The Virtues of ‘Over-Savings': A Post-Crisis Reflection on the Chinese Economy
October 12, 2009
By Qing Wang | Hong Kong
Mapping the future course of policy action. The developments in the Chinese economy since late 2007 have been truly remarkable. The economy completed a six-month journey from the end of ‘overheating' in 1Q08 to the beginning of a ‘hard landing' in 4Q08, as the global financial turmoil broke out. China managed to become the first of the major economies to recover from the ‘great recession' as a result of powerful policy responses without precedent. With a strong recovery now underway, attention is increasingly being paid to the potential consequences of the super-loose monetary and fiscal policies and the attendant exit strategies.
It is an issue of asset allocation, given China's high level of national savings. China's national savings rate is about 55% of GDP - 19% is contributed by households, 11% by the government and 25% by corporate sector. There are only three forms in which national savings can be deployed: 1) onshore physical assets; 2) offshore physical assets; and 3) offshore financial assets. Onshore physical assets are formed through domestic fixed-asset investment. Offshore physical assets are formed either through overseas direct investment or by obtaining ownership of existing offshore physical assets through M&A by Chinese residents. Offshore financial assets are formed either by the central bank's official FX reserve accumulation or private portfolio investment under free cross-border mobility (i.e., no capital account controls).
A recurring macro theme: high investment, high growth and low inflation. High savings provide sufficient funds to finance high growth of domestic investment, which, in turn, delivers high economic growth. This high growth, backed up by high domestic savings, tends to, ceteris paribus, generate deflationary instead of inflationary pressures. Specifically, when investment is initially carried out, it is part of aggregate demand (i.e., moving the demand curve to the right) and thus tends to put upward pressure on prices. However, investment will eventually add to production capacity and thus substantially boost supply (i.e., moving the supply curve to the right). The net impact is that, despite high economic growth, inflationary pressures will likely remain subdued. In a high-saving environment, any inflationary pressure is unlikely to last long, as the supply response through investment will likely be fast, given that abundant funding due to high saving is readily available.
Offshore financial assets are primarily in the form of FX reserves. China's offshore financial assets are primarily in the form of central bank's FX reserves, which account for 70% of China's total offshore assets. This has largely reflected capital account controls, such that domestic residents are not allowed to freely invest offshore. However, offshore financial assets in the form of official FX reserves do not imply genuine deployment of domestic private savings offshore, as domestic liquidity - which corresponds to the part of savings that would have been invested in offshore physical or financial assets by the private sector had there not been capital account controls - is created when the central bank accumulates FX reserves, but stays inside China.
Persistent asset price inflation pressures. On the one hand, abundant domestic liquidity is created as a result of FX reserve accumulation, and the demand for financial portfolio investment is strong; on the other hand, domestic capital markets are under-developed, and there is insufficient supply of securitized investment products. In China, 85% of financial intermediation is through the banking system, while the stock market accounts for only about 10%, and the bond market is virtually non-existent. The unbalanced demand-supply in capital markets is a key reason for the rich valuation in China's stock market. As a discounting mechanism, the still-small stock market in China is ‘over-burdened' to price in the long-term ‘bright future' of the entire economy, such that it can easily get into a bubble situation in a short period of time, especially when investor sentiment turns buoyant.
China's high savings is a generational phenomenon. China's high national savings is a generational phenomenon. The high savings ratio is primarily a function of such secular forces as China's demographics, largely shaped by China's ‘one-child' policy and slow adjustment in households' spending habits against the backdrop of rapid economic growth. The ‘one-child' policy artificially lowers the dependence ratio sharply in a much shorter period of time in China than in other countries, where aging is a natural process. The low dependence ratio substantially raises the savings ratio. While households' incomes increase rapidly in line with overall economic growth, personal consumption habits may take years and even decades to change. This results in a high savings ratio, which is often attributed to ‘cultural factors'. While other structural factors, such as lack of social security and corporate governance at SOEs, may also contribute to the high savings ratio in China, their impact is either marginal or an indirect reflection of the abovementioned secular forces.
