fund that is invested in a largely similar fashion as the separately managed accounts. Additionally, the specific strategies are discussed further in Item 8, below.

Types of Advisory Services

We offer the following advisory services:

Private Client Group

Through our Private Client Group (PCG), we provide advisory services to high net-worth individuals, trusts, Taft-Hartley plans, endowments, foundations, government entities, cemetery trusts, and other entities. PCG offers clients on-going advisory services

based on the goals, objectives, time horizon, and risk tolerance of each client. While the advice given to clients is tailored to the unique circumstances of our private clients, we use a number of centrally managed strategies in the implementation of a client's investment portfolio.

The advisory services are available either as separately managed accounts, with certain minimum investment requirements, or as mutual funds in which Roosevelt Investments acts as the adviser to the fund. For individually managed accounts, we request discretionary authority from clients so that we may select securities and execute transactions without permission from the client prior to each transaction.

Clients may restrict us from investing in certain securities or types of securities. We review these requests on a case-by-case basis.

Adviser to Wrap Fee Programs

We provide portfolio management services to high net-worth individuals, trusts, Taft-Hartley plans, endowments, foundations, government entities, cemetery trusts, and other entities in different Wrap Fee Programs (also known as "separately managed account programs or "SMA" programs). These services are tailored to the client, and are based on the client's individual goals, objectives, time horizon, and risk tolerance. We are paid a portion of the advisory fee the client pays to the firm that sponsors the SMA program. The management of SMA accounts is similar to how we manage PCG client accounts; however in some SMA programs the sponsor of the program may determine the investment strategy's suitability for the client and other programs may request that we participate in that process.

Clients may restrict us from investing in certain securities or types of securities. We review these requests on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, clients may terminate Roosevelt Investments as their manager in a SMA program at any time. The procedures for termination and information regarding the refund of any prepaid fees are described in the SMA sponsor's brochure.

Advisement of Pooled Investment Vehicles

We serve as an adviser to a mutual fund, The Roosevelt Multi-Cap Fund. We manage this pooled investment vehicle in keeping with the prospectus. We also serve as adviser to the Roosevelt International Fund, LP and the Roosevelt Beta Plus Fund, LP, further described in Item 10.

Investment Model Provider for Unified Managed Accounts (UMA)

We have relationships with numerous Registered Investment Advisers (also known as an "Overlay Manager" in connection with a UMA platform) where we provide a model portfolio to the Overlay Manager in their UMA platform. The Overlay Manager uses this model portfolio as a guide on how to invest their clients' accounts. The Overlay Manager may purchase and sell the investment within its clients' accounts at the same time, prior to, or after Roosevelt purchases and sells the same investment for its advisory clients. The resulting UMA trading activity could have a positive or negative impact on Roosevelt's ability to execute trades for its clients. This is because the UMA may affect the availability of securities in the marketplace and the securities' prices. Roosevelt seeks to mitigate the potential effect of this trading activity by pursuing the practices described in "Trade Rotation" described further in Item 12, below.

These client accounts typically pay an advisory fee to the Overlay Manager, and we are paid a portion of this fee. This service is impersonal and not tailored to client needs because we have no knowledge of the clients' identities or financial situations. We do not offer any additional services to UMA accounts and the Overlay Manager is responsible for all trading and client interaction. UMA assets under management are not considered Roosevelt assets under management and therefore not included in our AUM calculations. However, since we do earn revenue from UMA accounts, we do include them in our Assets Under Advisement calculation.

Consulting Services to Banks and other Fiduciaries

We offer consultations to Banks and other Fiduciaries that include advice regarding our views on financial markets and security recommendations.

Financial Planning Services

We offer financial planning services on topics such as retirement planning, college savings, cash flow, debt management, and estate and incapacity planning.

Financial planning is a comprehensive evaluation of a client's current and future financial state by using currently known variables to predict future cash flows, asset values and withdrawal plans. Through the financial planning process, questions, information and analysis may be considered as they impact and are impacted by the entire financial and life situation of the client.

In general, the financial plan may address any or all of the following areas of concern. The client and advisor generally work together to select the specific areas to cover. These areas may include, but are not limited to, the following:

Retirement Planning: Our retirement planning services typically include projections of your likelihood of achieving your financial goals, typically focusing on financial independence as the primary objective. For situations where projections show less than the desired results, we may make recommendations, including those that may impact the original projections by adjusting certain variables (i.e., working longer, saving more, spending less, taking more risk with investments).

College Savings: Includes projecting the amount that will be needed to achieve college or other post-secondary education funding goals, along with advice on ways for you to save the desired amount. Recommendations as to savings strategies may be included, and, if needed, we may review your financial picture as it relates to eligibility for financial aid or the best way to contribute to grandchildren (if appropriate).

Cash Flow and Debt Management: We may conduct a review of your income and expenses to determine your current surplus or

deficit along with advice on prioritizing how any surplus should be used or how to reduce expenses if they exceed your income. Advice may also be provided on which debts to pay off first based on factors such as the interest rate of the debt and any income tax ramifications. We may also recommend what we believe to be an appropriate cash reserve that should be considered for emergencies and other financial goals, along with a review of accounts (such as money market funds) for such reserves, plus strategies to save desired amounts.

Estate Planning: This usually includes an analysis of your exposure to estate taxes and your current estate plan, which may include whether you have a will, powers of attorney, trusts and other related documents. Our advice also typically includes ways for you to minimize or avoid future estate taxes by implementing appropriate estate planning strategies such as the use of applicable trusts.

Financial Goals: We may help clients identify financial goals and develop a plan to reach them. We may identify what you plan to accomplish, what resources you will need to make it happen, how much time you will need to reach the goal, and how much you should budget for your goal.

Investment Analysis: This may involve providing information on the types of investment vehicles available, employee stock options, investment analysis and strategies, asset selection and portfolio design, as well as assisting you in establishing your own investment account at a selected broker/dealer or custodian. The strategies and types of investments we may recommend are further discussed in Item 8 of this brochure.

We currently do not charge a fee for our financial planning services.

Item 5: Fees and Compensation

How we are paid depends on the type of advisory service we are providing, but generally we are compensated on the basis of fees calculated as a percentage of a client's assets under management. Please see below for fee and compensation information for each of our services.

Standard Advisory Fee

Private Client Group

Our basic fee schedules for our major investment strategies are listed in Appendix A. The minimum account sizes for most accounts are listed in Item 7.

The fee we charge is listed in a client's written agreement with us. Clients may choose to be billed directly for fees or to have us directly debit fees from their accounts. We will refund fees on a pro-rated basis upon termination of the advisory agreement. In certain circumstances, fees are negotiable.

Typically, fees are billed quarterly in advance. In the event that a client terminates their account mid-quarter they would be refunded the pro-rata share for the remainder of the quarter.

Wrap Fee Programs

The SMA programs described in Item 4 generally provide for an all-inclusive fee. This fee generally covers advisory fees, trade execution, reports of activity, custodial services, and the recommendation and monitoring of investment managers. In circumstances where Roosevelt is granted brokerage discretion, we may block client trade orders and trade away at a Broker/Dealer that is not the Wrap Program sponsor. When this occurs, an institutional per share commission rate, between $0.015 and $0.05 per share may be applied to the price of the security and no further disclosure is given to the client. As a result, this commission is not included in the wrap fee.

As an investment manager on SMA programs, our compensation is a portion of the total managed account program fee paid to the sponsor by the client.

Advisement of Pooled Investment Vehicles

The investment advisory fee charged to the registered investment company in which Roosevelt Investments serves as adviser are disclosed in the prospectuses of such investment companies and currently range between 0.60% and 1.0% of the fund's net assets.

Investment Model Provider to Investment Firms

The UMA programs described in Item 4 generally provide for an all-inclusive fee, which covers advisory fees, trade execution, reports of activity, custodial services, and the recommendation and monitoring of model providers.

As a model provider on UMA programs, we receive as compensation a portion of the total managed account program fee paid to the overlay manager by the client.

Consulting Services to Banks and other Fiduciaries

Our management fee for such services is a minimum of $30,000 per year, paid in advance on a quarterly basis.

Other Types of Fees and Expenses

Our fees do not include brokerage commissions, transaction fees, and other brokerage related costs and expenses that are paid by the client. Clients pay fees imposed by custodians, brokers, and other third parties that could include the following:

- fees charged by managers,
- custodial fees,
- brokerage commissions,
- deferred sales charges,
- odd-lot differentials,
- transfer taxes,
- wire transfer and electronic fund fees,
- and/or other fees and taxes on brokerage accounts and securities transactions.

Item 12 further describes the factors that we consider in selecting or recommending broker-dealers for client transactions and how

we determine that the commissions paid to the broker-dealers are reasonable.

We may include mutual funds and ETFs in our investment strategies. Mutual funds and ETFs charge expense ratios, and may charge commissions as well. These charges are in addition to our fee, and we do not receive any portion of these charges. This is called *layering of fees*.

*An **expense ratio** is a measurement of what it costs to operate a mutual fund or ETF. Operating expenses, which includes the management fee, are taken out of a fund's assets and lower the return to a fund's investors.*

For example, the table below demonstrates this *layering of fees* for a single ETF position.

Type of Fee	Annual Fee	**Annual Fee Paid** (based on $10,000 position in the ETF)
Roosevelt Investments' Advisory Fee	1.00%	$100.00
ETF Expense Ratio	0.90%	$90.00
Total Paid by Client	**1.90%**	**$190.00**

When a client invests in a mutual fund where we are the adviser, we do not bill the client an advisory fee because we will be compensated from the fund's expense ratio. Additionally, depending on the share class of the mutual fund, the fund may pay annual distribution charges, sometimes referred to as "12b-1 fees".

As well, the client's assets invested in a mutual fund in which we are the adviser are subject to the management fee associated with the mutual fund. That fee also includes charges for administration and accounting services for the fund, therefore the investor in a mutual fund will incur a higher total management fee if the mutual fund's expense ratio exceeds the rate the client would otherwise pay for the management of its assets.

Roosevelt Investments employs Regional Directors to support and enhance distribution of Roosevelt Investments' investment strategies through the SMA and UMA sponsor firms with which we have a contract. The Regional Directors receive various forms of compensation, including based on a percentage of revenue from existing SMA and UMA accounts. We believe that this practice does not present a conflict of interest since it is the SMA/UMA sponsoring firm (not the Roosevelt Regional Director) that decides whether the client should invest with Roosevelt Investments.

In our Private Client Group, we employ personnel to support and enhance the distribution of Roosevelt Investments advisory services directly to our target client base. The personnel receive various forms of compensation, including based on a percentage of revenue received from existing client accounts. Additionally, the level of compensation can be dependent on the investment strategy selected (for example equity accounts have a higher advisory fee then fixed income accounts). To ensure client suitability standards are met under this practice, new client accounts are generally reviewed and approved by Roosevelt compliance and/or management. Furthermore, regular reviews are conducted to ensure the appropriateness of the investment strategy.

Item 6: Performance-Based Fees and Side-By-Side Management

Roosevelt Investments provides advisory services to a variety of different clients including a mutual special portfolios on a sub-advisory basis, institutional accounts, ERISA accounts, and investment partnerships. We also have a variety of compensation structures, outlined in Item 5, which includes *performance-based fees*.

Item 7: Types of Clients

We provide investment management services to individuals, trusts, Taft-Hartley plans, endowments, foundations, government entities, business entities, pension plans, profit sharing plans, 401k plans, money purchase plans, banks or thrift institutions, cemetery trusts, investment companies, private investment funds, , and institutional DVP accounts.

For our Private Client Group, we require a minimum investment of $300,000 per client household. The strategy specific minimums for our Private Client Group are as follows.

Minimum Investment Requirements	
All Cap Core	$100,000
Large Cap Core	$100,000
Select Equity	$100,000
Global Enhanced Fixed Income	$300,000
Current Income Portfolio	$100,000
Core Fixed Income	$100,000
Intermediate Fixed Income	$100,000

The minimum account size for an account we manage in a SMA Program varies by sponsor, but generally is $100,000.

Item 8: Methods of Analysis, Investment Strategies, and Risk of Loss

Roosevelt Investments is a multi-strategy investment adviser, so it is possible that certain methods of analysis, investment strategies, and risks, discussed below, may not apply to our management of any particular client's account or investment product. The specific investment strategies and risks associated with a client's account may be described in more detail in presentations, investment guidelines, marketing materials and other documents provided, or discussions held, with that client or investment guidelines provided by the client (or in the case of Wrap Accounts, provided in the Wrap Sponsor's brochure or other program documentation).

Our Investment Process

As previously discussed in Item 4, our portfolio managers and analysts create proprietary research with which to base investment decisions for our various investment strategies. Our investment professionals have experience researching and investing in many types of securities and asset classes, including common and preferred stocks, convertible securities, government and corporate fixed-income securities, commodities, bank obligations, foreign securities, real estate-related assets, ETFs, MLPs, and oil and gas interests.

Methods of Analysis

We use the following methods of analysis in formulating investment advice:

- **Fundamental Analysis** involves reviewing financial statements to understand the general financial health of a company, and reviewing the management team or advantages the company may have over competitors. We also try to maintain contact with the management teams of the companies in which we invest or are under

consideration for investment. We regularly hold conference calls or host face-to-face meetings with company management and attend corporate presentations. This helps us learn the most we can about a company and any relevant changes to the economic landscape. The risk of fundamental analysis is that information obtained may be incorrect and the analysis may not provide a basis for a security's value. If securities prices adjust rapidly to new information, utilizing fundamental analysis may not result in favorable performance.

- **Technical Analysis** involves the analysis of past market data: specifically price and volume, and the use of patterns in performance charts. We may use this technique to search for patterns that help predict favorable conditions for buying or selling a security. The risk of investing based on technical analysis is that current prices of securities may not reflect all information known about the security and day to day changes in market prices may follow random patterns, which are unpredictable with any reliable degree of accuracy, resulting in the analysis not accurately predicting future price movements.
- **Cyclical Analysis** involves the analysis of business cycles to find favorable conditions for buying or selling a security. Economic/business cycles may not be predictable and may have many fluctuations between long term expansions and contractions. The lengths of economic cycles may be difficult to predict with accuracy and therefore the risk of cyclical analysis is the difficulty in predicting economic trends and consequently the changing value of securities that would be affected by these changing trends.
- **Quantitative Analysis** seeks to understand market behavior by using complex mathematical and statistical modeling, measurement, and research. The risks associated with this type of analysis include that Quantitative models may be based on assumptions and subjective judgments that may prove to be incorrect. In using this method of analysis, we also rely on publicly

available sources of information, which may be inaccurate or misleading.

Investment Strategies

All Cap Core Equity invests primarily in domestic common stock. Investment opportunity is pursued regardless of style or capitalization (usually investing in companies with a market capitalization of $1 billion or greater), and investment in stock of international companies may also be made.

Large Cap Core Equity invests primarily in domestic common stock. Investment opportunity is pursued regardless of style and investment in stock of international companies may also be made. It targets investment opportunities with a market cap of $3 billion or above.

Select Equity invests primarily in domestic common stock. Investment opportunity is pursued regardless of style or capitalization (usually investing in companies with a market capitalization of $1 billion or greater), and investment in stock of international companies may also be made. This strategy typically invests in fewer holdings than our other Domestic Equity strategies.

Global Enhanced Fixed Income may invest in domestic and foreign corporate and sovereign bonds. Investments in convertible securities, Eurodollar bonds, domestic preferred stock, as well as certain risk mitigation tools (such as leveraged inverse ETFs) may also be made. The strategy seeks to maximize total return through a combination of current income and capital appreciation from the active management of U.S. and international fixed income instruments. The strategy is not limited by geography, currency, or credit quality.

Current Income Portfolio seeks to provide high current income through a portfolio comprised primarily of short and intermediate term, investment-grade corporate and agency obligations, and relatively liquid preferred stock positions. Preferred stock positions serve as a portfolio income enhancer as the incremental risk for assuming a lower credit position in a company's capital

structure produces higher income streams than comparable bonds of the same company.

Intermediate Fixed Income seeks to provide capital appreciation and preservation while generating current income and modest capital appreciation. The strategy maintains a high quality credit portfolio and invests primarily in U.S. Treasuries, U.S. Agencies, and investment-grade corporate obligations that are short and intermediate-term in nature. Duration is controlled to limit interest rate sensitivity.

Core Fixed Income seeks to provide current income, capital appreciation and capital preservation. The strategy maintains a high quality credit portfolio and primarily invests in U.S. government, agency, and corporate obligations. The strategy may invest in debt securities of any maturity, though the portfolio tends to maintain an intermediate-term weighted average duration.

Material Risks Involved

Investing in securities involves risk of loss that clients should be prepared to bear. Additionally, we cannot guarantee that we will achieve the stated investment objectives of our strategies. The value of your investment in a Roosevelt Investments strategy may be affected by one or more of the following risks, any of which could cause the portfolio's return or the portfolio's yield to fluctuate:

Market Risk: Market risk involves the possibility that an investment's current market value will fall because of a general market decline, reducing the value of the investment regardless of the operational success of the issuer's operations or its financial condition.

Management Risk*:* The adviser's strategy may fail to produce the intended results.

Style Risk: Any of our strategies may invest in both "value" investments and "growth" investments. With respect to securities and investments we consider undervalued, the market may not agree with our determination that the security is undervalued, and its price may not increase to what we believe to be its full value. It may even decrease in value. With respect to "growth" investments, the underlying earnings or operational growth we anticipate may not occur, or the market price of the security may not increase as we expect it to.

Defensive Risk: To the extent that the strategy attempts to hedge its portfolio stocks or takes defensive measures, such as holding a significant portion of its assets in cash or cash equivalents, the objective may not be achieved.

Small and Medium Cap Company Risk: Securities of companies with small and medium market capitalizations are often more volatile and less liquid than investments in larger companies. Small and medium cap companies may face a greater risk of business failure, which could increase the volatility of the client's portfolio.

Turnover Risk: At times, the strategy may have a portfolio turnover rate that is higher than other strategies. A high portfolio turnover would result in correspondingly greater brokerage commission expenses and may result in the distribution of additional capital gains for tax purposes. These factors may negatively affect the account's performance.

Developing Market Countries: The strategies' investments in developing market countries are subject to all of the risks of foreign investing generally, and may have additional heightened risks due to a lack of established legal, political, business, and social frameworks to support securities markets, including: delays in settling portfolio securities transactions; currency and capital controls; greater sensitivity to interest rate changes; pervasiveness of corruption and crime; currency exchange rate volatility; and inflation, deflation, or currency devaluation.

Emerging Market Countries: Emerging market countries are subject to all the risks of developing market counties generally, and have additional risks due to a lack of established legal, political, business and social frameworks to support capital markets, including: delays in settling portfolio securities transactions; currency and capital controls; greater sensitivity to interest rate changes; pervasiveness of corruption and crime; currency exchange rate volatility; and inflation, deflation or currency devaluation.

Frontier Market Countries: Frontier market countries generally have smaller companies and less developed capital markets than traditional developing and emerging markets. The increased risks are the result of: potential for extreme price volatility and illiquidity in frontier markets; government ownership or control of parts of private sector and of certain companies; trade barriers, exchange controls, managed adjustments in relative currency values and other protectionist measures imposed or negotiated by the countries with which frontier market countries trade; and the relatively new and unsettled securities laws in many frontier market countries.

Availability of Information: Certain issuers, including municipalities, private companies, and foreign issuers may not be subject to the same disclosure, accounting, auditing, and financial reporting standards and practices as companies publicly-listed in U.S. stock markets. Thus, there may be less information publicly available about these issuers and their current financial condition.

Limited Markets: Certain securities may be less liquid (harder to sell) and their prices may at times be more volatile than at other times. Under certain market conditions we may be unable to sell or liquidate investments at prices we consider reasonable or favorable, or find buyers at any price.

Concentration Risk: To the extent that the strategy focuses on particular asset-classes, countries, regions, industries, sectors, or types of investment from time to time, the strategy may be subject to greater risks of adverse developments in such areas of focus than a strategy that invests is more broadly diversified across a wider variety of investments.

Interest Rate: Bond (fixed income) prices generally fall when interest rates rise, and the value may fall below par value or the principal investment. The opposite is also generally true: bond prices generally rise when interest rates fall. In general, fixed income securities with longer maturities are more sensitive to these price changes.

Credit: An issuer of debt securities may fail to make interest payments and repay principal when due, in whole or in part. Changes in an issuer's financial strength or in a security's credit rating may affect a security's value.