The whole picture: persistent asset price inflationary pressures to be a norm. Reflecting the ‘virtues of over-saving', the Chinese economy has experienced, and will likely continue to experience, high growth and relatively low inflation, with a cushion against external real or financial shocks, as long as the high savings ratio persists, in our view. In this context, persistent asset price inflation pressures will likely become the norm instead of the exception in the Chinese economy, constituting the most important and a constant macroeconomic challenge to policymakers for years to come, in our view.
Top policy priority: contain leverage with a view to minimizing systematic risks. In an ‘over-savings' economy like China, managing persistent asset price inflation pressures will likely become a more important policy objective than controlling conventional CPI inflation or promoting economic growth for years to come. However, since the conventional monetary policy tools are not best suited for managing asset price inflation, the pressing task is instead to minimize the attendant systematic risk in the event of a bursting asset price bubble. The damage from a bursting asset price bubble with limited leverage is more manageable.
To this end, ‘containing leverage' in the economic system will likely become a key policy objective. This will entail strict mortgage rules for homebuyers, strict restrictions on margin trading in the stock market, and strict capital adequacy requirements for banks. Also, in this context, preventing one-way bets on the renminbi exchange rate becomes important, as strong expectations of renminbi appreciation will induce hot money inflows, which is yet another form of leverage employed by foreign speculators.
In a similar vein, there is a need to push ahead with asymmetric liberalization of capital account controls to induce capital outflows and discourage capital inflows. Outbound capital account liberalization under initiatives such as the qualified domestic institutional investor (QDII) and qualified domestic retail investor (QDRI) programs should help to satisfy domestic savers' need to own offshore financial assets directly, thereby slowing the pace of FX reserve accumulation by the central bank and domestic liquidity creation. Controls over inbound capital flows - especially short-term portfolio investment - should, however, be either maintained or removed only gradually. Otherwise, these inflows contribute to exacerbating asset price inflationary pressures stemming from domestic savings and further complicate the policy challenges.
Structural reform agenda: price deregulation and development of capital markets. With macroeconomic and systematic risks under control, prominence should also be given to structural reform measures that help to improve the quality of investment. While ‘over-savings' helps to deliver good headline figures, such as high growth and low inflation, the capital generated by ‘over-savings' should be allocated efficiently. To this end, liberalization of administrative controls over interest rates and the price of energy and other key natural resource commodities should be implemented without delay, in our view. Domestic capital markets - including both equity and fixed income markets - should be strengthened to address the asset price inflationary pressures by increasing supply of securitized products to meet the rising demand for investment opportunities.
Structural reform agenda: what about consumption-promoting measures? Boosting domestic consumption by lowering the savings ratio has been made a key policy priority, especially since the global financial turmoil broke out. However, if China's high national savings is a generational phenomenon, there is not really much policy room to help lower the ratio meaningfully, in our view. In particular, strengthening the social security system and corporate governance at SOEs may lower the household savings ratio, but it may not be able to effectively lower the national savings ratio. Any consumption-boosting structural reform would likely be modest and have a marginal impact. Aggressive policy measures to lower the savings ratio irrespective of its generational nature would be counter-productive, in our view, by making a welfare system too generous to be affordable by a still low-income country like China. In fact, many of the relevant policy proposals being discussed in this regard should be viewed as measures to address income disparity instead of aiming at increasing consumption at the aggregate level, in our view.
Near-term policy implications. We expect the current policy stance to remain broadly unchanged towards year-end and to turn neutral at the beginning of 2010 as the pace of new bank lending creation normalizes from about Rmb9.5-10 trillion in 2009 to Rmb7-8 trillion in 2010. Policy tightening in the form of an RRR hike, base interest rate hike or renminbi appreciation is unlikely until the middle of next year, in our view.
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Near-Term Plenty
October 12, 2009
By Oliver Weeks | London
While the global focus shifts towards exit strategies, much of Russia's stimulus package is in its early stages. We remain bullish on the near-term growth outlook as fiscal stimulus finally kicks in, and see significant room for further interest rate falls. With capital markets reviving faster than we had expected, we are also raising our RUB forecasts, though we still expect slight depreciation in 4Q. We are less optimistic that the upcoming growth surge will last. While we do not expect a second wave crisis or return to recession, we expect growth to slow again after a strong 4Q, as the impact of temporary stimulus fades.