Prepayment or Call Risk: The issuer of a debt security may prepay or call the debt, in whole or in part, prior to the security's maturity date. We may be unable to reinvest the proceeds in a security of equivalent quality or paying a similar yield or coupon.

Trading Practices: Brokerage commissions and other fees may be higher in certain markets or for foreign securities. Government supervision and regulation of foreign securities markets, currency markets, trading systems, and brokers may be less than those in

the U.S. stock markets. The procedures and rules governing foreign transactions and custody also may involve delays in payment, delivery, or recovery of money or investments.

Legal or Legislative Risk: Legislative changes or court rulings may impact the value of investments, or the securities' claim on the issuer's assets and finances.

Inflation: Inflation may erode the buying power of your investment portfolio, even if the dollar value of your investments remains the same.

Risks of Specific Securities Used

Apart from the general risks outlined above which apply to all types of investments, specific securities may have other risks.

Bank Obligations including bonds and certificates of deposit may be vulnerable to setbacks or panics in the banking industry. Banks and other financial institutions are highly dependent on short-term interest rates and may be adversely affected by downturns in the U.S. and foreign economies or changes in banking regulations.

Commodities may be subject to extreme changes in price due to supply factors, changes in weather, and trade impacts.

Common stocks have often outperformed other types of investments at certain times, however, individual stock prices may go up and down more dramatically. A slower-growth or recessionary economic environment could have an adverse effect on the price of all stocks.

Corporate bonds may lose all value in the event of the issuer's bankruptcy or restructuring.

Currency can lose value when their market value in U.S. dollars is negatively affected by changes in exchange rates between such foreign currencies and the U.S. dollar, as well as between currencies of countries other than the U.S.

Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) prices may vary significantly from the Net Asset Value due to market conditions. Certain Exchange Traded Funds may not track underlying benchmarks as expected.

Foreign Securities including American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) may involve more risk than investing in U.S. securities. These risks include currency exchange rates and policies, country or government specific issues, less favorable trading practices or regulation and greater price volatility.

High Yield Debt Securities are lower-rated debt securities of issuers that are not as strong financially as those issuing higher credit quality debt securities. These issues are more likely to encounter financial difficulties and are more vulnerable to changes in the economy, such as a recession or sustained period of rising interest rates, that could affect their ability to make interest and principal payments when due. The prices of high yield debt securities generally fluctuate more than those of higher credit quality. These securities are generally more illiquid (harder to sell) and harder to value.

Inverse and/or Leveraged ETFs are securities that attempt to replicate multiples of the performance of an underlying financial index. Inverse ETFs are designed to replicate the opposite direction of these same indices, often at a multiple. These ETFs often use a combination of futures, swaps, short sales, and other derivatives to achieve these objectives. Most leveraged and inverse ETFs are designed to achieve these results on a daily basis only. This means that over periods longer than a trading day, the value of these ETFs can and usually do deviate from the performance of the index they are designed to track. Over longer periods of time or in situations of high volatility, these deviations can be substantial.

Municipal/Government bonds are susceptible to events in the municipality that issued the bond or the security posted for the bond. These events may include economic or political policy changes, changes in law, tax base erosion, state constitutional limits on tax increases, budget deficits or other financial

difficulties, and changes in the credit rating assigned to municipal issues.

Oil and Gas Interests may lose value due to changes in commodity prices, costs associated with transport of oil/gas, seasonal factors, or technological advances that impact the demand for oil and gas.

Please note that there are many other circumstances not described here that could adversely affect your investment and prevent your portfolio from reaching its objective.

Investors in the mutual fund in which Roosevelt Investments acts as Adviser should review the prospectus used to offer those shares.

Item 9: Disciplinary Information

There are no legal or disciplinary events that we deem are material to a client's or prospective client's evaluation of our firm or the integrity of our management.

Item 10: Other Financial Industry Activities and Affiliations

Registration as a Broker/Dealer or Registered Representative

We currently have management persons that are registered representatives of Unified Financial Securities, Inc., the distributor to the Roosevelt Multi-Cap Fund.

In the normal course of their employment with Roosevelt Investments, adviser to the Roosevelt Multi-Cap Fund, their activities, which may include wholesaling, marketing, and other financial professional contact, require the holding of a securities license. They do not receive compensation from Unified Financial Securities.

Relationships Material to Our Advisory Business and Possible Conflicts of Interest

We serve as the investment adviser to the Roosevelt Multi-Cap Fund, a mutual fund distributed by Unified Financial Securities, Inc., Our advisory services are supervised by the Board of Trustees for the fund, all of whom are independent of Roosevelt Investments.

Roosevelt Investments is the investment adviser to the Roosevelt International Fund, LP and the Roosevelt Beta Plus Fund, LP. These investment vehicles were created as seed accounts to build performance track records for two separate strategies. Interests in these partnerships are not registered and are only available to certain Roosevelt employees.

In many cases, these vehicles invest in strategies similar to those offered through our Private Client Group or SMA Program services; however they may invest in strategies not available to all clients. Certain employees and shareholders of Roosevelt Investments have an investment interest in the partnerships and

their general partners. Roosevelt Investments policies take steps to avoid or mitigate these potential conflicts.

Item 11: Code of Ethics, Participation or Interest in Client Transactions and Personal Trading

Code of Ethics

We have adopted a Code of Ethics, as required under the Investment Adviser's Act of 1940 and the Investment Company's Act of 1940, which describes our standard of business conduct, and our fiduciary duty to our clients. Additionally, it serves as a guide to make our employees aware of what conduct and behavior is expected of them, including their personal securities transactions, and rules against trading upon material nonpublic information so they do not take inappropriate advantage of their positions and the access to information that comes with their position.

The Code of Ethics covers the following areas: Prohibited Purchases and Sales, Insider Trading, Personal Securities Transactions, Exempted Transactions, Prohibited Activities, Conflicts of Interest, Confidentiality, Service on a Board of Directors, Compliance Procedures, Compliance with Laws and Regulations, Procedures and Reporting, Certification of Compliance, Reporting Violations, Compliance Officer Duties, Recordkeeping, Annual Review, and Sanctions.

We will provide a copy of our Code of Ethics to any client or prospective client upon request.

Recommendations Involving Material Financial Interests

We serve as the Investment Adviser to the Roosevelt Multi-Cap Fund, for which we receive a management fee, calculated at the annual rate of 0.90% for this service. When appropriate for the client, all or a portion of client assets may be invested in the fund

as part of our investment management services. Clients have the right, at any time, to prohibit us from investing any of their managed assets in the fund.

Because we are paid by the mutual fund itself, we do not charge the client an advisory fee for this investment.

Investing Personal Money in the Same Securities as Clients

Roosevelt Investments does not manage any "proprietary" investment accounts – i.e., accounts that are funded with the firm's own money and are intended to create profits for the firm. However, we may participate or have an interest in client transactions several other ways, which are described below.

Firm and Employee Investments

Personal trading by employees is allowed. Employees may own the same securities as clients; however we require that client accounts take priority over an employee's personal trading.

The following is a portion of our Personal Securities Transaction policy and applies to all employees.

Personal Securities Transaction policy covers any account that an employee, or member of their household, has direct or indirect ownership, influence, or control.

We require preapproval for personal trades that involve Private Placements, IPOs, or mutual funds in which we are the Adviser.

We maintain a restricted list of securities that we are currently trading. Personal trading of these securities is not allowed on the same day we are trading for our clients.

If a same-day trade is executed by an employee, then the trade is reviewed by the Chief Compliance Officer to determine client impact and sanction of employee.

Personal accounts that are managed by Roosevelt Investments, or another Investment Adviser (on a fully discretionary basis), are not subject to the same-day restriction.

Employees are required to have their custodian(s) send electronic feeds, or duplicate statements if electronic feed is not available, to our vendor of pre-

trade clearance, employee monitoring, and reporting. Employee trades are then compared against client trades and other criteria.

Employees should not purchase or sell securities for their own accounts or for client accounts which would involve the use of material "inside" information known to such employee but not generally available to the public, or by using knowledge of securities transactions by a client to profit personally, directly or indirectly, by the market effect of such transactions.

New employees are required to provide a copy of statements for all personal accounts that are covered by the Personal Securities Transaction policy. These accounts are then reviewed and added to the monitoring system.

Trading Securities At/Around the Same Time as Clients' Accounts

As previously discussed, Roosevelt Investments does not buy securities for its own account. Therefore no potential conflict of interest exists at the firm level. However, personal trading by employees is allowed. In some cases, employees may desire to trade securities that our clients also own. The potential conflicts of interest are addressed with our Personal Securities Transactions policy, Code of Ethics, trade allocation and inside information policies.

Item 12: Brokerage Practices

Broker Selection and Best Execution

Seeking the best trade execution is an important aspect of every trade that we place in a client account. Roosevelt Investments has a Best Execution Committee that consists of members of our Investment teams, Trading team, and Compliance team. The Best Execution Committee approves the brokers to be used to execute trades and determines the reasonableness of their compensation based on the range and quality of a broker's services including the quality of execution and services provided value of research provided, financial strength, and responsiveness to Roosevelt Investments.

We have controls in place for monitoring trade execution, including reviewing of trades for best execution.

Our trading staff may consider the following factors when placing a trade for a client with a particular approved broker.

Quality of overall execution services provided by the broker-dealer

Promptness of execution

Liquidity of the market for the security in question

Provision of dedicated telephone lines

Creditworthiness, business reputation, and reliability of the broker-dealer

Promptness and accuracy of oral, hard copy, or electronic reports of execution and confirmation statements

Ability and willingness to correct trade errors

Ability to access various market centers, including the market where the security trades

The broker-dealer's facilities, including any software or hardware provided to the adviser

Any specialized expertise the Broker-Dealer may have in executing trades for the particular type of security

Commission rates

Access to a specific IPO or to IPOs generally

Ability of the broker-dealer to use ECNs to gain liquidity, price improvement, lower commission rates, and anonymity

The broker-dealer's ability to provide for "step-out" transactions

For our clients that do not have a custodial relationship with a bank or SMA Sponsor, we generally recommend them to custody their account with TD Ameritrade, Inc.. We participate in the institutional advisor program offered by TD Ameritrade Institutional, which is a division of TD Ameritrade, Inc., member FINRA/SIPC/NFA, an unaffiliated SEC-registered broker-dealer and FINRA member.

TD Ameritrade offers to independent investment advisors, like Roosevelt Investments, services which include custody of securities, trade execution, and clearance and settlement of transactions. We receive some benefits from TD Ameritrade through our participation in the institutional advisor program, and therefore we may have a conflict of interest (please see Item 14 below).

Research and Other Soft Dollar Benefits

When selecting a broker to execute client trades, we do consider various factors that include research and brokerage services provided by the broker. This may result in a conflict between our duty to act in the best interests of our clients and any benefit that we may receive in result of that execution of client trades by a particular broker. This conflict is because (a) the selection of a broker that does provide us research may result in a higher fee to the client than that charged by a broker that does not provide us research and (b) the transaction may benefit us because the use of client commissions may relieve us of having to pay for those research services ourselves. Nevertheless, when selecting brokers for execution of client transactions, Roosevelt Investments does make a good faith determination that the amount of commission to be charged to the client is reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research services provided by the executing broker in terms of either the particular transaction or our overall responsibilities for all the accounts over which we exercise investment direction. Roosevelt Investments may use the research services provided in "soft dollar" arrangements to service all of its accounts and not just the accounts whose transactions paid for the research services. Moreover, it is possible that the accounts whose transactions generate brokerage commissions that are used to pay some of Roosevelt Investments' research obligations may not benefit in any way from this research.

We use an internal allocation procedure to identify those executing brokers who provide us with research services and direct sufficient transactions to them to ensure the continued offering of research. The determination of broker-dealers to

whom commissions are directed generally is made by the ranking of said broker-dealers by such characteristics as quality of research provided, accessibility to analysts, quality of execution, and accessibility to the broker-dealer in general.

We may use "soft dollar" arrangements to obtain a wide range of research (including proprietary research) and brokerage services from brokers, including: written information and analyses concerning specific securities, companies or sectors; financial and economic studies and forecasts; statistics and pricing services; stock price quotations and market; trade analysis; third party research reports (through "commission sharing arrangements"); as well as discussions with research personnel and meetings with senior management of companies whose securities are held in or may be held in client accounts. These soft dollar arrangements are designed to augment our own internal research and investment strategy capabilities.

Generally Roosevelt does not put a specific dollar value on proprietary research received from broker-dealers, believing that the research received is, in the aggregate, valuable to our clients. However, we may receive research from broker-dealers other than those we trade with, and enter into "soft dollar" arrangements in compliance with Section 28(e) of the Exchange Act pursuant for which such brokers are compensated for the research by broker-dealers with whom we executes transactions ("commission sharing arrangements"). In such cases, Roosevelt establishes what it believes is a fair value for such research.

We also use soft dollar arrangements to obtain services that serve partially an administrative function and are not entirely research or brokerage related. We refer to these arrangements as "mixed-use" and pay a portion of the costs from Roosevelt Investments revenue ("hard dollars"). In these instances, we have policies and procedures in place to define a reasonable allocation between soft dollars and hard dollars to pay for such arrangements. Examples of this would be our use of Bloomberg (used for both portfolio management and marketing).

Some of Roosevelt's clients have selected a broker-dealer to act as custodian for the clients' assets and direct Roosevelt to execute transactions through that broker-dealer. It is not Roosevelt's practice to negotiate commission rates with these broker-dealers. For clients who grant Roosevelt brokerage discretion, Roosevelt will block orders and all client transactions will be done at the same standard institutional per share commission rate. This rate is typically between $0.015 and $0.05 per share.

Brokerage for Client Referrals

In selecting broker-dealers, Roosevelt does not consider whether we have received client referrals from the broker-dealer. However, we may execute trades through Wrap Program Sponsors or other broker-dealers that may refer clients to Roosevelt. Additionally, a client may direct Roosevelt to trade at a particular broker-dealer for their account. In some cases, the directed broker-dealer may have recommended Roosevelt as the Adviser for that account.

Directed Brokerage

Certain clients may direct Roosevelt Investments to effect transactions with specific brokers. We do not typically negotiate commissions charged by such brokers and these brokers may charge commissions in excess of that which another broker might have charged for effecting the same transaction. Accounts with directed brokerage instructions may be excluded from block trades, and generally are not able to take advantage of volume discounts. As a result, performance for these accounts may vary from accounts in the same strategy that do not have directed brokerage instructions, and these accounts may not be able to obtain best execution.

In addition, brokers that refer clients to us may expect trading for the client account to be directed to them. In this case, a conflict of interest exists between the client's interest in obtaining best execution and our interest in receiving future referrals from that broker. In the event that the client wishes to direct its brokerage to a specified broker-dealer, then the client has various brokerage options, including utilizing the services of: 1) the referring broker,

if any, 2) any other broker that the client desires, or 3) any firm retained by us to provide custody and execution services for clients. We may be able to negotiate more favorable commission rates when we have full brokerage discretion.

Some clients have arrangements with their securities brokerage firms under which the clients pay a separate fee to their brokerage firm and are not charged commissions on trades. Where appropriate, transactions for advisory clients may be batched for execution which will not ordinarily affect commissions charged on such transactions. In an effort to achieve best execution, we may trade away from the directed broker or SMA sponsor. These trades may be marked up with no further disclosure.

Aggregated Trades

Although we individually manage client accounts, we often will purchase or sell the same securities for many accounts if it is in the best interests of each client, consistent with our duty to seek best execution, and allowed in client agreements.

When possible, we will group the same transactions in the same securities (aggregate trade) for many clients who have the same directed brokerage firm. Also, when practical, we will aggregate the same transactions in the same securities for many clients for whom we have discretion to direct brokerage. Clients in an aggregated transaction will each receive the same price per share and no client will be favored over another client.

If we have to place more than one order to fill all orders in an aggregated transaction, each client in the aggregated transaction receives the average price for all orders placed for clients in the same aggregated transaction in the same security for that day. If we are unable to complete a trade, the shares are allocated to clients on a pro-rata basis, a random basis, or based on an equitable rotational system.

Some clients may be excluded from an aggregated trade because there is not enough cash in their account, they may have tax

consequences, they may have imposed restrictions on their account, or other administrative reasons.

Conflicts may arise in the allocation of investment opportunities among accounts that we advise on. We will attempt to allocate limited investment opportunities believed appropriate for certain accounts on a fair and equitable basis consistent with the best interests of all accounts involved. However, there can be no assurance that a particular investment opportunity will be allocated in any specific manner.

Trade Rotation

For our investment strategies that are available in one or more UMA programs (currently our All Cap Core Equity strategy), Roosevelt Investments utilizes a trade rotation to determine the order in which account groups will be traded in an effort to seek to soften market impact of trading and to create an orderly trading process. However, we may choose to deviate from this procedure within the discretion of our investment and trading teams, because of, among other reasons; a) the security involved; b) Roosevelt's view as to the best interest of affected clients; c) market conditions at the time of the order; or d) the investment strategy being traded for.

Roosevelt organizes account groups into a sequential trade order to determine the order in which it will trade the groups.

Accounts may be grouped together by client type, order management system used, or by executing broker-dealer. The groups, and each group's membership, may change over time. Our trading desk may aggregate orders within the specific group where possible, or may determine on a trade by trade basis the order of execution for the various members of that group at time of group execution. Because the UMA group includes multiple programs where we do not exercise discretion, a sequential sub-rotation within the group itself will be applied.

The sequential order is a static sequence that applies for the entire trade.

Public Offerings

Roosevelt Investments does not allocate initial public offerings ("IPO") securities or secondary offerings to separately managed accounts. There are two main reasons for this. First, a material number of the broker-dealer/sponsor firms will not accept these securities into accounts held at their firm, which would lead to performance dispersion between accounts managed in the same strategy. Second, it would be unlikely that we would be allocated the sufficient number of shares of an IPO or secondary offering needed to fill across all of our separately managed accounts.

We will, however, from time to time participate in an IPO or secondary offering for a mutual fund in which we serve as Adviser as long as the investment conforms to the mutual fund's prospectus and investment strategy.

Item 13: Review of Accounts

Client accounts are generally monitored for consistency with client objectives and restrictions. Portfolio managers and our Compliance team perform periodic reviews of client accounts on our internal portfolio accounting system. Among other reviews they may monitor account performance and asset allocation.

Special reviews of an account may be triggered by unusual performance, the addition or deletion of funds or change in/addition of client imposed restrictions, buy and sell decisions from the Investment Committee, or other client needs.

For SMA programs, Roosevelt Investments reviews and evaluates model strategies to ensure compliance with the strategy's investment objectives, policies, and restrictions.

We issue periodic written reports to our direct clients. These written reports generally contain a list of assets, investment results, and statistical data related to the client's account. We urge clients to carefully review these reports and compare the statements that they receive from their custodian to the reports that we provide.

SMA program clients receive reports from the program sponsor. We also respond to special requests of clients for ad hoc reports related to activity in their account including, for example, proxy voting.

Item 14: Client Referrals and Other Compensation

As disclosed under Item 12 above, we participate in TD Ameritrade's institutional customer program and we recommend TD Ameritrade to clients for custody and brokerage services. There is no direct link between our participation in the program and the investment advice we give to our clients, although we do receive economic benefits because of our participation in the program and these benefits are not typically available to TD Ameritrade retail investors.

These benefits include the following products and services (provided without cost or at a discount): receipt of duplicate client statements and confirmations; research related products and tools; consulting services; access to a trading desk serving Advisor participants; access to block trading (which provides the ability to aggregate securities transactions for execution and then allocate the appropriate shares to client accounts); the ability to have advisory fees deducted directly from Client accounts; access to an electronic communications network for Client order entry and account information; access to mutual funds with no transaction fees and to certain institutional money managers; and discounts on compliance, marketing, research, technology, and practice management products or services provided to Advisor by third party vendors. TD Ameritrade may also have paid for business consulting and professional services received by our employees.

Some of the products and services made available by TD Ameritrade through the program may benefit us but may not benefit our clients. These products or services may assist us in managing and administering client accounts, including accounts

not maintained at TD Ameritrade. Other services made available by TD Ameritrade are intended to help us manage and further develop our business enterprise. The benefits we receive through participation in the program do not depend on the amount of brokerage transactions directed to TD Ameritrade.

As part of our fiduciary duties to our clients, we endeavor at all times to put the interests of our clients first. Clients should be aware, however, that the economic benefits we receive creates a potential conflict of interest and may indirectly influence our choice of TD Ameritrade for custody and brokerage services.