Still bullish on 2010 GDP, not on 2011: Despite weak output data for August, we remain bullish on the near-term outlook for GDP growth. Risks to our 4.0% real GDP growth forecast for 2010 look slightly to the upside. Several temporary factors are coming together that are likely to drive a strong but short-lived rebound (see also "Russia: Stronger 2H; Harder Choices for 2010", Russian Equity Guide, July 29, 2009). The first of these is inventories. Official GDP data do not allow for precise estimates, but the difference between gross and fixed investment implies that the inventory contribution to the real GDP contraction was in the order of 9pp in 1Q and 10pp in 2Q. Inventories are unlikely to return to apparently bloated pre-crisis levels, but the second derivative drives GDP growth and PMI data strongly suggest that this is turning. The second short-term boost is from gas production volumes, artificially compressed in 1H by temporarily high export prices linked to oil at its peak. As prices have fallen, European importers - still under ‘take or pay' contracts - have resumed filling storage reservoirs. Gas output in September was 25% up on June. Meanwhile, oil volumes have slightly exceeded our expectations, hitting a new all-time high in September as the Vankor field came on line. Again we expect this boost to be temporary. Underlying gas demand in Europe remains weak, while on the oil side new investment remains scarce and the pace of decline of mature fields looks close to incremental production from new fields in the next few years.
Even consumption likely close to bottom: While most domestic demand data remain weak, we expect household consumption at least to stabilize in the coming months. Retail sales have contracted on a month-on-month seasonally adjusted basis for 11 consecutive months. Further layoffs are in the pipeline as state pressure on firms to maintain employment loosens. State sector wages will be frozen in nominal terms under the 2010 budget. Yet it is also worth noting that savings rates have also spiked in recent months as households came to see that initial official assurances about the crisis being a US affair were unreliable. On Rosstat data, household savings averaged 15% of income in the past three months, against 6% in 2008. Given stabilization in near-term expectations, and the fact that Russian households have no aggregate excess leverage problem to work through, we would expect such unprecedentedly high savings rates to decline. Foreign car sales, not included in retail sales, picked up in September. Meanwhile, pensioners - a group likely to have a relatively high propensity to consume - will see a 31% rise in basic state pensions on December 1, and a further 10% on January 1, as fiscal firepower is shifted from investment spending to short-term consumption and political stability.
Short-term fiscal boost huge and concentrated: Fiscal support still looks both large and late. The G20 ranked Russia's 2009-10 discretionary fiscal stimulus as the third-largest after Saudi Arabia and China. However, in Russia's case this is concentrated overwhelmingly in 2H09. Policy was contractionary in 1Q09 while the budget revision was being discussed, and spending will fall in nominal terms in 2010. Final 2009 spending is likely to undershoot the full-year target slightly, but with much locked in, notably the pension hike, it is clear that the traditional 4Q spending surge will be particularly large. To meet the 2009 spending plan, average spending in the last four months of the year would need to be 48% higher than the average of the first eight months. In practice it will be even more concentrated in December. Clearly government spending in Russia is often inefficient, and we do not expect the impact of the current stimulus to be long-lasting - however, with its focus on poor consumers, we do expect it to be largely spent. We estimate that quarter-on-quarter seasonally adjusted (non-annualized) real GDP growth will be around 3.0% in 4Q, a number that arithmetically has little impact on our 2009 GDP forecast (still -8.5%) but provides a powerful ramp for 2010 (still at 4.0%). Again this is a boost that is unlikely to be sustained. The budget plan has total federal government spending falling from 25.5% of GDP in 2009 to 22.9% in 2010, and 2011 will see significant rises in payroll taxes to cover 2010's pension hikes.