We may receive client referrals from TD Ameritrade through our participation in TD Ameritrade AdvisorDirect. In addition to meeting the minimum eligibility criteria for participation in AdvisorDirect, we may have been selected to participate in AdvisorDirect based on the amount and profitability to TD Ameritrade of the assets in, and trades placed for, client accounts maintained with TD Ameritrade.

TD Ameritrade is a discount broker-dealer independent of and unaffiliated with Roosevelt Investments and there is no employee or agency relationship between us. TD Ameritrade has established AdvisorDirect as a means of referring its brokerage customers and other investors seeking fee-based personal investment management services or financial planning services to independent investment advisors. TD Ameritrade does not supervise us and has no responsibility for our management of client portfolios or our other advice or services.

We pay TD Ameritrade an on-going fee for each successful client referral. This fee is usually a percentage (not to exceed 25%) of the advisory fee that the client pays to us ("Solicitation Fee"). We will also pay TD Ameritrade the Solicitation Fee on any advisory fees we receive from any of a referred client's family members, including a spouse, child, or any other immediate family member who resides with the referred client and hired us on the recommendation of such referred client. We will not charge clients referred through AdvisorDirect any fees or costs higher than our standard fee schedule (see Item 5) offered to our clients

or otherwise pass Solicitation Fees paid to TD Ameritrade to our clients. For information regarding additional or other fees paid directly or indirectly to TD Ameritrade, please refer to the TD Ameritrade AdvisorDirect Disclosure and Acknowledgement Form.

Our participation in AdvisorDirect raises potential conflicts of interest. TD Ameritrade will most likely refer clients through AdvisorDirect to investment advisors that encourage their clients to custody their assets at TD Ameritrade and whose client accounts are profitable to TD Ameritrade. Consequently, in order to obtain client referrals from TD Ameritrade, we may have an incentive to recommend to clients that the assets we manage be held in custody with TD Ameritrade and to place transactions for client accounts with TD Ameritrade. In addition, we have agreed not to solicit clients referred to us through AdvisorDirect to transfer their accounts from TD Ameritrade or to establish brokerage or custody accounts at other custodians, except when our fiduciary duties require doing so. Our participation in AdvisorDirect does not diminish our duty to seek best execution of trades for client accounts.

We also have referral fee arrangements with other unaffiliated persons, in addition to TD Ameritrade. These arrangements comply with Rule 206(4)-3 and Rule 206(4)-5 requirements under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

Item 15: Custody

We have authority to debit fees directly from client accounts. For this reason only, we are deemed to have custody of client funds. Our client assets are held with broker/dealers, banks, or other qualified custodians. Clients should receive at least quarterly statements from their qualified custodian. We urge clients to carefully review such statements and compare the official custodial records to the account statements that we may provide to them. The information in our statements may vary from custodial statements based on accounting procedures, reporting dates, or valuation methodologies of certain securities.

Item 16: Investment Discretion

Roosevelt Investments provides both discretionary and non-discretionary investment advisory services. The vast majority of our clients grant discretion, which allows us to manage portfolios and make investment decisions without client consultation regarding the securities and other assets that are bought and sold for the account. In such accounts, we do not require client approval for the total amount of the securities and other assets to be bought and sold, the choice of executing brokers or the price and commission rates for such transactions.

We usually receive discretionary authority from the client at the outset of an advisory relationship to select the identity and amount of securities to be bought or sold. In all cases, however, such discretion is to be exercised in a manner consistent with the stated investment objectives for the particular client account.

When selecting securities and determining amounts, we observe the investment policies, limitations, and restrictions of the clients for which we advise. For registered investment companies, our authority to trade securities may also be limited by certain federal securities and tax laws that require diversification of investments and favor the holding of investments once made.

Investment guidelines and restrictions must be provided to us in writing by the client. We make every effort to manage restricted portfolios along with other clients within similar mandates. However, it is possible that security selection and trade placement may be delayed for these portfolios while we determine whether a proposed investment decision complies with the account guidelines and restrictions or identify alternatives. Accounts with investment restrictions may forfeit some of the advantages that may result from aggregated orders and may be disadvantaged by the market impact of trading for other portfolios.

Under certain circumstances on a case by case basis, Roosevelt may accept a client request to place an investment into their

advisory account. In most cases, this investment is an "unsupervised" asset, meaning that Roosevelt does not manage or provide advice regarding such asset. If a client holds an unsupervised asset in their advisory account, the client does so with the understanding that the unsupervised asset may not be included in account statements or performance reports provided by Roosevelt, and Roosevelt does not manage or provide advice regarding any unsupervised asset, even if the asset is included in account statements or performance reports provided to the client.

Item 17: Voting Client Securities

We vote our clients' securities in a manner that, in our opinion, is in our clients' best interests. We have established the following proxy voting policy.

Responsibility for Voting

We will not vote proxies solicited by or with respect to the issuers of securities in which assets of a client portfolio are invested, unless the client instructs us, in writing, to vote such proxies.

Primary Consideration in Voting

Our primary consideration in determining how proxies should be voted is the client's interest as a shareholder of that issuer. Except as otherwise specifically instructed by a client, we generally do not take into account interests of other stakeholders, of the issuer, or interests the client may have in other capacities.

Conflicts of Interest

There are circumstances in which a conflict of interest might arise by an Investment Adviser voting proxies on behalf of its client. This might occur where an issuer who is soliciting proxy votes also has a client relationship with the Adviser, when a client of the Adviser is involved in a proxy contest (such as a corporate director), or when an employee of the Adviser has a personal interest in a proxy matter.

We believe that our policy of voting in accordance with the recommendations of Glass Lewis (GL), which provides independent recommendations, ensures that proxies are voted solely in the best interests of clients and resolves any potential conflict of interest. In case we become aware that a GL recommendation results in a conflict of interest, such as described above, we will disclose the conflict to the client and obtain the client's consent or advice with respect to the voting based on GL recommendations.

Proxy Voting Records

Clients may also obtain information from us about how we voted any proxies on behalf of their account(s) upon request.

Proxy Voting Policy and Summary

Clients may obtain a copy of our complete proxy voting policies and procedures upon request.

Item 18: Financial Information

In certain circumstances, registered investment advisers are required to provide you with financial information or disclosures about their financial condition in this Item.

Roosevelt Investments has no financial commitment that impairs its ability to meet contractual and fiduciary commitments to clients and has never been the subject of a bankruptcy proceeding. Additionally, Roosevelt Investments does not receive fees more than six months in advance. Therefore, Roosevelt Investments is not required to provide such financial information or disclosures for this item.

Appendix A: Private Client Group Fee Schedule

Domestic Equity		
Strategy	**Account Size**	**Annual Fee**
All Cap Core	First $10,000,000 Over $10,000,000	1.00% 0.50%
Large Cap Core	First $10,000,000 Over $10,000,000	1.00% 0.50%
Small/Mid Cap Core	First $10,000,000 Over $10,000,000	1.00% 0.50%
Select Equity	First $10,000,000 Over $10,000,000	1.00% 0.50%

Fixed Income		
Strategy	**Account Size**	**Annual Fee**
Global Enhanced Fixed Income	First $10,000,000 Over $10,000,000	1.00% 0.50%
Current Income Portfolio	$100,000 and above	0.50%
Core Fixed Income	$100,000 and above	0.50%
Intermediate Fixed Income	$100,000 and above	0.50%

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Form ADV Part 2B – Domestic Equity Team Brochure Supplement

March 15, 2014

Arthur Sheer	Robert Meyer, CFA	John Roscoe, CFA
CIO	*Portfolio Manager*	*Senior Portfolio Manager*
Jason Sheer, CFA	Jason Benowitz, CFA	Nainesh Shah, CFA
Portfolio Manager	*Senior Portfolio Manager*	*Portfolio Manager*

This Brochure Supplement provides information about the Domestic Equity Team that supplements the Roosevelt Investments Brochure. You should have received a copy of that Brochure. Please contact Kathryn Mogan, Compliance Manager, if you did not receive Roosevelt Investments' Brochure or if you have any questions about the contents of this supplement.

Item 2: Educational Background and Business Experience

Arthur Sheer

Born: 1942

Educational Background

- Master's Degree in Business Administration, Babson College – 1969
- Bachelor's of Science in Economics, University of Rhode Island - 1967

Professional Background:

- 2013 – Present Chief Investment Officer, Roosevelt Investments
- 2002 – 2013 Chief Executive Officer/Chief Investment Officer, Roosevelt Investments
- 1990 – 2002 Founder/Chief Executive Officer, Sheer Asset Management

Robert Meyer, CFA

Born: 1940

Educational Background:

- Master's Degree in Business Administration, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration – 1964
- Bachelor's of Arts in Economics, Harvard College - 1962

Professional Background:

- 2007 – Present Managing Director/ Portfolio Manager, Roosevelt Investments
- 1992 – 2007 President, Ehrlich Meyer Associates

Professional Designation:

CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst): The CFA Program is a graduate-level self-study program that combines a broad-based

curriculum of investment principles with professional conduct requirements. It is designed to prepare charterholders for a wide range of investment specialties that apply in every market all over the world. To earn a CFA charter, applicants study for three exams (Levels I, II, III) using an assigned curriculum. Upon passing all three exams and meeting the professional and ethical requirements, they are awarded a charter.

John Roscoe, CFA

Born: 1963

Educational Background:

- Master's Degree in Business Administration with a concentration in Finance, Cornell University – 1990
- Bachelor's of Science in Biology, Cornell University - 1985

Professional Background:

- 2008 – Present Portfolio Manager, Roosevelt Investments
- 2008 – 2012 Registered Representative, Unified Financial Securities, Inc.
- 2004 - 2007 Portfolio Manager, Morgan Stanley Investment Management

Professional Designation:

CFA - Chartered Financial Analyst

Please see previous description

Jason Sheer, CFA

Born: 1977

Educational Background:

- Master's Degree in Business Administration with a concentration in Finance, George Washington University – 1999
- Bachelor's of Arts in Philosophy, Tulane University - 2005

Professional Background:

- 2009 – Present Portfolio Manager, Roosevelt Investments
- 2005 – 2009 Securities Analyst, Roosevelt Investments

Professional Designation:

CFA - Chartered Financial Analyst

Please see previous description

Jason Benowitz, CFA

Born: 1978

Educational Background:

- Master's Degree in Business Administration with a concentration in Finance and Accounting, The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania – 2005
- Bachelor's of Arts in Computer Science, Harvard University-2000

Professional Background:

- 2013 – Present Senior Portfolio Manager, Roosevelt Investments
- 2011 – 2013 Portfolio Manager, Roosevelt Investments
- 2009 – Present Registered Representative, Unified Financial Securities, Inc.
- 2009 – 2011 Securities Analyst, Roosevelt Investments
- 2008 – 2009 Principal, Druker Capital
- 2008 – 2008 Vice President, Morgan Stanley Investment Management
- 2005 – 2007 Associate, Morgan Stanley Investment Management

Professional Designation:

CFA - Chartered Financial Analyst

Please see previous description

Nainesh Shah, CFA

Born: 1963

Educational Background:

- Master's Degree in Business Administration, Dailhousie University – 1992
- Bachelor's of Arts in Industrial Engineering, The Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, India – 1984

Professional Background:

- 2014 – Present Portfolio Manager
- 2002 – 2014 Senior Securities Analyst, Roosevelt Investments

Professional Designation:

CFA - Chartered Financial Analyst

Please see previous description

Item 3: Disciplinary Information

Registered investment advisers are required to disclose all material facts regarding any legal or disciplinary events that would be material to your evaluation of each supervised person providing investment advice. No information is applicable to this Item.

Item 4: Other Business Activities

Mr. Benowitz is a registered representative of Unified Financial Securities, Inc., the distributor for the Roosevelt Multi-Cap Fund. In the normal course of his employment with Roosevelt Investments, adviser to the Roosevelt Multi-Cap Fund, his activities, which may include wholesaling, marketing, and other financial professional contact, require the holding of a securities license. Mr. Benowitz does not receive compensation from Unified Financial Securities.

Item 5: Additional Compensation

Other than salary, annual bonuses, and compensation based on client assets, members of the Domestic Equity Team do not receive any economic benefit from any person, organization, or company, in exchange for providing clients advisory services through Roosevelt Investments.

Item 6: Supervision

Adam Sheer, CO-CEO of Roosevelt Investments, is responsible for supervising the Domestic Equity Team's advisory activities and can be reached at 646-452-6700. Roosevelt Investments has dedicated supervisors, as well as compliance and operational staff, who monitor and provide oversight to the investment activities of supervised personnel. The supervisors, or their designees, review and monitor the activities of the Portfolio Managers and/or Investment Advisor Representatives assigned to their group. Such activities include, but are not limited to, adhering to client guidelines and objectives, trading and best execution, employee trading, marketing, and advertising.

PRIVACY NOTICE

At The Roosevelt Investment Group, Inc., we recognize the importance of protecting our clients' privacy. We have policies to maintain the confidentiality and security of your nonpublic personal information. The following is designed to help you understand what information we collect from you and how we use that information to serve your account.

Categories of Information We May Collect

In the normal course of business, we may collect the following types of information:

- Information you provide in the subscription documents and other forms (including name, address, social security number, date of birth, income and other financial-related information); and
- Data about your transactions with us (such as the types of investments you have made and your account status).

How We Use Your Information That We Collect

Any and all nonpublic personal information that we receive with respect to our clients who are natural persons is not shared with nonaffiliated third parties which are not service providers to us without prior notice to, and consent of, such clients, unless otherwise required by law. In the normal course of business, we may disclose the kinds of nonpublic personal information listed above to nonaffiliated third party service providers involved in servicing and administering products and services on our behalf. Our service providers include, but are not limited to, our administrator, our auditors and our legal advisor. Additionally, we may disclose such nonpublic personal information as required by law (such as to respond to a subpoena) or to satisfy a request from a regulator and/or to prevent fraud. Without limiting the foregoing, we may disclose nonpublic personal information about you to governmental entities and others in connection with meeting our obligations to prevent money laundering including, without limitation, the disclosure that may be required by the Uniting and Strengthening America Act by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. In addition, if we choose to dispose of our clients' nonpublic personal information that we are not legally bound to maintain, then we will do so in a manner that reasonably protects such information from unauthorized access. The same privacy policy also applies to former clients who are natural persons.

Confidentiality and Security

We restrict access to nonpublic personal information about our clients to those employees and agents who need to know that information to provide products and services to our clients. We maintain physical, electronic and procedural safeguards to protect our clients' nonpublic personal information. We respect and value that you have entrusted us with your private financial information, and we will work diligently to maintain that trust. We are committed to preserving that trust by respecting your privacy as provided herein.

If you have any questions regarding this privacy notice, please contact Steven Weiss at 646-452-6700.

Proxy Voting Policy 2014

Introduction

As a fiduciary, Roosevelt exercises its responsibility, to the extent it has such responsibility, to vote its clients' securities in a manner that, in Roosevelt's judgment, is in the clients' best interests. In accordance with that fiduciary obligation and Rule 206(4)-6 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended, Roosevelt has established the following proxy voting policy.

Responsibility for Voting

Roosevelt will not vote proxies solicited by or with respect to the issuers of securities in which assets of a client portfolio are invested, unless the client instructs Roosevelt, in writing, to vote such proxies.

Primary Consideration in Voting

Roosevelt's primary consideration in determining how proxies should be voted is the client's interest as a shareholder of that issuer. Except as otherwise specifically instructed by a client, Roosevelt generally does not take into account interests of other stakeholders of the issuer or interests the client may have in other capacities.

Engagement of Service Provider

Roosevelt has engaged Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. ("Broadridge") to: (i) perform the administrative tasks of receiving proxies and proxy statements; (ii) marking proxies as instructed by Roosevelt and delivering those proxies; (iii) retain proxy voting records and information; and (iv) report to Roosevelt on its activities in these regards.

Revised Date: January 14, 2014

Via Broadridge, Roosevelt has engaged a second service provider, Glass, Lewis & Co. ("GL"), to: (i) make recommendations to Roosevelt of proxy voting policies for adoption by Roosevelt on behalf of Roosevelt's client(s); and (ii) perform research and make recommendations to Roosevelt as to particular shareholder votes being solicited. Both Broadridge and GL are completely independent of Roosevelt and have no other business relationships with Roosevelt or its personnel.

In no circumstances shall Broadridge have the authority to vote proxies except in accordance with standing or specific instructions given to it by Roosevelt. Subject to Section 2 above, Roosevelt retains final authority and fiduciary responsibility for the voting of proxies. If at any time Roosevelt has engaged one or more other entities to perform the proxy administration and research services described above, all references to Broadridge and GL in this policy shall be deemed to be references to those other entities.

Voting Guidelines

A. **Client Policy.** If the client has chosen to retain the right to vote proxies for shares held in the client's account, the advisory agreement will expressly provide for this election either in the agreement or a written addendum to the agreement. If the client has a proxy voting policy that has been delivered to Roosevelt, Roosevelt shall vote proxies solicited by, or with respect to the issuers of securities held in that client's account in accordance with that policy and will check with the client regarding questions, if any, about the client's policy.

B. **No Client Policy.** If the client does not in the advisory agreement or an addendum to the agreement retain the right to vote proxies for shares held in the client's account and does not deliver a proxy voting policy to Roosevelt, Roosevelt shall vote proxies solicited by or with respect to, the issuers of securities held in the client's account in the manner that, in the judgment of Roosevelt, is in the best interests of the client as a shareholder in accordance with the standards described in this Policy. When making proxy voting decisions, Roosevelt generally adheres to the proxy voting guidelines provided by GL, a current version of which is set forth in Appendix A hereto (the "Guidelines"). Roosevelt believes the Guidelines, if followed, generally will result in the casting of votes in the economic best interests of clients as shareholders. Roosevelt therefore has instructed Broadridge to vote such proxies in accordance with the recommendations provided by GL.

Administrative Procedures

A. **Receipt and Recording of Proxy Information.** The Roosevelt operations personnel responsible for the opening of a new client account will notify the legal and compliance department in the event that a client has: i) requested, in writing, that Roosevelt vote proxies on the client's behalf; and ii) whether the client provided a written proxy voting policy that Roosevelt is required to follow.

B. **Notification to Broadridge**. For each client account for which Roosevelt has been instructed to vote shareholder proxies, a member of the Roosevelt operations department shall notify Broadridge of the client name and its custodian name and client account number so that Broadridge may communicate with the client's custodian and ensure that all proxy materials and ballots are forwarded to Broadridge, and shall take such follow-up steps as necessary to ensure that Broadridge and the custodian establish appropriate contact. Such notification need not be individually undertaken if the client account is part of a wrap program, as the wrap custodians automatically communicate with Broadridge as necessary.

Conflicts of Interest

There are circumstances in which a conflict of interest might arise by an Investment Advisor voting proxies on behalf of its client, such as where an issuer who is soliciting proxy votes also has a client relationship with the Advisor, when a client of the Advisor is involved in a proxy contest (such as a corporate director), or when an employee of the Advisor has a personal interest in a proxy matter. We believe that our policy of voting in accordance with the recommendations of GL, which provides independent recommendations, ensures that proxies are voted solely in the best interests of clients and resolves any potential conflict of interest. In case Roosevelt becomes aware that a GL recommendation results in a conflict of interest, such as described above, Roosevelt will disclose the conflict to the client and obtain the client's consent or advice with respect to the voting based on GL recommendations.

Records and Reports

A. **Proxy Voting Policy and Summary.** Roosevelt shall make this Proxy Voting Policy and a summary of it available to clients upon request. That Policy and/or summary may be available on Roosevelt's website.

B. **Proxy Voting Records**. Roosevelt shall also make Roosevelt's proxy voting records with respect to a client's account available to that client or its representatives for review upon the client's request or as may be required by applicable law.

C. **Records – General.** The following documents shall be maintained by Roosevelt or by Broadridge or another third party service provider, on behalf of Roosevelt; provided that if such documents are maintained by Broadridge or a service provider of Roosevelt, Broadridge or such third party shall undertake to provide Roosevelt copies of such documents promptly upon Roosevelt' request:

1. Roosevelt's proxy voting policies and procedures;

2. A copy of each proxy statement received, provided that no copy need be retained of a proxy statement found on the SEC's EDGAR website;

3. A record of each proxy vote cast;

4. A copy of each written client request for Roosevelt's proxy voting record with respect to such client and any written response to such requests; and

5. Any document prepared by Roosevelt that is material to making a decision on how to vote or that memorialized the basis for a decision on how to vote, as well as a copy of Roosevelt' Proxy Voting Policy, including the Guidelines.

PROXY PAPER™ GUIDELINES

2014 PROXY SEASON

AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS LEWIS
APPROACH TO PROXY ADVICE

UNITED STATES

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I. OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT UPDATES FOR 2014

Glass Lewis evaluates these guidelines on an ongoing basis and formally updates them on an annual basis. This year we've made noteworthy revisions in the following areas, which are summarized below but discussed in greater detail throughout this document:

MAJORITY-APPROVED SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS SEEKING BOARD DECLASSIFICATION

- We have updated our policy with regard to implementation of majority-approved shareholder proposals seeking board declassification. If a company fails to implement a shareholder proposal seeking board declassification, which received majority support from shareholders (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes) at the previous year's annual meeting, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all nominees up for election that served throughout the previous year, regardless of their committee membership.

POISON PILLS WITH A TERM OF ONE YEAR OR LESS

- We have refined our policy with regard to short-term poison pills (those with a term of one year or less). If a poison pill with a term of one year or less was adopted without shareholder approval, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of the governance committee. If the board has, without seeking shareholder approval, extended the term of a poison pill by one year or less in two consecutive years, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the entire board.

DUAL-LISTED COMPANIES

- We have clarified our approach to companies whose shares are listed on exchanges in multiple countries, and which may seek shareholder approval of proposals in accordance with varying exchange- and country-specific rules. In determining which Glass Lewis country-specific policy to apply, we will consider a number of factors, and we will apply the policy standards most relevant in each situation.

HEDGING AND PLEDGING OF STOCK

- We have included general discussions of our policies regarding hedging of stock and pledging of shares owned by executives.

SEC FINAL RULES REGARDING COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MEMBER INDEPENDENCE AND COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS

- We have summarized the SEC requirements for compensation committee member independence and compensation consultant independence, and how these new rules may affect our evaluation of compensation committee members. These requirements were mandated by Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act and formally adopted by the NYSE and NASDAQ in 2013. Companies listed on these exchanges were required to meet certain basic requirements under the new rules by July 1, 2013, with full compliance by the earlier of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014.

II. A BOARD OF DIRECTORS THAT SERVES THE INTERESTS OF SHAREHOLDERS

ELECTION OF DIRECTORS

The purpose of Glass Lewis' proxy research and advice is to facilitate shareholder voting in favor of governance structures that will drive performance, create shareholder value and maintain a proper tone at the top. Glass Lewis looks for talented boards with a record of protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. We believe that a board can best protect and enhance the interests of shareholders if it is sufficiently independent, has a record of positive performance, and consists of individuals with diverse backgrounds and a breadth and depth of relevant experience.

INDEPENDENCE

The independence of directors, or lack thereof, is ultimately demonstrated through the decisions they make. In assessing the independence of directors, we will take into consideration, when appropriate, whether a director has a track record indicative of making objective decisions. Likewise, when assessing the independence of directors we will also examine when a director's service track record on multiple boards indicates a lack of objective decision-making. Ultimately, we believe the determination of whether a director is independent or not must take into consideration both compliance with the applicable independence listing requirements as well as judgments made by the director.

We look at each director nominee to examine the director's relationships with the company, the company's executives, and other directors. We do this to evaluate whether personal, familial, or financial relationships (not including director compensation) may impact the director's decisions. We believe that such relationships make it difficult for a director to put shareholders' interests above the director's or the related party's interests. We also believe that a director who owns more than 20% of a company can exert disproportionate influence on the board and, in particular, the audit committee.

Thus, we put directors into three categories based on an examination of the type of relationship they have with the company:

Independent Director – An independent director has no material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, its executives, or other board members, except for board service and standard fees paid for that service. Relationships that existed within three to five years[1] before the inquiry are usually considered "current" for purposes of this test.

In our view, a director who is currently serving in an interim management position should be considered an insider, while a director who previously served in an interim management position for less than one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered independent. Moreover, a director who previously served in an interim management position for over one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered an affiliate for five years following the date of his/her resignation or departure from the interim management position. Glass Lewis applies a three-year look-back period to all directors who have an affiliation with the company other than former employment, for which we apply a five-year look-back.

1 NASDAQ originally proposed a five-year look-back period but both it and the NYSE ultimately settled on a three-year look-back prior to finalizing their rules. A five-year standard is more appropriate, in our view, because we believe that the unwinding of conflicting relationships between former management and board members is more likely to be complete and final after five years. However, Glass Lewis does not apply the five-year look-back period to directors who have previously served as executives of the company on an interim basis for less than one year.

Affiliated Director – An affiliated director has a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company or its executives, but is not an employee of the company.[2] This includes directors whose employers have a material financial relationship with the company.[3] In addition, we view a director who owns or controls 20% or more of the company's voting stock as an affiliate.[4]

We view 20% shareholders as affiliates because they typically have access to and involvement with the management of a company that is fundamentally different from that of ordinary shareholders. More importantly, 20% holders may have interests that diverge from those of ordinary holders, for reasons such as the liquidity (or lack thereof) of their holdings, personal tax issues, etc.

Definition of "Material": A material relationship is one in which the dollar value exceeds:

- $50,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for directors who are paid for a service they have agreed to perform for the company, outside of their service as a director, including professional or other services; or
- $120,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for those directors employed by a professional services firm such as a law firm, investment bank, or consulting firm and the company pays the firm, not the individual, for services. This dollar limit would also apply to charitable contributions to schools where a board member is a professor; or charities where a director serves on the board or is an executive;[5] and any aircraft and real estate dealings between the company and the director's firm; or
- 1% of either company's consolidated gross revenue for other business relationships (e.g., where the director is an executive officer of a company that provides services or products to or receives services or products from the company).[6]

Definition of "Familial": Familial relationships include a person's spouse, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces, nephews, in-laws, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares such person's home. A director is an affiliate if: i) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and receives more than $120,000 in annual compensation; or, ii) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and the company does not disclose this individual's compensation.

Definition of "Company": A company includes any parent or subsidiary in a group with the company or any entity that merged with, was acquired by, or acquired the company.

Inside Director – An inside director simultaneously serves as a director and as an employee of the company. This category may include a chairman of the board who acts as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company. In our view, an inside director who derives a greater amount of income as a result of affiliated transactions with the company rather than through compensation paid by the company (i.e., salary, bonus, etc. as a company employee) faces a conflict between making decisions that are in the best interests of the company versus those in the director's own best interests. Therefore, we will recommend voting against such a director.

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2 If a company classifies one of its non-employee directors as non-independent, Glass Lewis will classify that director as an affiliate.
3 We allow a five-year grace period for former executives of the company or merged companies who have consulting agreements with the surviving company. (We do not automatically recommend voting against directors in such cases for the first five years.) If the consulting agreement persists after this five-year grace period, we apply the materiality thresholds outlined in the definition of "material."
4 This includes a director who serves on a board as a representative (as part of his or her basic responsibilities) of an in-vestment firm with greater than 20% ownership. However, while we will generally consider him/her to be affiliated, we will not recommend voting against unless (i) the investment firm has disproportionate board representation or (ii) the director serves on the audit committee.
5 We will generally take into consideration the size and nature of such charitable entities in relation to the company's size and industry along with any other relevant factors such as the director's role at the charity. However, unlike for other types of related party transactions, Glass Lewis generally does not apply a look-back period to affiliated relationships involving charitable contributions; if the relationship between the director and the school or charity ceases, or if the company discontinues its donations to the entity, we will consider the director to be independent.
6 This includes cases where a director is employed by, or closely affiliated with, a private equity firm that profits from an acquisition made by the company. Unless disclosure suggests otherwise, we presume the director is affiliated.

VOTING RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BASIS OF BOARD INDEPENDENCE

Glass Lewis believes a board will be most effective in protecting shareholders' interests if it is at least two-thirds independent. We note that each of the Business Roundtable, the Conference Board, and the Council of Institutional Investors advocates that two-thirds of the board be independent. Where more than one-third of the members are affiliated or inside directors, we typically[7] recommend voting against some of the inside and/or affiliated directors in order to satisfy the two-thirds threshold.

In the case of a less than two-thirds independent board, Glass Lewis strongly supports the existence of a presiding or lead director with authority to set the meeting agendas and to lead sessions outside the insider chairman's presence.

In addition, we scrutinize avowedly "independent" chairmen and lead directors. We believe that they should be unquestionably independent or the company should not tout them as such.

COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE

We believe that only independent directors should serve on a company's audit, compensation, nominating, and governance committees.[8] We typically recommend that shareholders vote against any affiliated or inside director seeking appointment to an audit, compensation, nominating, or governance committee, or who has served in that capacity in the past year.

Pursuant to Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the SEC approved new listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require that boards apply enhanced standards of independence when making an affirmative determination of the independence of compensation committee members. Specifically, when making this determination, in addition to the factors considered when assessing general director independence, the board's considerations must include: (i) the source of compensation of the director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the listed company to the director (the "Fees Factor"); and (ii) whether the director is affiliated with the listing company, its subsidiaries, or affiliates of its subsidiaries (the "Affiliation Factor").

Glass Lewis believes it is important for boards to consider these enhanced independence factors when assessing compensation committee members. However, as discussed above in the section titled Independence, we apply our own standards when assessing the independence of directors, and these standards also take into account consulting and advisory fees paid to the director, as well as the director's affiliations with the company and its subsidiaries and affiliates. We may recommend voting against compensation committee members who are not independent based on our standards.

INDEPENDENT CHAIRMAN

Glass Lewis believes that separating the roles of CEO (or, more rarely, another executive position) and chairman creates a better governance structure than a combined CEO/chairman position. An executive manages the business according to a course the board charts. Executives should report to the board regarding their performance in achieving goals set by the board. This is needlessly complicated when a CEO chairs the board, since a CEO/chairman presumably will have a significant influence over the board.

It can become difficult for a board to fulfill its role of overseer and policy setter when a CEO/chairman controls the agenda and the boardroom discussion. Such control can allow a CEO to have an entrenched

7 With a staggered board, if the affiliates or insiders that we believe should not be on the board are not up for election, we will express our concern regarding those directors, but we will not recommend voting against the other affiliates or insiders who are up for election just to achieve two-thirds independence. However, we will consider recommending voting against the directors subject to our concern at their next election if the concerning issue is not resolved.

8 We will recommend voting against an audit committee member who owns 20% or more of the company's stock, and we believe that there should be a maximum of one director (or no directors if the committee is comprised of less than three directors) who owns 20% or more of the company's stock on the compensation, nominating, and governance committees.

position, leading to longer-than-optimal terms, fewer checks on management, less scrutiny of the business operation, and limitations on independent, shareholder-focused goal-setting by the board.

A CEO should set the strategic course for the company, with the board's approval, and the board should enable the CEO to carry out the CEO's vision for accomplishing the board's objectives. Failure to achieve the board's objectives should lead the board to replace that CEO with someone in whom the board has confidence.

Likewise, an independent chairman can better oversee executives and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. Such oversight and concern for shareholders allows for a more proactive and effective board of directors that is better able to look out for the interests of shareholders.

Further, it is the board's responsibility to select a chief executive who can best serve a company and its shareholders and to replace this person when his or her duties have not been appropriately fulfilled. Such a replacement becomes more difficult and happens less frequently when the chief executive is also in the position of overseeing the board.

Glass Lewis believes that the installation of an independent chairman is almost always a positive step from a corporate governance perspective and promotes the best interests of shareholders. Further, the presence of an independent chairman fosters the creation of a thoughtful and dynamic board, not dominated by the views of senior management. Encouragingly, many companies appear to be moving in this direction—one study even indicates that less than 12 percent of incoming CEOs in 2009 were awarded the chairman title, versus 48 percent as recently as 2002.[9] Another study finds that 45 percent of S&P 500 boards now separate the CEO and chairman roles, up from 23 percent in 2003, although the same study found that of those companies, only 25 percent have truly independent chairs.[10]

We do not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who chair the board. However, we typically recommend that our clients support separating the roles of chairman and CEO whenever that question is posed in a proxy (typically in the form of a shareholder proposal), as we believe that it is in the long-term best interests of the company and its shareholders.

PERFORMANCE

The most crucial test of a board's commitment to the company and its shareholders lies in the actions of the board and its members. We look at the performance of these individuals as directors and executives of the company and of other companies where they have served.

VOTING RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BASIS OF PERFORMANCE

We disfavor directors who have a record of not fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders at any company where they have held a board or executive position. We typically recommend voting against:

1. A director who fails to attend a minimum of 75% of board and applicable committee meetings, calculated in the aggregate.[11]

2. A director who belatedly filed a significant form(s) 4 or 5, or who has a pattern of late filings if the late filing was the director's fault (we look at these late filing situations on a case-by-case basis).

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9 Ken Favaro, Per-Ola Karlsson and Gary Neilson. "CEO Succession 2000-2009: A Decade of Convergence and Compression." Booz & Company (from Strategy+Business, Issue 59, Summer 2010).
10 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2013, p. 5
11 However, where a director has served for less than one full year, we will typically not recommend voting against for failure to attend 75% of meetings. Rather, we will note the poor attendance with a recommendation to track this issue going forward. We will also refrain from recommending to vote against directors when the proxy discloses that the director missed the meetings due to serious illness or other extenuating circumstances.

3. A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious and material restatement has occurred after the CEO had previously certified the pre-restatement financial statements.

4. A director who has received two against recommendations from Glass Lewis for identical reasons within the prior year at different companies (the same situation must also apply at the company being analyzed).

5. All directors who served on the board if, for the last three years, the company's performance has been in the bottom quartile of the sector and the directors have not taken reasonable steps to address the poor performance.

BOARD RESPONSIVENESS

Glass Lewis believes that any time 25% or more of shareholders vote contrary to the recommendation of management, the board should, depending on the issue, demonstrate some level of responsiveness to address the concerns of shareholders. These include instances when 25% or more of shareholders (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes): WITHOLD votes from (or vote AGAINST) a director nominee, vote AGAINST a management-sponsored proposal, or vote FOR a shareholder proposal. In our view, a 25% threshold is significant enough to warrant a close examination of the underlying issues and an evaluation of whether or not a board response was warranted and, if so, whether the board responded appropriately following the vote. While the 25% threshold alone will not automatically generate a negative vote recommendation from Glass Lewis on a future proposal (e.g. to recommend against a director nominee, against a say-on-pay proposal, etc.), it may be a contributing factor if we recommend to vote against management's recommendation in the event we determine that the board did not respond appropriately.

As a general framework, our evaluation of board responsiveness involves a review of publicly available disclosures (e.g. the proxy statement, annual report, 8-Ks, company website, etc.) released following the date of the company's last annual meeting up through the publication date of our most current Proxy Paper. Depending on the specific issue, our focus typically includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- At the board level, any changes in directorships, committee memberships, disclosure of related party transactions, meeting attendance, or other responsibilities;
- Any revisions made to the company's articles of incorporation, bylaws or other governance documents;
- Any press or news releases indicating changes in, or the adoption of, new company policies, business practices or special reports; and
- Any modifications made to the design and structure of the company's compensation program.

Our Proxy Paper analysis will include a case-by-case assessment of the specific elements of board responsiveness that we examined along with an explanation of how that assessment impacts our current vote recommendations.

THE ROLE OF A COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

Glass Lewis believes that a designated committee chairman maintains primary responsibility for the actions of his or her respective committee. As such, many of our committee-specific vote recommendations deal with the applicable committee chair rather than the entire committee (depending on the seriousness of the issue). However, in cases where we would ordinarily recommend voting against a committee chairman but the chair is not specified, we apply the following general rules, which apply throughout our guidelines:

- If there is no committee chair, we recommend voting against the longest-serving committee member or, if the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, the longest-serving board member serving on the committee (i.e. in either case, the "senior director"); and
- If there is no committee chair, but multiple senior directors serving on the committee, we recommend voting against both (or all) such senior directors.

In our view, companies should provide clear disclosure of which director is charged with overseeing each committee. In cases where that simple framework is ignored and a reasonable analysis cannot determine which committee member is the designated leader, we believe shareholder action against the longest serving committee member(s) is warranted. Again, this only applies if we would ordinarily recommend voting against the committee chair but there is either no such position or no designated director in such role.

On the contrary, in cases where there is a designated committee chair and the recommendation is to vote against the committee chair, but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern with regard to the committee chair.

AUDIT COMMITTEES AND PERFORMANCE

Audit committees play an integral role in overseeing the financial reporting process because "[v]ibrant and stable capital markets depend on, among other things, reliable, transparent, and objective financial information to support an efficient and effective capital market process. The vital oversight role audit committees play in the process of producing financial information has never been more important."[12]

When assessing an audit committee's performance, we are aware that an audit committee does not prepare financial statements, is not responsible for making the key judgments and assumptions that affect the financial statements, and does not audit the numbers or the disclosures provided to investors. Rather, an audit committee member monitors and oversees the process and procedures that management and auditors perform. The 1999 Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees stated it best:

> *A proper and well-functioning system exists, therefore, when the three main groups responsible for financial reporting – the full board including the audit committee, financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside auditors – form a 'three legged stool' that supports responsible financial disclosure and active participatory oversight. However, in the view of the Committee, the audit committee must be 'first among equals' in this process, since the audit committee is an extension of the full board and hence the ultimate monitor of the process.*

STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING THE AUDIT COMMITTEE

For an audit committee to function effectively on investors' behalf, it must include members with sufficient knowledge to diligently carry out their responsibilities. In its audit and accounting recommendations, the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise said "members of the audit committee must be independent and have both knowledge and experience in auditing financial matters."[13]

We are skeptical of audit committees where there are members that lack expertise as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or corporate controller, or similar experience. While

12 Audit Committee Effectiveness – What Works Best." PricewaterhouseCoopers. The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation. 2005.
13 Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise. The Conference Board. 2003.

we will not necessarily vote against members of an audit committee when such expertise is lacking, we are more likely to vote against committee members when a problem such as a restatement occurs and such expertise is lacking.

Glass Lewis generally assesses audit committees against the decisions they make with respect to their oversight and monitoring role. The quality and integrity of the financial statements and earnings reports, the completeness of disclosures necessary for investors to make informed decisions, and the effectiveness of the internal controls should provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements are materially free from errors. The independence of the external auditors and the results of their work all provide useful information by which to assess the audit committee.

When assessing the decisions and actions of the audit committee, we typically defer to its judgment and would vote in favor of its members, but we would recommend voting against the following members under the following circumstances:[14]

1. All members of the audit committee when options were backdated, there is a lack of adequate controls in place, there was a resulting restatement, and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation with respect to the option grants.
2. The audit committee chair, if the audit committee does not have a financial expert or the committee's financial expert does not have a demonstrable financial background sufficient to understand the financial issues unique to public companies.
3. The audit committee chair, if the audit committee did not meet at least 4 times during the year.
4. The audit committee chair, if the committee has less than three members.
5. Any audit committee member who sits on more than three public company audit committees, unless the audit committee member is a retired CPA, CFO, controller or has similar experience, in which case the limit shall be four committees, taking time and availability into consideration including a review of the audit committee member's attendance at all board and committee meetings.[15]
6. All members of an audit committee who are up for election and who served on the committee at the time of the audit, if audit and audit-related fees total one-third or less of the total fees billed by the auditor.
7. The audit committee chair when tax and/or other fees are greater than audit and audit-related fees paid to the auditor for more than one year in a row (in which case we also recommend against ratification of the auditor).
8. All members of an audit committee where non-audit fees include fees for tax services (including, but not limited to, such things as tax avoidance or shelter schemes) for senior executives of the company. Such services are prohibited by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB").
9. All members of an audit committee that reappointed an auditor that we no longer consider to be independent for reasons unrelated to fee proportions.

14 As discussed under the section labeled "Committee Chairman," where the recommendation is to vote against the committee chair but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against the members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern with regard to the committee chair.

15 Glass Lewis may exempt certain audit committee members from the above threshold if, upon further analysis of relevant factors such as the director's experience, the size, industry-mix and location of the companies involved and the director's attendance at all the companies, we can reasonably determine that the audit committee member is likely not hindered by multiple audit committee commitments.

10. All members of an audit committee when audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.

11. The audit committee chair[16] if the committee failed to put auditor ratification on the ballot for shareholder approval. However, if the non-audit fees or tax fees exceed audit plus audit-related fees in either the current or the prior year, then Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the entire audit committee.