As sterilization gets harder, rates can continue to fall: Another implication of concentrated fiscal spending is likely to be a further boost to domestic liquidity and downward pressure on local rates. The 2009 fiscal deficit, likely around 8.0% of GDP, is funded primarily by spending down the oil Reserve Fund. The monetary impact of this process, as the CBR receives FX previously on the Finance Ministry's accounts and prints RUB in return, has so far been effectively sterilized. The balance of the Reserve Fund has fallen by RUB 2.5 trillion since January, though net claims on general government at the CBR have fallen by just RUB 1.8 trillion as actual spending lags. On the CBR's balance sheet, this has been effectively matched by a RUB 1.8 trillion fall in claims on credit institutions, leaving the monetary base little changed. Sterilization has come mainly through the withdrawal of the CBR's uncollateralized lending to banks, down RUB 1.5 trillion since its February peak. However, the market may underestimate the further impact of oil fund spending, we think. There are now only RUB 0.3 trillion of uncollateralized CBR loans outstanding, and we think it will be hard to reduce this to zero, given the weakness of some banks. The government has suspended further transfers from the Reserve Fund in 4Q, but the budget plan still envisages spending the next RUB 2.3 trillion of the Reserve Fund in 2010 and RUB 0.4 billion of the National Welfare Fund, a total equivalent to 55% of current base money. In practice, the near-term reduction in CBR net claims on the government will likely also be driven by falling treasury balances. Rising demand for RUB as activity and confidence in the currency grow will mitigate some of the impact of this. However, as in the past it is likely to be politically and practically harder for the CBR to move to active sterilization of excess liquidity than it has been to withdraw outstanding credit. PM Putin warned only two weeks ago against risking a ‘monetary famine' that might trigger a second downturn.
Near-term inflation outlook justifies further rate cuts: Meanwhile, the near-term inflation outlook looks even weaker than we had expected. CPI was flat in the first week of October, unprecedented in post-Soviet history. Rosstat's core inflation measure - excluding administrative, seasonal and one-off factors - was down from 11.9%Y in August to 10.9%Y in September. While we have long expected single-digit headline inflation by December, our forecast is now tracking around 9.4%, against 9.9% previously. In 1Q10, the impact of sharp rises in excise taxes on alcohol is likely to be outweighed by smaller price rises than last January for household electricity and communal services. In addition, we continue to think that the new year reweighting of the basket may have an unusually strong downward effect, given the shift of consumption to cheaper items this year. We see headline CPI at around 8.5%Y by March. We still expect inflation to re-accelerate later in 2010 as the lagged impact of upcoming money supply growth starts to feed through. Structural inflationary factors, notably lack of support for competition, have not improved. However, we believe that short-term disinflation will only reinforce pressure on the CBR for further policy rate cuts. Both the president and the PM have been vocal on their expectation that corporate and household lending rates should fall well into single-digits. The CBR's most recent policy statement was remarkably dovish - "further rate cuts will be driven by the necessity to create conditions to boost credit and stimulate the economy, while considering inflation trends". Growth is seen as a greater risk than inflation. While Deputy Governor Ulukaev suggested only a month ago that 9.75% would be the policy reference rate floor for December, we think that the policy reference rate can fall 125bp to 8.75% by December, and 8.0% by March. Under pressure from RUB appreciation as well as the government, it may become increasingly hard for the CBR to maintain its commitment to positive real rates.
Stronger capital account outlook good for rates, and RUB: At the same time, stronger capital inflows should reinforce the downward pressure on rates. Net private sector capital continued to flow out in 3Q, to the tune of US$31.5 billion, but much of this was triggered by July's lifting of foreign asset limits on banks. Clearly, in the last few weeks these flows have turned significantly positive, a reflection both of global speculative flows and local concerns about broad US$ weakness. After buying US$2.65 billion in September, the CBR has bought around US$6.5 billion already in October. CBR data have US$40 billion of FX debt due in 4Q09, and US$89 billion in 2010. Given many corporates' recent purchases of their own debt, this is likely to be an overestimate. The CBR's new monetary projections have the overall balance of payments in surplus (FX reserves rising) in 2010-12 at every oil price scenario except US$45, and even then the deficit moves to surplus after 2010. We are slightly less optimistic than this, since we expect imports to recover rapidly in any bullish scenario. However, given more rapid healing in markets than we expected, we have cut our own estimate of the net capital account outflow in 2010 to US$15 billion. At any oil price above US$55, we assume that the current account is in surplus in 2010, and at our central assumption of oil at US$75 we expect a current account surplus of around US$50 billion. Unless the CBR and government are prepared to see sharp RUB appreciation, interest rate policy looks increasingly likely to be driven once again by a balance of payments surplus.