12. All members of an audit committee where the auditor has resigned and reported that a section 10A[17] letter has been issued.

13. All members of an audit committee at a time when material accounting fraud occurred at the company.[18]

14. All members of an audit committee at a time when annual and/or multiple quarterly financial statements had to be restated, and any of the following factors apply:

    - The restatement involves fraud or manipulation by insiders;
    - The restatement is accompanied by an SEC inquiry or investigation;
    - The restatement involves revenue recognition;
    - The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to costs of goods sold, operating expense, or operating cash flows; or
    - The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to net income, 10% adjustment to assets or shareholders equity, or cash flows from financing or investing activities.

15. All members of an audit committee if the company repeatedly fails to file its financial reports in a timely fashion. For example, the company has filed two or more quarterly or annual financial statements late within the last 5 quarters.

16. All members of an audit committee when it has been disclosed that a law enforcement agency has charged the company and/or its employees with a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

17. All members of an audit committee when the company has aggressive accounting policies and/or poor disclosure or lack of sufficient transparency in its financial statements.

18. All members of the audit committee when there is a disagreement with the auditor and the auditor resigns or is dismissed (e.g., the company receives an adverse opinion on its financial statements from the auditor).

19. All members of the audit committee if the contract with the auditor specifically limits the auditor's liability to the company for damages.[19]

20. All members of the audit committee who served since the date of the company's last annual

16 As discussed under the section labeled "Committee Chairman," in all cases, if the chair of the committee is not specified, we recommend voting against the director who has been on the committee the longest.
17 Auditors are required to report all potential illegal acts to management and the audit committee unless they are clearly inconsequential in nature. If the audit committee or the board fails to take appropriate action on an act that has been determined to be a violation of the law, the independent auditor is required to send a section 10A letter to the SEC. Such letters are rare and therefore we believe should be taken seriously.
18 Recent research indicates that revenue fraud now accounts for over 60% of SEC fraud cases, and that companies that engage in fraud experience significant negative abnormal stock price declines—facing bankruptcy, delisting, and material asset sales at much higher rates than do non-fraud firms (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. "Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007." May 2010).
19 The Council of Institutional Investors. "Corporate Governance Policies," p. 4, April 5, 2006; and "Letter from Council of Institutional Investors to the AICPA," November 8, 2006.

meeting, and when, since the last annual meeting, the company has reported a material weakness that has not yet been corrected, or, when the company has an ongoing material weakness from a prior year that has not yet been corrected.

We also take a dim view of audit committee reports that are boilerplate, and which provide little or no information or transparency to investors. When a problem such as a material weakness, restatement or late filings occurs, we take into consideration, in forming our judgment with respect to the audit committee, the transparency of the audit committee report.

COMPENSATION COMMITTEE PERFORMANCE

Compensation committees have the final say in determining the compensation of executives. This includes deciding the basis on which compensation is determined, as well as the amounts and types of compensation to be paid. This process begins with the hiring and initial establishment of employment agreements, including the terms for such items as pay, pensions and severance arrangements. It is important in establishing compensation arrangements that compensation be consistent with, and based on the long-term economic performance of, the business's long-term shareholders returns.

Compensation committees are also responsible for the oversight of the transparency of compensation. This oversight includes disclosure of compensation arrangements, the matrix used in assessing pay for performance, and the use of compensation consultants. In order to ensure the independence of the compensation consultant, we believe the compensation committee should only engage a compensation consultant that is not also providing any services to the company or management apart from their contract with the compensation committee. It is important to investors that they have clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements in order to make informed decisions with respect to the oversight and decisions of the compensation committee.

Finally, compensation committees are responsible for oversight of internal controls over the executive compensation process. This includes controls over gathering information used to determine compensation, establishment of equity award plans, and granting of equity awards. For example, the use of a compensation consultant who maintains a business relationship with company management may cause the committee to make decisions based on information that is compromised by the consultant's conflict of interests. Lax controls can also contribute to improper awards of compensation such as through granting of backdated or spring-loaded options, or granting of bonuses when triggers for bonus payments have not been met.

Central to understanding the actions of a compensation committee is a careful review of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis ("CD&A") report included in each company's proxy. We review the CD&A in our evaluation of the overall compensation practices of a company, as overseen by the compensation committee. The CD&A is also integral to the evaluation of compensation proposals at companies, such as advisory votes on executive compensation, which allow shareholders to vote on the compensation paid to a company's top executives.

When assessing the performance of compensation committees, we will recommend voting against for the following:[20]

1. All members of the compensation committee who are up for election and served at the time of poor pay-for-performance (e.g., a company receives an F grade in our pay-for-performance analysis) when shareholders are not provided with an advisory vote on executive compensation

20 As discussed under the section labeled "Committee Chairman," where the recommendation is to vote against the committee chair and the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern with regard to the committee chair.

at the annual meeting.[21]

2. Any member of the compensation committee who has served on the compensation committee of at least two other public companies that received F grades in our pay-for-performance model and whose oversight of compensation at the company in question is suspect.

3. The compensation committee chair if the company received two D grades in consecutive years in our pay-for-performance analysis, and if during the past year the company performed the same as or worse than its peers.[22]

4. All members of the compensation committee (during the relevant time period) if the company entered into excessive employment agreements and/or severance agreements.

5. All members of the compensation committee when performance goals were changed (i.e., lowered) when employees failed or were unlikely to meet original goals, or performance-based compensation was paid despite goals not being attained.

6. All members of the compensation committee if excessive employee perquisites and benefits were allowed.

7. The compensation committee chair if the compensation committee did not meet during the year, but should have (e.g., because executive compensation was restructured or a new executive was hired).

8. All members of the compensation committee when the company repriced options or completed a "self tender offer" without shareholder approval within the past two years.

9. All members of the compensation committee when vesting of in-the-money options is accelerated.

10. All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were backdated. Glass Lewis will recommend voting against an executive director who played a role in and participated in option backdating.

11. All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were spring-loaded or otherwise timed around the release of material information.

12. All members of the compensation committee when a new employment contract is given to an executive that does not include a clawback provision and the company had a material restatement, especially if the restatement was due to fraud.

13. The chair of the compensation committee where the CD&A provides insufficient or unclear information about performance metrics and goals, where the CD&A indicates that pay is not tied to performance, or where the compensation committee or management has excessive discretion to alter performance terms or increase amounts of awards in contravention of previously defined targets.

14. All members of the compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to

21 Where there are multiple CEOs in one year, we will consider not recommending against the compensation committee but will defer judgment on compensation policies and practices until the next year or a full year after arrival of the new CEO. In addition, if a company provides shareholders with a say-on-pay proposal and receives an F grade in our pay-for-performance model, we will recommend that shareholders only vote against the say-on-pay proposal rather than the members of the compensation committee, unless the company exhibits egregious practices. However, if the company receives successive F grades, we will then recommend against the members of the compensation committee in addition to recommending voting against the say-on-pay proposal.

22 In cases where a company has received two consecutive D grades, or if its grade improved from an F to a D in the most recent period, and during the most recent year the company performed better than its peers (based on our analysis), we refrain from recommending to vote against the compensation committee chair. In addition, if a company provides shareholders with a say-on-pay proposal in this instance, we will consider voting against the advisory vote rather than the compensation committee chair unless the company exhibits unquestionably egregious practices.

implement a shareholder proposal regarding a compensation-related issue, where the proposal received the affirmative vote of a majority of the voting shares at a shareholder meeting, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) should have taken steps to implement the request.[23]

15. All members of a compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to address shareholder concerns following majority shareholder rejection of the say-on-pay proposal in the previous year. Where the proposal was approved but there was a significant shareholder vote (i.e., greater than 25% of votes cast) against the say-on-pay proposal in the prior year, if there is no evidence that the board responded accordingly to the vote including actively engaging shareholders on this issue, we will also consider recommending voting against the chairman of the compensation committee or all members of the compensation committee, depending on the severity and history of the compensation problems and the level of opposition.

NOMINATING AND GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE PERFORMANCE

The nominating and governance committee, as an agency for the shareholders, is responsible for the governance by the board of the company and its executives. In performing this role, the board is responsible and accountable for selection of objective and competent board members. It is also responsible for providing leadership on governance policies adopted by the company, such as decisions to implement shareholder proposals that have received a majority vote. (At most companies, a single committee is charged with these oversight functions; at others, the governance and nominating responsiblities are apportioned among two separate committees.)

Consistent with Glass Lewis' philosophy that boards should have diverse backgrounds and members with a breadth and depth of relevant experience, we believe that nominating and governance committees should consider diversity when making director nominations within the context of each specific company and its industry. In our view, shareholders are best served when boards make an effort to ensure a constituency that is not only reasonably diverse on the basis of age, race, gender and ethnicity, but also on the basis of geographic knowledge, industry experience and culture.

Regarding the committee responsible for governance, we will recommend voting against the following:[24]

1. All members of the governance committee[25] during whose tenure the board failed to implement a shareholder proposal with a direct and substantial impact on shareholders and their rights – i.e., where the proposal received enough shareholder votes (at least a majority) to allow the board to implement or begin to implement that proposal.[26] Examples of these types of shareholder proposals are majority vote to elect directors and to declassify the board.

2. The governance committee chair,[27] when the chairman is not independent and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.[28]

23 In all other instances (i.e., a non-compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented) we recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the governance committee.
24 As discussed in the guidelines section labeled "Committee Chairman," where we would recommend to vote against the committee chair but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern regarding the committee chair.
25 If the board does not have a committee responsible for governance oversight and the board did not implement a shareholder proposal that received the requisite support, we will recommend voting against the entire board. If the shareholder proposal at issue requested that the board adopt a declassified structure, we will recommend voting against all director nominees up for election.
26 Where a compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the members of the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) bear the responsibility for failing to implement the request, we recommend that shareholders only vote against members of the compensation committee.
27 As discussed in the guidelines section labeled "Committee Chairman," if the committee chair is not specified, we recommend voting against the director who has been on the committee the longest. If the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, we will recommend voting against the longest-serving board member serving on the committee.
28 We believe that one independent individual should be appointed to serve as the lead or presiding director. When such a position is rotated among directors from meeting to meeting, we will recommend voting against as if there were no lead or presiding director.

3. In the absence of a nominating committee, the governance committee chair when there are less than five or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.

4. The governance committee chair, when the committee fails to meet at all during the year.

5. The governance committee chair, when for two consecutive years the company provides what we consider to be "inadequate" related party transaction disclosure (i.e., the nature of such transactions and/or the monetary amounts involved are unclear or excessively vague, thereby preventing a shareholder from being able to reasonably interpret the independence status of multiple directors above and beyond what the company maintains is compliant with SEC or applicable stock exchange listing requirements).

6. The governance committee chair, when during the past year the board adopted a forum selection clause (i.e., an exclusive forum provision)[29] without shareholder approval, or, if the board is currently seeking shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal.

Regarding the nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the following:[30]

1. All members of the nominating committee, when the committee nominated or renominated an individual who had a significant conflict of interest or whose past actions demonstrated a lack of integrity or inability to represent shareholder interests.

2. The nominating committee chair, if the nominating committee did not meet during the year, but should have (i.e., because new directors were nominated or appointed since the time of the last annual meeting).

3. In the absence of a governance committee, the nominating committee chair[31] when the chairman is not independent, and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.[32]

4. The nominating committee chair, when there are less than five or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.[33]

5. The nominating committee chair, when a director received a greater than 50% against vote the prior year and not only was the director not removed, but the issues that raised shareholder concern were not corrected.[34]

BOARD-LEVEL RISK MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT

Glass Lewis evaluates the risk management function of a public company board on a strictly case-by-case basis. Sound risk management, while necessary at all companies, is particularly important at

29 A forum selection clause is a bylaw provision stipulating that a certain state, typically Delaware, shall be the exclusive forum for all intra-corporate disputes (e.g. shareholder derivative actions, assertions of claims of a breach of fiduciary duty, etc.). Such a clause effectively limits a shareholder's legal remedy regarding appropriate choice of venue and related relief offered under that state's laws and rulings.
30 As discussed in the guidelines section labeled "Committee Chairman," where we would recommend to vote against the committee chair but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern regarding the committee chair.
31 As discussed under the section labeled "Committee Chairman," if the committee chair is not specified, we will recommend voting against the director who has been on the committee the longest. If the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, we will recommend voting against the longest-serving board member on the committee.
32 In the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the chairman of the board on this basis, unless if the chairman also serves as the CEO, in which case we will recommend voting against the director who has served on the board the longest.
33 In the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the chairman of the board on this basis, unless if the chairman also serves as the CEO, in which case we will recommend voting against the director who has served on the board the longest.
34 Considering that shareholder discontent clearly relates to the director who received a greater than 50% against vote rather than the nominating chair, we review the validity of the issue(s) that initially raised shareholder concern, follow-up on such matters, and only recommend voting against the nominating chair if a reasonable analysis suggests that it would be most appropriate. In rare cases, we will consider recommending against the nominating chair when a director receives a substantial (i.e., 25% or more) vote against based on the same analysis.

financial firms which inherently maintain significant exposure to financial risk. We believe such financial firms should have a chief risk officer reporting directly to the board and a dedicated risk committee or a committee of the board charged with risk oversight. Moreover, many non-financial firms maintain strategies which involve a high level of exposure to financial risk. Similarly, since many non-financial firms have complex hedging or trading strategies, those firms should also have a chief risk officer and a risk committee.

Our views on risk oversight are consistent with those expressed by various regulatory bodies. In its December 2009 Final Rule release on Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, the SEC noted that risk oversight is a key competence of the board and that additional disclosures would improve investor and shareholder understanding of the role of the board in the organization's risk management practices. The final rules, which became effective on February 28, 2010, now explicitly require companies and mutual funds to describe (while allowing for some degree of flexibility) the board's role in the oversight of risk.

When analyzing the risk management practices of public companies, we take note of any significant losses or writedowns on financial assets and/or structured transactions. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or writedown, and where we find that the company's board-level risk committee contributed to the loss through poor oversight, we would recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise)[35], we will consider recommending to vote against the chairman of the board on that basis. However, we generally would not recommend voting against a combined chairman/CEO, except in egregious cases.

EXPERIENCE

We find that a director's past conduct is often indicative of future conduct and performance. We often find directors with a history of overpaying executives or of serving on boards where avoidable disasters have occurred appearing at companies that follow these same patterns. Glass Lewis has a proprietary database of directors serving at over 8,000 of the most widely held U.S. companies. We use this database to track the performance of directors across companies.

Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Director Experience

We typically recommend that shareholders vote against directors who have served on boards or as executives of companies with records of poor performance, inadequate risk oversight, excessive compensation, audit- or accounting-related issues, and/or other indicators of mismanagement or actions against the interests of shareholders.[36]

Likewise, we examine the backgrounds of those who serve on key board committees to ensure that they have the required skills and diverse backgrounds to make informed judgments about the subject matter for which the committee is responsible.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to the three key characteristics – independence, performance, experience – that we use to evaluate board members, we consider conflict-of-interest issues as well as the size of the board of directors when making voting recommendations.

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35 A committee responsible for risk management could be a dedicated risk committee, the audit committee, or the finance committee, depending on a given company's board structure and method of disclosure. At some companies, the entire board is charged with risk management.
36 We typically apply a three-year look-back to such issues and also take into account the level of support the director has received from shareholders since the time of the failure.

Conflicts of Interest

We believe board members should be wholly free of identifiable and substantial conflicts of interest, regardless of the overall level of independent directors on the board. Accordingly, we recommend that shareholders vote against the following types of directors:

1. A CFO who is on the board: In our view, the CFO holds a unique position relative to financial reporting and disclosure to shareholders. Due to the critical importance of financial disclosure and reporting, we believe the CFO should report to the board and not be a member of it.

2. A director who is on an excessive number of boards: We will typically recommend voting against a director who serves as an executive officer of any public company while serving on more than two other public company boards and any other director who serves on more than six public company boards.[37] Academic literature suggests that one board takes up approximately 200 hours per year of each member's time. We believe this limits the number of boards on which directors can effectively serve, especially executives at other companies.[38] Further, we note a recent study has shown that the average number of outside board seats held by CEOs of S&P 500 companies is 0.6, down from 0.7 in 2008 and 1.0 in 2003.[39]

3. A director, or a director who has an immediate family member, providing material consulting or other material professional services to the company: These services may include legal, consulting, or financial services. We question the need for the company to have consulting relationships with its directors. We view such relationships as creating conflicts for directors, since they may be forced to weigh their own interests against shareholder interests when making board decisions. In addition, a company's decisions regarding where to turn for the best professional services may be compromised when doing business with the professional services firm of one of the company's directors.

4. A director, or a director who has an immediate family member, engaging in airplane, real estate, or similar deals, including perquisite-type grants from the company, amounting to more than $50,000. Directors who receive these sorts of payments from the company will have to make unnecessarily complicated decisions that may pit their interests against shareholder interests.

5. Interlocking directorships: CEOs or other top executives who serve on each other's boards create an interlock that poses conflicts that should be avoided to ensure the promotion of shareholder interests above all else.[40]

6. All board members who served at a time when a poison pill with a term of longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months.[41] In the event a board is classified and shareholders are therefore unable to vote against all directors, we will recommend voting against the remaining directors the next year they are up for a shareholder vote. If a poison pill with a term of one year or less was adopted without shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of the governance committee. If the board has, without seeking shareholder

37 Glass Lewis will not recommend voting against the director at the company where he or she serves as an executive officer, only at the other public companies where he or she serves on the board.

38 Our guidelines are similar to the standards set forth by the NACD in its "Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism," 2001 Edition, pp. 14-15 (also cited approvingly by the Conference Board in its "Corporate Governance Best Practices: A Blueprint for the Post-Enron Era," 2002, p. 17), which suggested that CEOs should not serve on more than 2 additional boards, persons with full-time work should not serve on more than 4 additional boards, and others should not serve on more than six boards.

39 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2013, p. 6.

40 We do not apply a look-back period for this situation. The interlock policy applies to both public and private companies. We will also evaluate multiple board interlocks among non-insiders (i.e., multiple directors serving on the same boards at other companies), for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.

41 Refer to Section V. Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise for further discussion of our policies regarding anti-takeover measures, including poison pills.

approval, and without adequate justification, extended the term of a poison pill by one year or less in two consecutive years, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the entire board.

Size of the Board of Directors

While we do not believe there is a universally applicable optimum board size, we do believe boards should have at least five directors to ensure sufficient diversity in decision-making and to enable the formation of key board committees with independent directors. Conversely, we believe that boards with more than 20 members will typically suffer under the weight of "too many cooks in the kitchen" and have difficulty reaching consensus and making timely decisions. Sometimes the presence of too many voices can make it difficult to draw on the wisdom and experience in the room by virtue of the need to limit the discussion so that each voice may be heard.

To that end, we typically recommend voting against the chairman of the nominating committee at a board with fewer than five directors. With boards consisting of more than 20 directors, we typically recommend voting against all members of the nominating committee (or the governance committee, in the absence of a nominating committee).[42]

CONTROLLED COMPANIES

Controlled companies present an exception to our independence recommendations. The board's function is to protect shareholder interests; however, when an individual or entity owns more than 50% of the voting shares, the interests of the majority of shareholders are the interests of that entity or individual. Consequently, Glass Lewis does not apply our usual two-thirds independence rule and therefore we will not recommend voting against boards whose composition reflects the makeup of the shareholder population.

Independence Exceptions

The independence exceptions that we make for controlled companies are as follows:

1. We do not require that controlled companies have boards that are at least two-thirds independent. So long as the insiders and/or affiliates are connected with the controlling entity, we accept the presence of non-independent board members.
2. The compensation committee and nominating and governance committees do not need to consist solely of independent directors.
    - We believe that standing nominating and corporate governance committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although having a committee charged with the duties of searching for, selecting, and nominating independent directors can be beneficial, the unique composition of a controlled company's shareholder base makes such committees weak and irrelevant.
    - Likewise, we believe that independent compensation committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although independent directors are the best choice for approving and monitoring senior executives' pay, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests. As such, we believe that having affiliated directors on a controlled company's compensation committee is acceptable. However, given that a controlled company has certain obligations to minority shareholders we feel that an insider should not serve on the compensation committee. Therefore, Glass Lewis

42 The Conference Board, at p. 23 in its May 2003 report "Corporate Governance Best Practices, Id.," quotes one of its roundtable participants as stating, "[w]hen you've got a 20 or 30 person corporate board, it's one way of assuring that nothing is ever going to happen that the CEO doesn't want to happen."

will recommend voting against any insider (the CEO or otherwise) serving on the compensation committee.

3. Controlled companies do not need an independent chairman or an independent lead or presiding director. Although an independent director in a position of authority on the board – such as chairman or presiding director – can best carry out the board's duties, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests.

Size of the Board of Directors

We have no board size requirements for controlled companies.

Audit Committee Independence

We believe that audit committees should consist solely of independent directors. Regardless of a company's controlled status, the interests of all shareholders must be protected by ensuring the integrity and accuracy of the company's financial statements. Allowing affiliated directors to oversee the preparation of financial reports could create an insurmountable conflict of interest.

UNOFFICIALLY CONTROLLED COMPANIES AND 20-50% BENEFICIAL OWNERS

Where a shareholder group owns more than 50% of a company's voting power but the company is not a "controlled" company as defined by relevant listing standards, we apply a lower independence requirement of a majority of the board but believe the company should otherwise be treated like another public company; we will therefore apply all other standards as outlined above.

Similarly, where an individual or entity holds between 20-50% of a company's voting power, but the company is not "controlled," we believe it is reasonable to allow proportional representation on the board and committees (excluding the audit committee) based on the individual or entity's percentage of ownership.

EXCEPTIONS FOR RECENT IPOs

We believe companies that have recently completed an initial public offering ("IPO") should be allowed adequate time to fully comply with marketplace listing requirements as well as to meet basic corporate governance standards. We believe a one-year grace period immediately following the date of a company's IPO is sufficient time for most companies to comply with all relevant regulatory requirements and to meet such corporate governance standards. Except in egregious cases, Glass Lewis refrains from issuing voting recommendations on the basis of corporate governance best practices (e.g., board independence, committee membership and structure, meeting attendance, etc.) during the one-year period following an IPO.

However, two specific cases warrant strong shareholder action against the board of a company that completed an IPO within the past year:

1. Adoption of a poison pill: In cases where a board implements a poison pill preceding an IPO, we will consider voting against the members of the board who served during the period of the poison pill's adoption if the board (i) did not also commit to submit the poison pill to a shareholder vote within 12 months of the IPO or (ii) did not provide a sound rationale for adopting the pill and the pill does not expire in three years or less. In our view, adopting such an anti-takeover device unfairly penalizes future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on a matter that could potentially negatively impact their ownership interest. This notion is strengthened when a board adopts a poison pill with a five to ten year life immediately prior to having a public shareholder base so as to insulate management for a substantial amount

of time while postponing and/or avoiding allowing public shareholders the ability to vote on the pill's adoption. Such instances are indicative of boards that may subvert shareholders' best interests following their IPO.

2. Adoption of an exclusive forum provision: Consistent with our general approach to boards that adopt exclusive forum provisions without shareholder approval (refer to our discussion of nominating and governance committee performance in Section I of the guidelines), in cases where a board adopts such a provision for inclusion in a company's charter or bylaws before the company's IPO, we will recommend voting against the chairman of the governance committee, or, in the absence of such a committee, the chairman of the board, who served during the period of time when the provision was adopted.

In addition, shareholders should also be wary of companies that adopt supermajority voting requirements before their IPO. Absent explicit provisions in the articles or bylaws stipulating that certain policies will be phased out over a certain period of time (e.g. a predetermined declassification of the board, a planned separation of the chairman and CEO, etc.) long-term shareholders could find themselves in the predicament of having to attain a supermajority vote to approve future proposals seeking to eliminate such policies.

DUAL-LISTED COMPANIES

For those companies whose shares trade on exchanges in multiple countries, and which may seek shareholder approval of proposals in accordance with varying exchange- and country-specific rules, we will apply the governance standards most relevant in each situation. We will consider a number of factors in determining which Glass Lewis country-specific policy to apply, including but not limited to: (i) the corporate governance structure and features of the company including whether the board structure is unique to a particular market; (ii) the nature of the proposals; (iii) the location of the company's primary listing, if one can be determined; (iv) the regulatory/governance regime that the board is reporting against; and (v) the availability and completeness of the company's SEC filings.

MUTUAL FUND BOARDS

Mutual funds, or investment companies, are structured differently from regular public companies (i.e., operating companies). Typically, members of a fund's adviser are on the board and management takes on a different role from that of regular public companies. Thus, we focus on a short list of requirements, although many of our guidelines remain the same.

The following mutual fund policies are similar to the policies for regular public companies:

1. Size of the board of directors: The board should be made up of between five and twenty directors.
2. The CFO on the board: Neither the CFO of the fund nor the CFO of the fund's registered investment adviser should serve on the board.
3. Independence of the audit committee: The audit committee should consist solely of independent directors.
4. Audit committee financial expert: At least one member of the audit committee should be designated as the audit committee financial expert.

The following differences from regular public companies apply at mutual funds:

1. Independence of the board: We believe that three-fourths of an investment company's board should be made up of independent directors. This is consistent with a proposed SEC rule on

investment company boards. The Investment Company Act requires 40% of the board to be independent, but in 2001, the SEC amended the Exemptive Rules to require that a majority of a mutual fund board be independent. In 2005, the SEC proposed increasing the independence threshold to 75%. In 2006, a federal appeals court ordered that this rule amendment be put back out for public comment, putting it back into "proposed rule" status. Since mutual fund boards play a vital role in overseeing the relationship between the fund and its investment manager, there is greater need for independent oversight than there is for an operating company board.

2. When the auditor is not up for ratification: We do not recommend voting against the audit committee if the auditor is not up for ratification. Due to the different legal structure of an investment company compared to an operating company, the auditor for the investment company (i.e., mutual fund) does not conduct the same level of financial review for each investment company as for an operating company.

3. Non-independent chairman: The SEC has proposed that the chairman of the fund board be independent. We agree that the roles of a mutual fund's chairman and CEO should be separate. Although we believe this would be best at all companies, we recommend voting against the chairman of an investment company's nominating committee as well as the chairman of the board if the chairman and CEO of a mutual fund are the same person and the fund does not have an independent lead or presiding director. Seven former SEC commissioners support the appointment of an independent chairman and we agree with them that "an independent board chairman would be better able to create conditions favoring the long-term interests of fund shareholders than would a chairman who is an executive of the adviser." (See the comment letter sent to the SEC in support of the proposed rule at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/indchair.pdf)

4. Multiple funds overseen by the same director: Unlike service on a public company board, mutual fund boards require much less of a time commitment. Mutual fund directors typically serve on dozens of other mutual fund boards, often within the same fund complex. The Investment Company Institute's ("ICI") Overview of Fund Governance Practices, 1994-2012, indicates that the average number of funds served by an independent director in 2012 was 53. Absent evidence that a specific director is hindered from being an effective board member at a fund due to service on other funds' boards, we refrain from maintaining a cap on the number of outside mutual fund boards that we believe a director can serve on.

DECLASSIFIED BOARDS

Glass Lewis favors the repeal of staggered boards and the annual election of directors. We believe staggered boards are less accountable to shareholders than boards that are elected annually. Furthermore, we feel the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on shareholder interests.

Empirical studies have shown: (i) companies with staggered boards reduce a firm's value; and (ii) in the context of hostile takeovers, staggered boards operate as a takeover defense, which entrenches management, discourages potential acquirers, and delivers a lower return to target shareholders.

In our view, there is no evidence to demonstrate that staggered boards improve shareholder returns in a takeover context. Research shows that shareholders are worse off when a staggered board blocks a transaction. A study by a group of Harvard Law professors concluded that companies whose staggered boards prevented a takeover "reduced shareholder returns for targets ... on the order of eight to ten percent in the nine months after a hostile bid was announced."[43] When a staggered board negotiates

43 Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV, Guhan Subramanian, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants," 55 Stanford Law Review 885-917 (2002), page 1.

a friendly transaction, no statistically significant difference in premiums occurs.[44] Further, one of those same professors found that charter-based staggered boards "reduce the market value of a firm by 4% to 6% of its market capitalization" and that "staggered boards bring about and not merely reflect this reduction in market value."[45] A subsequent study reaffirmed that classified boards reduce shareholder value, finding "that the ongoing process of dismantling staggered boards, encouraged by institutional investors, could well contribute to increasing shareholder wealth."[46]

Shareholders have increasingly come to agree with this view. In 2013, 91% of S&P 500 companies had declassified boards, up from approximately 40% a decade ago.[47] Clearly, more shareholders have supported the repeal of classified boards. Resolutions relating to the repeal of staggered boards garnered on average over 70% support among shareholders in 2008, whereas in 1987, only 16.4% of votes cast favored board declassification.[48]

Given the empirical evidence suggesting staggered boards reduce a company's value and the increasing shareholder opposition to such a structure, Glass Lewis supports the declassification of boards and the annual election of directors.

MANDATORY DIRECTOR TERM AND AGE LIMITS

Glass Lewis believes that director age and term limits typically are not in shareholders' best interests. Too often age and term limits are used by boards as a crutch to remove board members who have served for an extended period of time. When used in that fashion, they are indicative of a board that has a difficult time making "tough decisions."

Academic literature suggests that there is no evidence of a correlation between either length of tenure or age and director performance. On occasion, term limits can be used as a means to remove a director for boards that are unwilling to police their membership and to enforce turnover. Some shareholders support term limits as a way to force change when boards are unwilling to do so.

While we understand that age limits can be a way to force change where boards are unwilling to make changes on their own, the long-term impact of age limits restricts experienced and potentially valuable board members from service through an arbitrary means. Further, age limits unfairly imply that older (or, in rare cases, younger) directors cannot contribute to company oversight.

In our view, a director's experience can be a valuable asset to shareholders because of the complex, critical issues that boards face. However, we support periodic director rotation to ensure a fresh perspective in the boardroom and the generation of new ideas and business strategies. We believe the board should implement such rotation instead of relying on arbitrary limits. When necessary, shareholders can address the issue of director rotation through director elections.

We believe that shareholders are better off monitoring the board's approach to corporate governance and the board's stewardship of company performance rather than imposing inflexible rules that don't necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders.

However, if a board adopts term/age limits, it should follow through and not waive such limits. If the board waives its term/age limits, Glass Lewis will consider recommending shareholders vote against the nominating and/or governance committees, unless the rule was waived with sufficient explanation, such as consummation of a corporate transaction like a merger.

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44 Id. at 2 ("Examining a sample of seventy-three negotiated transactions from 2000 to 2002, we find no systematic benefits in terms of higher premia to boards that have [staggered structures].").
45 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, "The Costs of Entrenched Boards" (2004).
46 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang, "Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706806 (2010), p. 26.
47 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2013, p. 4
48 Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy," 54 Stanford Law Review 887-951 (2002).

REQUIRING TWO OR MORE NOMINEES PER BOARD SEAT

In an attempt to address lack of access to the ballot, shareholders sometimes propose that the board give shareholders a choice of directors for each open board seat in every election. However, we feel that policies requiring a selection of multiple nominees for each board seat would discourage prospective directors from accepting nominations. A prospective director could not be confident either that he or she is the board's clear choice or that he or she would be elected. Therefore, Glass Lewis generally will vote against such proposals.

PROXY ACCESS

Proxy Access has garnered significant attention in recent years. As in 2013, we expect to see a number of shareholder proposals regarding this topic in 2014 and perhaps even some companies unilaterally adopting some elements of proxy access. However, considering the uncertainty in this area and the inherent case-by-case nature of those situations, we refrain from establishing any specific parameters at this time.

For a discussion of recent regulatory events in this area, along with a detailed overview of the Glass Lewis approach to Shareholder Proposals regarding Proxy Access, refer to Glass Lewis' ***Proxy Paper Guidelines for Shareholder Initiatives.***

MAJORITY VOTE FOR THE ELECTION OF DIRECTORS

In stark contrast to the failure of shareholder access to gain acceptance, majority voting for the election of directors is fast becoming the de facto standard in corporate board elections. In our view, the majority voting proposals are an effort to make the case for shareholder impact on director elections on a company-specific basis.

While this proposal would not give shareholders the opportunity to nominate directors or lead to elections where shareholders have a choice among director candidates, if implemented, the proposal would allow shareholders to have a voice in determining whether the nominees proposed by the board should actually serve as the overseer-representatives of shareholders in the boardroom. We believe this would be a favorable outcome for shareholders.

During the first half of 2013, Glass Lewis tracked approximately 30 shareholder proposals seeking to require a majority vote to elect directors at annual meetings in the U.S. While this is roughly on par with what we have reviewed in each of the past several years, it is a sharp contrast to the 147 proposals tracked during all of 2006. This large drop in the number of proposals being submitted in recent years compared to 2006 is a result of many companies having already adopted some form of majority voting, including approximately 84% of companies in the S&P 500 Index, up from 56% in 2008.[49] During 2013, these proposals received, on average, 59% shareholder support (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes), up from 54% in 2008. Further, nearly half of these resolutions received majority shareholder support.

THE PLURALITY VOTE STANDARD

Today, most US companies still elect directors by a plurality vote standard. Under that standard, if one shareholder holding only one share votes in favor of a nominee (including himself, if the director is a shareholder), that nominee "wins" the election and assumes a seat on the board. The common concern among companies with a plurality voting standard is the possibility that one or more directors would not receive a majority of votes, resulting in "failed elections." This was of particular concern during the 1980s, an era of frequent takeovers and contests for control of companies.

49 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2013, p. 13

ADVANTAGES OF A MAJORITY VOTE STANDARD

If a majority vote standard were implemented, a nominee would have to receive the support of a majority of the shares voted in order to be elected. Thus, shareholders could collectively vote to reject a director they believe will not pursue their best interests. We think that this minimal amount of protection for shareholders is reasonable and will not upset the corporate structure nor reduce the willingness of qualified shareholder-focused directors to serve in the future.

We believe that a majority vote standard will likely lead to more attentive directors. Occasional use of this power will likely prevent the election of directors with a record of ignoring shareholder interests in favor of other interests that conflict with those of investors. Glass Lewis will generally support proposals calling for the election of directors by a majority vote except for use in contested director elections.

In response to the high level of support majority voting has garnered, many companies have voluntarily taken steps to implement majority voting or modified approaches to majority voting. These steps range from a modified approach requiring directors that receive a majority of withheld votes to resign (e.g., Ashland Inc.) to actually requiring a majority vote of outstanding shares to elect directors (e.g., Intel).

We feel that the modified approach does not go far enough because requiring a director to resign is not the same as requiring a majority vote to elect a director and does not allow shareholders a definitive voice in the election process. Further, under the modified approach, the corporate governance committee could reject a resignation and, even if it accepts the resignation, the corporate governance committee decides on the director's replacement. And since the modified approach is usually adopted as a policy by the board or a board committee, it could be altered by the same board or committee at any time.

III. TRANSPARENCY AND INTEGRITY OF FINANCIAL REPORTING

AUDITOR RATIFICATION

The auditor's role as gatekeeper is crucial in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the financial information necessary for protecting shareholder value. Shareholders rely on the auditor to ask tough questions and to do a thorough analysis of a company's books to ensure that the information provided to shareholders is complete, accurate, fair, and that it is a reasonable representation of a company's financial position. The only way shareholders can make rational investment decisions is if the market is equipped with accurate information about a company's fiscal health. As stated in the October 6, 2008 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury:

> *"The auditor is expected to offer critical and objective judgment on the financial matters under consideration, and actual and perceived absence of conflicts is critical to that expectation. The Committee believes that auditors, investors, public companies, and other market participants must understand the independence requirements and their objectives, and that auditors must adopt a mindset of skepticism when facing situations that may compromise their independence."*

As such, shareholders should demand an objective, competent and diligent auditor who performs at or above professional standards at every company in which the investors hold an interest. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should avoid situations requiring a choice between the auditor's interests and the public's interests. Almost without exception, shareholders should be able to annually review an auditor's performance and to annually ratify a board's auditor selection. Moreover, in October 2008, the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession went even further, and recommended that "to further enhance audit committee oversight and auditor accountability ... disclosure in the company proxy statement regarding shareholder ratification [should] include the name(s) of the senior auditing partner(s) staffed on the engagement."[50]

On August 16, 2011, the PCAOB issued a Concept Release seeking public comment on ways that auditor independence, objectivity and professional skepticism could be enhanced, with a specific emphasis on mandatory audit firm rotation. The PCAOB convened several public roundtable meetings during 2012 to further discuss such matters. Glass Lewis believes auditor rotation can ensure both the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the audit; we will typically recommend supporting proposals to require auditor rotation when the proposal uses a reasonable period of time (usually not less than 5-7 years), particularly at companies with a history of accounting problems.

VOTING RECOMMENDATIONS ON AUDITOR RATIFICATION

We generally support management's choice of auditor except when we believe the auditor's independence or audit integrity has been compromised. Where a board has not allowed shareholders to review and ratify an auditor, we typically recommend voting against the audit committee chairman. When there have been material restatements of annual financial statements or material weaknesses in internal controls, we usually recommend voting against the entire audit committee.

50 "Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury." p. VIII:20, October 6, 2008.

Reasons why we may not recommend ratification of an auditor include:

1. When audit fees plus audit-related fees total less than the tax fees and/or other non-audit fees.
2. Recent material restatements of annual financial statements, including those resulting in the reporting of material weaknesses in internal controls and including late filings by the company where the auditor bears some responsibility for the restatement or late filing.[51]
3. When the auditor performs prohibited services such as tax-shelter work, tax services for the CEO or CFO, or contingent-fee work, such as a fee based on a percentage of economic benefit to the company.
4. When audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.
5. When the company has aggressive accounting policies.
6. When the company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in its financial statements.
7. Where the auditor limited its liability through its contract with the company or the audit contract requires the corporation to use alternative dispute resolution procedures without adequate justification.
8. We also look for other relationships or concerns with the auditor that might suggest a conflict between the auditor's interests and shareholder interests.

PENSION ACCOUNTING ISSUES

A pension accounting question often raised in proxy proposals is what effect, if any, projected returns on employee pension assets should have on a company's net income. This issue often arises in the executive-compensation context in a discussion of the extent to which pension accounting should be reflected in business performance for purposes of calculating payments to executives.

Glass Lewis believes that pension credits should not be included in measuring income that is used to award performance-based compensation. Because many of the assumptions used in accounting for retirement plans are subject to the company's discretion, management would have an obvious conflict of interest if pay were tied to pension income. In our view, projected income from pensions does not truly reflect a company's performance.

51 An auditor does not audit interim financial statements. Thus, we generally do not believe that an auditor should be opposed due to a restatement of interim financial statements unless the nature of the misstatement is clear from a reading of the incorrect financial statements.

IV. THE LINK BETWEEN COMPENSATION AND PERFORMANCE

Glass Lewis carefully reviews the compensation awarded to senior executives, as we believe that this is an important area in which the board's priorities are revealed. Glass Lewis strongly believes executive compensation should be linked directly with the performance of the business the executive is charged with managing. We believe the most effective compensation arrangements provide for an appropriate mix of performance-based short- and long-term incentives in addition to fixed pay elements.

Glass Lewis believes that comprehensive, timely and transparent disclosure of executive pay is critical to allowing shareholders to evaluate the extent to which pay is keeping pace with company performance. When reviewing proxy materials, Glass Lewis examines whether the company discloses the performance metrics used to determine executive compensation. We recognize performance metrics must necessarily vary depending on the company and industry, among other factors, and may include a wide variety of financial measures as well as industry-specific performance indicators. However, we believe companies should disclose why the specific performance metrics were selected and how the actions they are designed to incentivize will lead to better corporate performance.

Moreover, it is rarely in shareholders' interests to disclose competitive data about individual salaries below the senior executive level. Such disclosure could create internal personnel discord that would be counterproductive for the company and its shareholders. While we favor full disclosure for senior executives and we view pay disclosure at the aggregate level (e.g., the number of employees being paid over a certain amount or in certain categories) as potentially useful, we do not believe shareholders need or will benefit from detailed reports about individual management employees other than the most senior executives.

ADVISORY VOTE ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ("SAY-ON-PAY")

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act") required companies to hold an advisory vote on executive compensation at the first shareholder meeting that occurs six months after enactment of the bill (January 21, 2011).

This practice of allowing shareholders a non-binding vote on a company's compensation report is standard practice in many non-US countries, and has been a requirement for most companies in the United Kingdom since 2003 and in Australia since 2005. Although say-on-pay proposals are non-binding, a high level of "against" or "abstain" votes indicates substantial shareholder concern about a company's compensation policies and procedures.