Revising RUB forecasts on stronger inflows: Official CBR policy remains to move to inflation targeting and a RUB free float by 2012. We remain sceptical that a full free float is likely, given the government's sensitivity to the nominal exchange rate, or desirable, given the volatility of oil prices (see Oil Sensitivities Revisited, July 17, 2009). So far the CBR has been consistent in sticking to its policy of moving its intervention level 5 kopecks for US$0.7 billion of intervention. We think it likely that this threshold will be moved up if inflows continue. In the short term, we still expect the RUB to weaken slightly from current levels in 4Q as fiscal spending hits the market. With the CBR's intervention level on the weak side distant, any move could be sharp, though likely temporary. We continue to expect gradual appreciation through 2010, resisted but not stopped by the CBR. Given stronger inflows and refinancing rates, we are raising our RUBUSD forecast to 31.2 at end-2009 (assuming EURUSD at 1.45), 27.6 at end-2010 (with EURUSD at 1.60) and 28.3 at end-2011 (with EURUSD at 1.45). Our near-term preference remains for interest rates, however.
Bank crisis remote, but recovery still slow: Lower rates and growing confidence in the RUB will also be positive for the banking system, in our view. Prohibitively high rates have clearly kept some creditworthy borrowers from the market. A continuing shift back to RUB deposits is likely to ease some of the pressure of FX mismatches, given little demand for FX loans. Across the system, the share of deposits in FX has fallen from 43% in February to 38% in August. A return to the pre-crisis 23% looks unlikely to us, but broad USD weakness will likely accelerate the return to RUB. We continue to see risks of a second wave banking crisis as very low. Deposit insurance has been tested and found to work, and the system remains small enough for further bailouts to be quite affordable. However, we are less optimistic on bank recapitalization. The peak on recorded NPLs may now be close, but it is clear that there is significant discretion in registering these, and the high share of restructured loans (24% for the top 30 banks) suggests that NPLs are also unlikely to fall soon. With lending from the CBR and VEB being withdrawn, the only significant source of new official support is the recapitalization program through OFZ issuance. Few banks are prepared to apply for this, given the conditions currently attached, and the plan looks likely to follow the pattern of recent government support programs of being largely ineffective in its first draft. We expect the conditions to be revised, but significant support looks unlikely before late 2010. In the meantime, lending is likely to remain constrained.
Growth rebound looks likely to be temporary: All this bodes much less well for longer-term growth. Slow bank recapitalization and, eventually, reaccelerating inflation will likely limit the scope for long-term domestic lending. While the outlook for foreign borrowing has improved, levels are unlikely to return to 2007's heights. The government is becoming more open to foreign direct investment, but vested interests and complex ownership structures stand in the way and, as the budget deficit falls, current privatization plans may drop back down the agenda. Government investment spending has already been slashed to make way for pension hikes - the share of spending on the ‘national economy' (including both government investment and corporate subsidies) in 2010 falls from 18.6% to 13.6%. Pressure to raise spending is likely to be strong if, as we expect, revenue comes in higher than expected, but given the electoral timetable in 2011-12, any spending hikes are likely to remain more focused on consumption than investment. Funding the near-term deficit does not look particularly challenging to us, but conservative fiscal policy remains a central plank of the Putin-Kudrin philosophy, its wisdom confirmed by the crisis, and fiscal tightening after 2009 looks likely. In this context, much-demanded tax concessions for energy investment may also prove hard to deliver. The long-term challenges of a declining workforce, an unreliable legal system and low investment levels remain major headwinds. After a surge from a belated stimulus, further growth may once again become uncomfortably dependent on ever-increasing energy prices.
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