Given the complexity of most companies' compensation programs, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach when analyzing advisory votes on executive compensation. We review each company's compensation on a case-by-case basis, recognizing that each company must be examined in the context of industry, size, maturity, performance, financial condition, its historic pay for performance practices, and any other relevant internal or external factors.

We believe that each company should design and apply specific compensation policies and practices that are appropriate to the circumstances of the company and, in particular, will attract and retain competent executives and other staff, while motivating them to grow the company's long-term shareholder value.

Where we find those specific policies and practices serve to reasonably align compensation with performance, and such practices are adequately disclosed, Glass Lewis will recommend supporting the company's approach. If, however, those specific policies and practices fail to demonstrably link compensation with performance, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against the say-on-pay proposal.

Glass Lewis focuses on four main areas when reviewing say-on-pay proposals:

- The overall design and structure of the company's executive compensation program including performance metrics;
- The quality and content of the company's disclosure;
- The quantum paid to executives; and
- The link between compensation and performance as indicated by the company's current and past pay-for-performance grades.

We also review any significant changes or modifications, and rationale for such changes, made to the company's compensation structure or award amounts, including base salaries.

SAY-ON-PAY VOTING RECOMMENDATIONS

In cases where we find deficiencies in a company's compensation program's design, implementation or management, we will recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. Generally such instances include evidence of a pattern of poor pay-for-performance practices (i.e., deficient or failing pay for performance grades), unclear or questionable disclosure regarding the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited information regarding benchmarking processes, limited rationale for bonus performance metrics and targets, etc.), questionable adjustments to certain aspects of the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited rationale for significant changes to performance targets or metrics, the payout of guaranteed bonuses or sizable retention grants, etc.), and/or other egregious compensation practices.

Although not an exhaustive list, the following issues when weighed together may cause Glass Lewis to recommend voting against a say-on-pay vote:

- Inappropriate peer group and/or benchmarking issues;
- Inadequate or no rationale for changes to peer groups;
- Egregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards or severance payments, including golden handshakes and golden parachutes;
- Guaranteed bonuses;
- Targeting overall levels of compensation at higher than median without adequate justification;
- Bonus or long-term plan targets set at less than mean or negative performance levels;
- Performance targets not sufficiently challenging, and/or providing for high potential payouts;
- Performance targets lowered without justification;
- Discretionary bonuses paid when short- or long-term incentive plan targets were not met;
- Executive pay high relative to peers not justified by outstanding company performance; and

- The terms of the long-term incentive plans are inappropriate (please see "Long-Term Incentives" on page 28).

In instances where a company has simply failed to provide sufficient disclosure of its policies, we may recommend shareholders vote against this proposal solely on this basis, regardless of the appropriateness of compensation levels.

COMPANY RESPONSIVENESS

At companies that received a significant level of shareholder disapproval (25% or greater) to their say-on-pay proposal at the previous annual meeting, we believe the board should demonstrate some level of engagement and responsiveness to the shareholder concerns behind the discontent. While we recognize that sweeping changes cannot be made to a compensation program without due consideration and that a majority of shareholders voted in favor of the proposal, we will look for disclosure in the proxy statement and other publicly-disclosed filings that indicates the compensation committee is responding to the prior year's vote results including engaging with large shareholders to identify the concerns causing the substantial vote against. In the absence of any evidence that the board is actively engaging shareholders on these issues and responding accordingly, we may recommend holding compensation committee members accountable for failing to adequately respond to shareholder opposition, giving careful consideration to the level of shareholder protest and the severity and history of compensation problems.

Where we identify egregious compensation practices, we may also recommend voting against the compensation committee based on the practices or actions of its members during the year, such as approving large one-off payments, the inappropriate, unjustified use of discretion, or sustained poor pay for performance practices.

PAY FOR PERFORMANCE

Glass Lewis believes an integral part of a well-structured compensation package is a successful link between pay and performance. Our proprietary pay-for-performance model was developed to better evaluate the link between pay and performance of the top five executives at US companies. Our model benchmarks these executives' pay and company performance against peers selected by Equilar's market-based peer groups and across five performance metrics. By measuring the magnitude of the gap between two weighted-average percentile rankings (executive compensation and performance), we grade companies from a school letter system: "A", "B", "F", etc. The grades guide our evaluation of compensation committee effectiveness and we generally recommend voting against compensation committee of companies with a pattern of failing our pay-for-performance analysis.

We also use this analysis to inform our voting decisions on say-on-pay proposals. As such, if a company receives a failing grade from our proprietary model, we are likely to recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. However, there may be exceptions to this rule such as when a company makes significant enhancements to its compensation programs that may not be reflected yet in a quantitative assessment.

SHORT-TERM INCENTIVES

A short-term bonus or incentive ("STI") should be demonstrably tied to performance. Whenever possible, we believe a mix of corporate and individual performance measures is appropriate. We would normally expect performance measures for STIs to be based on company-wide or divisional financial measures as well as non-financial factors such as those related to safety, environmental issues, and customer satisfaction. While we recognize that companies operating in different sectors or markets may seek to utilize a wide range of metrics, we expect such measures to be appropriately tied to a company's business drivers.

Further, the target and potential maximum awards that can be achieved under STI awards should be disclosed. Shareholders should expect stretching performance targets for the maximum award to be achieved. Any increase in the potential maximum award should be clearly justified to shareholders.

Glass Lewis recognizes that disclosure of some measures may include commercially confidential information. Therefore, we believe it may be reasonable to exclude such information in some cases as long as the company provides sufficient justification for non-disclosure. However, where a short-term bonus has been paid, companies should disclose the extent to which performance has been achieved against relevant targets, including disclosure of the actual target achieved.

Where management has received significant STIs but short-term performance over the previous year prima facie appears to be poor or negative, we believe the company should provide a clear explanation of why these significant short-term payments were made.

LONG-TERM INCENTIVES

Glass Lewis recognizes the value of equity-based incentive programs. When used appropriately, they can provide a vehicle for linking an executive's pay to company performance, thereby aligning their interests with those of shareholders. In addition, equity-based compensation can be an effective way to attract, retain and motivate key employees.

There are certain elements that Glass Lewis believes are common to most well-structured long-term incentive ("LTI") plans. These include:

- No re-testing or lowering of performance conditions;
- Performance metrics that cannot be easily manipulated by management;
- Two or more performance metrics;
- At least one relative performance metric that compares the company's performance to a relevant peer group or index;
- Performance periods of at least three years;
- Stretching metrics that incentivize executives to strive for outstanding performance while not encouraging excessive risk-taking; and
- Individual limits expressed as a percentage of base salary.

Performance measures should be carefully selected and should relate to the specific business/industry in which the company operates and, especially, the key value drivers of the company's business.

While cognizant of the inherent complexity of certain performance metrics, Glass Lewis generally believes that measuring a company's performance with multiple metrics serves to provide a more complete picture of the company's performance than a single metric, which may focus too much management attention on a single target and is therefore more susceptible to manipulation. When utilized for relative measurements, external benchmarks such as a sector index or peer group should be disclosed and transparent. The rationale behind the selection of a specific index or peer group should also be disclosed. Internal benchmarks should also be disclosed and transparent, unless a cogent case for confidentiality is made and fully explained.

We also believe shareholders should evaluate the relative success of a company's compensation programs, particularly with regard to existing equity-based incentive plans, in linking pay and performance in evaluating new LTI plans to determine the impact of additional stock awards. We

will therefore review the company's pay-for-performance grade (see below for more information) and specifically the proportion of total compensation that is stock-based.

RECOUPMENT ("CLAWBACK") PROVISIONS

Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to create a rule requiring listed companies to adopt policies for recouping certain compensation during a three-year look-back period. The rule applies to incentive-based compensation paid to current or former executives if the company is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to erroneous data resulting from material non-compliance with any financial reporting requirements under the securities laws.

These recoupment provisions are more stringent than under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in three respects: (i) the provisions extend to current or former executive officers rather than only to the CEO and CFO; (ii) it has a three-year look-back period (rather than a twelve-month look-back period); and (iii) it allows for recovery of compensation based upon a financial restatement due to erroneous data, and therefore does not require misconduct on the part of the executive or other employees.

HEDGING OF STOCK

Glass Lewis believes that the hedging of shares by executives in the shares of the companies where they are employed severs the alignment of interests of the executive with shareholders. We believe companies should adopt strict policies to prohibit executives from hedging the economic risk associated with their shareownership in the company.

PLEDGING OF STOCK

Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should examine the facts and circumstances of each company rather than apply a one-size-fits-all policy regarding employee stock pledging. Glass Lewis believes that shareholders benefit when employees, particularly senior executives have "skin-in-the-game" and therefore recognizes the benefits of measures designed to encourage employees to both buy shares out of their own pocket and to retain shares they have been granted; blanket policies prohibiting stock pledging may discourage executives and employees from doing either.

However, we also recognize that the pledging of shares can present a risk that, depending on a host of factors, an executive with significant pledged shares and limited other assets may have an incentive to take steps to avoid a forced sale of shares in the face of a rapid stock price decline. Therefore, to avoid substantial losses from a forced sale to meet the terms of the loan, the executive may have an incentive to boost the stock price in the short term in a manner that is unsustainable, thus hurting shareholders in the long-term. We also recognize concerns regarding pledging may not apply to less senior employees, given the latter group's significantly more limited influence over a company's stock price. Therefore, we believe that the issue of pledging shares should be reviewed in that context, as should polices that distinguish between the two groups.

Glass Lewis believes that the benefits of stock ownership by executives and employees may outweigh the risks of stock pledging, depending on many factors. As such, Glass Lewis reviews all relevant factors in evaluating proposed policies, limitations and prohibitions on pledging stock, including:

- The number of shares pledged;
- The percentage executives' pledged shares are of outstanding shares;
- The percentage executives' pledged shares are of each executive's shares and total assets;
- Whether the pledged shares were purchased by the employee or granted by the company;

- Whether there are different policies for purchased and granted shares;
- Whether the granted shares were time-based or performance-based;
- The overall governance profile of the company;
- The volatility of the company's stock (in order to determine the likelihood of a sudden stock price drop);
- The nature and cyclicality, if applicable, of the company's industry;
- The participation and eligibility of executives and employees in pledging;
- The company's current policies regarding pledging and any waiver from these policies for employees and executives; and
- Disclosure of the extent of any pledging, particularly among senior executives.

COMPENSATION CONSULTANT INDEPENDENCE

As mandated by Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the SEC approved new listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require compensation committees to consider six factors in assessing compensation advisor independence. These factors include: (1) provision of other services to the company; (2) fees paid by the company as a percentage of the advisor's total annual revenue; (3) policies and procedures of the advisor to mitigate conflicts of interests; (4) any business or personal relationships of the consultant with any member of the compensation committee; (5) any company stock held by the consultant; and (6) any business or personal relationships of the consultant with any executive officer of the company. According to the SEC, "no one factor should be viewed as a determinative factor." Glass Lewis believes this six-factor assessment is an important process for every compensation committee to undertake.

We believe compensation consultants are engaged to provide objective, disinterested, expert advice to the compensation committee. When the consultant or its affiliates receive substantial income from providing other services to the company, we believe the potential for a conflict of interest arises and the independence of the consultant may be jeopardized. Therefore, Glass Lewis will, when relevant, note the potential for a conflict of interest when the fees paid to the advisor or its affiliates for other services exceeds those paid for compensation consulting.

FREQUENCY OF SAY-ON-PAY

The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to allow shareholders a non-binding vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes, i.e. every one, two or three years. Additionally, Dodd-Frank requires companies to hold such votes on the frequency of say-on-pay votes at least once every six years.

We believe companies should submit say-on-pay votes to shareholders every year. We believe that the time and financial burdens to a company with regard to an annual vote are relatively small and incremental and are outweighed by the benefits to shareholders through more frequent accountability. Implementing biannual or triennial votes on executive compensation limits shareholders' ability to hold the board accountable for its compensation practices through means other than voting against the compensation committee. Unless a company provides a compelling rationale or unique circumstances for say-on-pay votes less frequent than annually, we will generally recommend that shareholders support annual votes on compensation.

VOTE ON GOLDEN PARACHUTE ARRANGEMENTS

The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to provide shareholders with a separate non-binding vote on approval of golden parachute compensation arrangements in connection with certain change-in-control transactions. However, if the golden parachute arrangements have previously been subject to a say-on-pay vote which shareholders approved, then this required vote is waived.

Glass Lewis believes the narrative and tabular disclosure of golden parachute arrangements benefits all shareholders. Glass Lewis analyzes each golden parachute arrangement on a case-by-case basis, taking into account, among other items: the ultimate value of the payments particularly compared to the value of the transaction, the tenure and position of the executives in question, and the type of triggers involved (single vs. double).

EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION PLAN PROPOSALS

We believe that equity compensation awards are useful, when not abused, for retaining employees and providing an incentive for them to act in a way that will improve company performance. Glass Lewis evaluates equity-based compensation plans using a detailed model and analytical review.

Equity-based compensation programs have important differences from cash compensation plans and bonus programs. Accordingly, our model and analysis takes into account factors such as plan administration, the method and terms of exercise, repricing history, express or implied rights to reprice, and the presence of evergreen provisions.

Our analysis is primarily quantitative and focused on the plan's cost as compared with the business's operating metrics. We run twenty different analyses, comparing the program with absolute limits we believe are key to equity value creation and with a carefully chosen peer group. In general, our model seeks to determine whether the proposed plan is either absolutely excessive or is more than one standard deviation away from the average plan for the peer group on a range of criteria, including dilution to shareholders and the projected annual cost relative to the company's financial performance. Each of the twenty analyses (and their constituent parts) is weighted and the plan is scored in accordance with that weight.

In our analysis, we compare the program's expected annual expense with the business's operating metrics to help determine whether the plan is excessive in light of company performance. We also compare the plan's expected annual cost to the enterprise value of the firm rather than to market capitalization because the employees, managers and directors of the firm contribute to the creation of enterprise value but not necessarily market capitalization (the biggest difference is seen where cash represents the vast majority of market capitalization). Finally, we do not rely exclusively on relative comparisons with averages because, in addition to creeping averages serving to inflate compensation, we believe that some absolute limits are warranted.

We evaluate equity plans based on certain overarching principles:

- Companies should seek more shares only when needed;
- Requested share amounts should be small enough that companies seek shareholder approval every three to four years (or more frequently);
- If a plan is relatively expensive, it should not grant options solely to senior executives and board members;
- Annual net share count and voting power dilution should be limited;

- Annual cost of the plan (especially if not shown on the income statement) should be reasonable as a percentage of financial results and should be in line with the peer group;
- The expected annual cost of the plan should be proportional to the business's value;
- The intrinsic value that option grantees received in the past should be reasonable compared with the business's financial results;
- Plans should deliver value on a per-employee basis when compared with programs at peer companies;
- Plans should not permit re-pricing of stock options;
- Plans should not contain excessively liberal administrative or payment terms;
- Plans should not count shares in ways that understate the potential dilution, or cost, to common shareholders. This refers to "inverse" full-value award multipliers;
- Selected performance metrics should be challenging and appropriate, and should be subject to relative performance measurements; and
- Stock grants should be subject to minimum vesting and/or holding periods sufficient to ensure sustainable performance and promote retention.

OPTION EXCHANGES

Glass Lewis views option repricing plans and option exchange programs with great skepticism. Shareholders have substantial risk in owning stock and we believe that the employees, officers, and directors who receive stock options should be similarly situated to align their interests with shareholder interests.

We are concerned that option grantees who believe they will be "rescued" from underwater options will be more inclined to take unjustifiable risks. Moreover, a predictable pattern of repricing or exchanges substantially alters a stock option's value because options that will practically never expire deeply out of the money are worth far more than options that carry a risk of expiration.

In short, repricings and option exchange programs change the bargain between shareholders and employees after the bargain has been struck.

There is one circumstance in which a repricing or option exchange program is acceptable: if macroeconomic or industry trends, rather than specific company issues, cause a stock's value to decline dramatically and the repricing is necessary to motivate and retain employees. In this circumstance, we think it fair to conclude that option grantees may be suffering from a risk that was not foreseeable when the original "bargain" was struck. In such a circumstance, we will recommend supporting a repricing only if the following conditions are true:

- Officers and board members cannot participate in the program;
- The stock decline mirrors the market or industry price decline in terms of timing and approximates the decline in magnitude;
- The exchange is value-neutral or value-creative to shareholders using very conservative assumptions and with a recognition of the adverse selection problems inherent in voluntary programs; and
- Management and the board make a cogent case for needing to motivate and retain existing employees, such as being in a competitive employment market.

OPTION BACKDATING, SPRING-LOADING AND BULLET-DODGING

Glass Lewis views option backdating, and the related practices of spring-loading and bullet-dodging, as egregious actions that warrant holding the appropriate management and board members responsible. These practices are similar to re-pricing options and eliminate much of the downside risk inherent in an option grant that is designed to induce recipients to maximize shareholder return.

Backdating an option is the act of changing an option's grant date from the actual grant date to an earlier date when the market price of the underlying stock was lower, resulting in a lower exercise price for the option. Since 2006, Glass Lewis has identified over 270 companies that have disclosed internal or government investigations into their past stock-option grants.

Spring-loading is granting stock options while in possession of material, positive information that has not been disclosed publicly. Bullet-dodging is delaying the grants of stock options until after the release of material, negative information. This can allow option grants to be made at a lower price either before the release of positive news or following the release of negative news, assuming the stock's price will move up or down in response to the information. This raises a concern similar to that of insider trading, or the trading on material non-public information.

The exercise price for an option is determined on the day of grant, providing the recipient with the same market risk as an investor who bought shares on that date. However, where options were backdated, the executive or the board (or the compensation committee) changed the grant date retroactively. The new date may be at or near the lowest price for the year or period. This would be like allowing an investor to look back and select the lowest price of the year at which to buy shares.

A 2006 study of option grants made between 1996 and 2005 at 8,000 companies found that option backdating can be an indication of poor internal controls. The study found that option backdating was more likely to occur at companies without a majority independent board and with a long-serving CEO; both factors, the study concluded, were associated with greater CEO influence on the company's compensation and governance practices.[52]

Where a company granted backdated options to an executive who is also a director, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against that executive/director, regardless of who decided to make the award. In addition, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against those directors who either approved or allowed the backdating. Glass Lewis feels that executives and directors who either benefited from backdated options or authorized the practice have breached their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders.

Given the severe tax and legal liabilities to the company from backdating, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against members of the audit committee who served when options were backdated, a restatement occurs, material weaknesses in internal controls exist and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation. These committee members failed in their responsibility to ensure the integrity of the company's financial reports.

When a company has engaged in spring-loading or bullet-dodging, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against the compensation committee members where there has been a pattern of granting options at or near historic lows. Glass Lewis will also recommend voting against executives serving on the board who benefited from the spring-loading or bullet-dodging.

DIRECTOR COMPENSATION PLANS

Glass Lewis believes that non-employee directors should receive reasonable and appropriate compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees. However, a

52 Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer. "LUCKY CEOs." November, 2006.

balance is required. Fees should be competitive in order to retain and attract qualified individuals, but excessive fees represent a financial cost to the company and potentially compromise the objectivity and independence of non-employee directors. We will consider recommending supporting compensation plans that include option grants or other equity-based awards that help to align the interests of outside directors with those of shareholders. However, equity grants to directors should not be performance-based to ensure directors are not incentivized in the same manner as executives but rather serve as a check on imprudent risk-taking in executive compensation plan design.

Glass Lewis uses a proprietary model and analyst review to evaluate the costs of equity plans compared to the plans of peer companies with similar market capitalizations. We use the results of this model to guide our voting recommendations on stock-based director compensation plans.

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TAX DEDUCTIBILITY (IRS 162(M) COMPLIANCE)

Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code allows companies to deduct compensation in excess of $1 million for the CEO and the next three most highly compensated executive officers, excluding the CFO, if the compensation is performance-based and is paid under shareholder-approved plans. Companies therefore submit incentive plans for shareholder approval to take of advantage of the tax deductibility afforded under 162(m) for certain types of compensation.

We believe the best practice for companies is to provide robust disclosure to shareholders so that they can make fully-informed judgments about the reasonableness of the proposed compensation plan. To allow for meaningful shareholder review, we prefer that disclosure should include specific performance metrics, a maximum award pool, and a maximum award amount per employee. We also believe it is important to analyze the estimated grants to see if they are reasonable and in line with the company's peers.

We typically recommend voting against a 162(m) proposal where: (i) a company fails to provide at least a list of performance targets; (ii) a company fails to provide one of either a total maximum or an individual maximum; or (iii) the proposed plan is excessive when compared with the plans of the company's peers.

The company's record of aligning pay with performance (as evaluated using our proprietary pay-for-performance model) also plays a role in our recommendation. Where a company has a record of setting reasonable pay relative to business performance, we generally recommend voting in favor of a plan even if the plan caps seem large relative to peers because we recognize the value in special pay arrangements for continued exceptional performance.

As with all other issues we review, our goal is to provide consistent but contextual advice given the specifics of the company and ongoing performance. Overall, we recognize that it is generally not in shareholders' best interests to vote against such a plan and forgo the potential tax benefit since shareholder rejection of such plans will not curtail the awards; it will only prevent the tax deduction associated with them.

V. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND THE SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE

ANTI-TAKEOVER MEASURES

POISON PILLS (SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PLANS)

Glass Lewis believes that poison pill plans are not generally in shareholders' best interests. They can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. Rights plans can thus prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock. Typically we recommend that shareholders vote against these plans to protect their financial interests and ensure that they have an opportunity to consider any offer for their shares, especially those at a premium.

We believe boards should be given wide latitude in directing company activities and in charting the company's course. However, on an issue such as this, where the link between the shareholders' financial interests and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is substantial, we believe that shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether they support such a plan's implementation. This issue is different from other matters that are typically left to board discretion. Its potential impact on and relation to shareholders is direct and substantial. It is also an issue in which management interests may be different from those of shareholders; thus, ensuring that shareholders have a voice is the only way to safeguard their interests.

In certain circumstances, we will support a poison pill that is limited in scope to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable qualifying offer clause. We will consider supporting a poison pill plan if the qualifying offer clause includes each of the following attributes:

- The form of offer is not required to be an all-cash transaction;
- The offer is not required to remain open for more than 90 business days;
- The offeror is permitted to amend the offer, reduce the offer, or otherwise change the terms;
- There is no fairness opinion requirement; and
- There is a low to no premium requirement.

Where these requirements are met, we typically feel comfortable that shareholders will have the opportunity to voice their opinion on any legitimate offer.

NOL POISON PILLS

Similarly, Glass Lewis may consider supporting a limited poison pill in the unique event that a company seeks shareholder approval of a rights plan for the express purpose of preserving Net Operating Losses (NOLs). While companies with NOLs can generally carry these losses forward to offset future taxable income, Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code limits companies' ability to use NOLs in the event of a "change of ownership."[53] In this case, a company may adopt or amend a poison pill ("NOL pill") in order to prevent an inadvertent change of ownership by multiple investors purchasing small

53 Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code refers to a "change of ownership" of more than 50 percentage points by one or more 5% shareholders within a three-year period. The statute is intended to deter the "trafficking" of net operating losses.

chunks of stock at the same time, and thereby preserve the ability to carry the NOLs forward. Often such NOL pills have trigger thresholds much lower than the common 15% or 20% thresholds, with some NOL pill triggers as low as 5%.

Glass Lewis evaluates NOL pills on a strictly case-by-case basis taking into consideration, among other factors, the value of the NOLs to the company, the likelihood of a change of ownership based on the size of the holding and the nature of the larger shareholders, the trigger threshold and whether the term of the plan is limited in duration (i.e., whether it contains a reasonable "sunset" provision) or is subject to periodic board review and/or shareholder ratification. However, we will recommend that shareholders vote against a proposal to adopt or amend a pill to include NOL protective provisions if the company has adopted a more narrowly tailored means of preventing a change in control to preserve its NOLs. For example, a company may limit share transfers in its charter to prevent a change of ownership from occurring.

Furthermore, we believe that shareholders should be offered the opportunity to vote on any adoption or renewal of a NOL pill regardless of any potential tax benefit that it offers a company. As such, we will consider recommending voting against those members of the board who served at the time when an NOL pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months and where the NOL pill is not subject to shareholder ratification.

FAIR PRICE PROVISIONS

Fair price provisions, which are rare, require that certain minimum price and procedural requirements be observed by any party that acquires more than a specified percentage of a corporation's common stock. The provision is intended to protect minority shareholder value when an acquirer seeks to accomplish a merger or other transaction which would eliminate or change the interests of the minority stockholders. The provision is generally applied against the acquirer unless the takeover is approved by a majority of "continuing directors" and holders of a majority, in some cases a supermajority as high as 80%, of the combined voting power of all stock entitled to vote to alter, amend, or repeal the above provisions.

The effect of a fair price provision is to require approval of any merger or business combination with an "interested stockholder" by 51% of the voting stock of the company, excluding the shares held by the interested stockholder. An interested stockholder is generally considered to be a holder of 10% or more of the company's outstanding stock, but the trigger can vary.

Generally, provisions are put in place for the ostensible purpose of preventing a back-end merger where the interested stockholder would be able to pay a lower price for the remaining shares of the company than he or she paid to gain control. The effect of a fair price provision on shareholders, however, is to limit their ability to gain a premium for their shares through a partial tender offer or open market acquisition which typically raise the share price, often significantly. A fair price provision discourages such transactions because of the potential costs of seeking shareholder approval and because of the restrictions on purchase price for completing a merger or other transaction at a later time.

Glass Lewis believes that fair price provisions, while sometimes protecting shareholders from abuse in a takeover situation, more often act as an impediment to takeovers, potentially limiting gains to shareholders from a variety of transactions that could significantly increase share price. In some cases, even the independent directors of the board cannot make exceptions when such exceptions may be in the best interests of shareholders. Given the existence of state law protections for minority shareholders such as Section 203 of the Delaware Corporations Code, we believe it is in the best interests of shareholders to remove fair price provisions.

REINCORPORATION

In general, Glass Lewis believes that the board is in the best position to determine the appropriate jurisdiction of incorporation for the company. When examining a management proposal to reincorporate to a different state or country, we review the relevant financial benefits, generally related to improved corporate tax treatment, as well as changes in corporate governance provisions, especially those relating to shareholder rights, resulting from the change in domicile. Where the financial benefits are de minimis and there is a decrease in shareholder rights, we will recommend voting against the transaction.

However, costly, shareholder-initiated reincorporations are typically not the best route to achieve the furtherance of shareholder rights. We believe shareholders are generally better served by proposing specific shareholder resolutions addressing pertinent issues which may be implemented at a lower cost, and perhaps even with board approval. However, when shareholders propose a shift into a jurisdiction with enhanced shareholder rights, Glass Lewis examines the significant ways would the company benefit from shifting jurisdictions including the following:

- Is the board sufficiently independent?
- Does the company have anti-takeover protections such as a poison pill or classified board in place?
- Has the board been previously unresponsive to shareholders (such as failing to implement a shareholder proposal that received majority shareholder support)?
- Do shareholders have the right to call special meetings of shareholders?
- Are there other material governance issues at the company?
- Has the company's performance matched or exceeded its peers in the past one and three years?
- How has the company ranked in Glass Lewis' pay-for-performance analysis during the last three years?
- Does the company have an independent chairman?

We note, however, that we will only support shareholder proposals to change a company's place of incorporation in exceptional circumstances.

EXCLUSIVE FORUM PROVISIONS

Glass Lewis believes that charter or bylaw provisions limiting a shareholder's choice of legal venue are not in the best interests of shareholders. Such clauses may effectively discourage the use of shareholder derivative claims by increasing their associated costs and making them more difficult to pursue. As such, shareholders should be wary about approving any limitation on their legal recourse including limiting themselves to a single jurisdiction (e.g. Delaware) without compelling evidence that it will benefit shareholders.

For this reason, we recommend that shareholders vote against any bylaw or charter amendment seeking to adopt an exclusive forum provision unless the company: (i) provides a compelling argument on why the provision would directly benefit shareholders; (ii) provides evidence of abuse of legal process in other, non-favored jurisdictions; and (ii) maintains a strong record of good corporate governance practices.

Moreover, in the event a board seeks shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal, we will weigh the importance of

the other bundled provisions when determining the vote recommendation on the proposal. We will nonetheless recommend voting against the chairman of the governance committee for bundling disparate proposals into a single proposal (refer to our discussion of nominating and governance committee performance in Section I of the guidelines).

AUTHORIZED SHARES

Glass Lewis believes that adequate capital stock is important to a company's operation. When analyzing a request for additional shares, we typically review four common reasons why a company might need additional capital stock:

1. Stock Split – We typically consider three metrics when evaluating whether we think a stock split is likely or necessary: The historical stock pre-split price, if any; the current price relative to the company's most common trading price over the past 52 weeks; and some absolute limits on stock price that, in our view, either always make a stock split appropriate if desired by management or would almost never be a reasonable price at which to split a stock.

2. Shareholder Defenses – Additional authorized shares could be used to bolster takeover defenses such as a poison pill. Proxy filings often discuss the usefulness of additional shares in defending against or discouraging a hostile takeover as a reason for a requested increase. Glass Lewis is typically against such defenses and will oppose actions intended to bolster such defenses.

3. Financing for Acquisitions – We look at whether the company has a history of using stock for acquisitions and attempt to determine what levels of stock have typically been required to accomplish such transactions. Likewise, we look to see whether this is discussed as a reason for additional shares in the proxy.

4. Financing for Operations – We review the company's cash position and its ability to secure financing through borrowing or other means. We look at the company's history of capitalization and whether the company has had to use stock in the recent past as a means of raising capital.

Issuing additional shares can dilute existing holders in limited circumstances. Further, the availability of additional shares, where the board has discretion to implement a poison pill, can often serve as a deterrent to interested suitors. Accordingly, where we find that the company has not detailed a plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan, we typically recommend against the authorization of additional shares. Similar concerns may also lead us to recommend against a proposal to conduct a reverse stock split if the board does not state that it will reduce the number of authorized common shares in a ratio proportionate to the split.

While we think that having adequate shares to allow management to make quick decisions and effectively operate the business is critical, we prefer that, for significant transactions, management come to shareholders to justify their use of additional shares rather than providing a blank check in the form of a large pool of unallocated shares available for any purpose.

ADVANCE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS

We typically recommend that shareholders vote against proposals that would require advance notice of shareholder proposals or of director nominees.

These proposals typically attempt to require a certain amount of notice before shareholders are allowed to place proposals on the ballot. Notice requirements typically range between three to six months prior to the annual meeting. Advance notice requirements typically make it impossible for a shareholder who misses the deadline to present a shareholder proposal or a director nominee that might be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.

We believe shareholders should be able to review and vote on all proposals and director nominees. Shareholders can always vote against proposals that appear with little prior notice. Shareholders, as owners of a business, are capable of identifying issues on which they have sufficient information and ignoring issues on which they have insufficient information. Setting arbitrary notice restrictions limits the opportunity for shareholders to raise issues that may come up after the window closes.

VOTING STRUCTURE

CUMULATIVE VOTING

Cumulative voting increases the ability of minority shareholders to elect a director by allowing shareholders to cast as many shares of the stock they own multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. As companies generally have multiple nominees up for election, cumulative voting allows shareholders to cast all of their votes for a single nominee, or a smaller number of nominees than up for election, thereby raising the likelihood of electing one or more of their preferred nominees to the board. It can be important when a board is controlled by insiders or affiliates and where the company's ownership structure includes one or more shareholders who control a majority-voting block of company stock.

Glass Lewis believes that cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a candidate of their choosing to the board. This allows the creation of boards that are responsive to the interests of all shareholders rather than just a small group of large holders.

However, academic literature indicates that where a highly independent board is in place and the company has a shareholder-friendly governance structure, shareholders may be better off without cumulative voting. The analysis underlying this literature indicates that shareholder returns at firms with good governance structures are lower and that boards can become factionalized and prone to evaluating the needs of special interests over the general interests of shareholders collectively.

We review cumulative voting proposals on a case-by-case basis, factoring in the independence of the board and the status of the company's governance structure. But we typically find these proposals on ballots at companies where independence is lacking and where the appropriate checks and balances favoring shareholders are not in place. In those instances we typically recommend in favor of cumulative voting.

Where a company has adopted a true majority vote standard (i.e., where a director must receive a majority of votes cast to be elected, as opposed to a modified policy indicated by a resignation policy only), Glass Lewis will recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals due to the incompatibility of the two election methods. For companies that have not adopted a true majority voting standard but have adopted some form of majority voting, Glass Lewis will also generally recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals if the company has not adopted antitakeover protections and has been responsive to shareholders.

Where a company has not adopted a majority voting standard and is facing both a shareholder proposal to adopt majority voting and a shareholder proposal to adopt cumulative voting, Glass Lewis will support only the majority voting proposal. When a company has both majority voting and cumulative voting in place, there is a higher likelihood of one or more directors not being elected as a result of not receiving a majority vote. This is because shareholders exercising the right to cumulate their votes could unintentionally cause the failed election of one or more directors for whom shareholders do not cumulate votes.

SUPERMAJORITY VOTE REQUIREMENTS

Glass Lewis believes that supermajority vote requirements impede shareholder action on ballot items critical to shareholder interests. An example is in the takeover context, where supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit the voice of shareholders in making decisions on such crucial matters as selling the business. This in turn degrades share value and can limit the possibility of buyout premiums to shareholders. Moreover, we believe that a supermajority vote requirement can enable a small group of shareholders to overrule the will of the majority shareholders. We believe that a simple majority is appropriate to approve all matters presented to shareholders.

TRANSACTION OF OTHER BUSINESS

We typically recommend that shareholders not give their proxy to management to vote on any other business items that may properly come before an annual or special meeting. In our opinion, granting unfettered discretion is unwise.

ANTI-GREENMAIL PROPOSALS

Glass Lewis will support proposals to adopt a provision preventing the payment of greenmail, which would serve to prevent companies from buying back company stock at significant premiums from a certain shareholder. Since a large or majority shareholder could attempt to compel a board into purchasing its shares at a large premium, the anti-greenmail provision would generally require that a majority of shareholders other than the majority shareholder approve the buyback.

MUTUAL FUNDS: INVESTMENT POLICIES AND ADVISORY AGREEMENTS

Glass Lewis believes that decisions about a fund's structure and/or a fund's relationship with its investment advisor or sub-advisors are generally best left to management and the members of the board, absent a showing of egregious or illegal conduct that might threaten shareholder value. As such, we focus our analyses of such proposals on the following main areas:

- The terms of any amended advisory or sub-advisory agreement;
- Any changes in the fee structure paid to the investment advisor; and
- Any material changes to the fund's investment objective or strategy.

We generally support amendments to a fund's investment advisory agreement absent a material change that is not in the best interests of shareholders. A significant increase in the fees paid to an investment advisor would be reason for us to consider recommending voting against a proposed amendment to an investment advisory agreement. However, in certain cases, we are more inclined to support an increase in advisory fees if such increases result from being performance-based rather than asset-based. Furthermore, we generally support sub-advisory agreements between a fund's advisor and sub-advisor, primarily because the fees received by the sub-advisor are paid by the advisor, and not by the fund.

In matters pertaining to a fund's investment objective or strategy, we believe shareholders are best served when a fund's objective or strategy closely resembles the investment discipline shareholders understood and selected when they initially bought into the fund. As such, we generally recommend voting against amendments to a fund's investment objective or strategy when the proposed changes would leave shareholders with stakes in a fund that is noticeably different than when originally contemplated, and which could therefore potentially negatively impact some investors' diversification strategies.

REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS

The complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements of Real Estate Investment Trusts ("REITs") provide for a unique shareholder evaluation. In simple terms, a REIT must have a minimum of 100 shareholders (the "100 Shareholder Test") and no more than 50% of the value of its shares can be held by five or fewer individuals (the "5/50 Test"). At least 75% of a REITs' assets must be in real estate, it must derive 75% of its gross income from rents or mortgage interest, and it must pay out 90% of its taxable earnings as dividends. In addition, as a publicly traded security listed on a stock exchange, a REIT must comply with the same general listing requirements as a publicly traded equity.

In order to comply with such requirements, REITs typically include percentage ownership limitations in their organizational documents, usually in the range of 5% to 10% of the REITs outstanding shares. Given the complexities of REITs as an asset class, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach in our evaluation of REIT proposals, especially regarding changes in authorized share capital, including preferred stock.

PREFERRED STOCK ISSUANCES AT REITS

Glass Lewis is generally against the authorization of preferred shares that allows the board to determine the preferences, limitations and rights of the preferred shares (known as "blank-check preferred stock"). We believe that granting such broad discretion should be of concern to common shareholders, since blank-check preferred stock could be used as an antitakeover device or in some other fashion that adversely affects the voting power or financial interests of common shareholders. However, given the requirement that a REIT must distribute 90% of its net income annually, it is inhibited from retaining capital to make investments in its business. As such, we recognize that equity financing likely plays a key role in a REIT's growth and creation of shareholder value. Moreover, shareholder concern regarding the use of preferred stock as an anti-takeover mechanism may be allayed by the fact that most REITs maintain ownership limitations in their certificates of incorporation. For these reasons, along with the fact that REITs typically do not engage in private placements of preferred stock (which result in the rights of common shareholders being adversely impacted), we may support requests to authorize shares of blank-check preferred stock at REITs.

BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES

Business Development Companies ("BDCs") were created by the U.S. Congress in 1980; they are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and are taxed as regulated investment companies ("RICs") under the Internal Revenue Code. BDCs typically operate as publicly traded private equity firms that invest in early stage to mature private companies as well as small public companies. BDCs realize operating income when their investments are sold off, and therefore maintain complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements that are similar to those of REITs—the most evident of which is that BDCs must distribute at least 90% of their taxable earnings as dividends.

AUTHORIZATION TO SELL SHARES AT A PRICE BELOW NET ASSET VALUE

Considering that BDCs are required to distribute nearly all their earnings to shareholders, they sometimes need to offer additional shares of common stock in the public markets to finance operations and acquisitions. However, shareholder approval is required in order for a BDC to sell shares of common stock at a price below Net Asset Value ("NAV"). Glass Lewis evaluates these proposals using a case-by-case approach, but will recommend supporting such requests if the following conditions are met:

- The authorization to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date of one year or less from the date that shareholders approve the underlying proposal (i.e. the meeting date);
- The proposed discount below NAV is minimal (ideally no greater than 20%);
- The board specifies that the issuance will have a minimal or modest dilutive effect (ideally no greater than 25% of the company's then-outstanding common stock prior to the issuance); and
- A majority of the company's independent directors who do not have a financial interest in the issuance approve the sale.

In short, we believe BDCs should demonstrate a responsible approach to issuing shares below NAV, by proactively addressing shareholder concerns regarding the potential dilution of the requested share issuance, and explaining if and how the company's past below-NAV share issuances have benefitted the company.

VI. COMPENSATION, ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE SHAREHOLDER INITIATIVES OVERVIEW

Glass Lewis typically prefers to leave decisions regarding day-to-day management and policy decisions, including those related to social, environmental or political issues, to management and the board, except when there is a clear link between the proposal and value enhancement or risk mitigation. We feel strongly that shareholders should not attempt to micromanage the company, its businesses or its executives through the shareholder initiative process. Rather, we believe shareholders should use their influence to push for governance structures that protect shareholders and promote director accountability. Shareholders should then put in place a board they can trust to make informed decisions that are in the best interests of the business and its owners, and then hold directors accountable for management and policy decisions through board elections. However, we recognize that support of appropriately crafted shareholder initiatives may at times serve to promote or protect shareholder value.

To this end, Glass Lewis evaluates shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis. We generally recommend supporting shareholder proposals calling for the elimination of, as well as to require shareholder approval of, antitakeover devices such as poison pills and classified boards. We generally recommend supporting proposals likely to increase and/or protect shareholder value and also those that promote the furtherance of shareholder rights. In addition, we also generally recommend supporting proposals that promote director accountability and those that seek to improve compensation practices, especially those promoting a closer link between compensation and performance.

For a detailed review of our policies concerning compensation, environmental, social and governance shareholder initiatives, please refer to our comprehensive *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Shareholder Initiatives.*

DISCLAIMER

This document sets forth the proxy voting policy and guidelines of Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC. The policies included herein have been developed based on Glass Lewis' experience with proxy voting and corporate governance issues and are not tailored to any specific person. Moreover, these guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive and do not include all potential voting issues. The information included herein is reviewed periodically and updated or revised as necessary. Glass Lewis is not responsible for any actions taken or not taken on the basis of this information. This document may not be reproduced or distributed in any manner without the written permission of Glass Lewis.

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