Review and Preview
February 03, 2009
By Ted Wieseman | New York
The Treasury curve saw another major bear steepening sell-off over the past week, as supply fears continued to weigh with the fiscal stimulus bill moving towards passage and a potentially expensive ‘bad bank’ coupled with broader loss backstops reportedly being readied, and investors wondered at what levels they could hope for the Fed to begin intervening to support the long end. We note that describing the fiscal stimulus bill as such instead of as simply a very large multi-year appropriations bill is questionable, considering how little it appears likely to do to actually stimulate the economy this year according to CBO and JCT estimates. The FOMC did say that it was “prepared” to begin buying long-dated Treasuries in Wednesday’s FOMC statement after only saying it was “evaluating” this possibility in December, if it felt doing so “would be particularly effective in improving conditions in private credit markets.” We would argue that the disarray at the long end of the market has become bad enough − though there was at least some stabilization Friday after huge losses Wednesday and Thursday − that buying Treasuries at this point could indeed be effective in helping the Fed’s targeted quantitative easing policies gain traction. The most critical recent failure of this shift in approach to gain traction, to which the Treasury meltdown has substantially contributed, has been the backup in mortgage rates despite heavy Fed buying. Yields on mortgage-backed securities rose to their highest levels since the first part of December late in the week after what’s been a huge reversal off the historical lows hit shortly after the Fed began MBS purchases early in the month. It would probably be a good time for the Fed to temporarily set aside the Treasury/Fed accord that freed it from capping Treasury bond yields in 1951 (until which for about a decade the Fed had not allowed long Treasury yields to rise above 2.5%) and start trying to put a ceiling on long-term yields as we head towards what will certainly be a record Treasury refunding announcement Wednesday. With such a ceiling in place, the Fed’s MBS purchases would stand a much better chance of driving mortgage rates substantially lower.
Economic data released through the week remained terrible. New home sales plunged to a record low and supply of unsold new homes to a record high, as homebuilders struggled to compete with fire sale priced foreclosed homes that boosted existing home sales. The Conference Board’s measure of consumer confidence, which focuses on labor market conditions, also hit a record low ahead of what will likely be another grim employment report Friday. The durable goods report extended the collapse since last summer, suggesting that the plunge in business investment in 4Q is likely to be repeated in 1Q. Severe weakness in business investment was a key contributor to a 4Q GDP report that was terrible in its underlying private demand components, with consumption and residential investment also both way down again, even as headline GDP was boosted by a huge surge in the inventory valuation adjustment. Higher inventories in 4Q − and economy-wide inventory/sales ratios were badly out of line at the end of last year − point to a continuation of the severe production cuts seen in 2H08 as we move into 1Q and add downside risks to an already dismal picture for 1Q GDP growth. On the week, benchmark Treasury coupon yields rose another 9 to 27bp, with the long end again getting crushed. The old 2-year yield rose 9bp to 0.90%, 3-year 19bp to 1.34%, old 5-year 17bp to 1.80%, 10-year 23bp to 2.84%, and 30-year 27bp to 3.60%. The long bond yield has now risen 71bp in the past two weeks and 107bp in the past six weeks. The very short end came under pressure for the first time in quite a while, with the 4-week bill’s yield up 12bp to 0.14% and 3-month 14bp to 0.24%. Among the new issues, the 2-year ended the week at 0.95% after being auctioned Tuesday at 0.925% and the 5-year closed at 1.87% after being issued Thursday at 1.82%. Although it came after an extremely sloppy auction that saw an enormous 13bp tail, the 20-year TIPS performed relatively much better after its Monday sale, closing the week at 2.44% after being auctioned at 2.50%. This was part of a broadly positive week for TIPS as investors started to look past the painful ongoing carry from several months of sharp CPI declines as headline inflation will likely see at least a temporary move higher as gasoline prices rebounded during the month. With a 10-year and 20-year issued in January, the month-end index duration extension for TIPS was also quite large and appeared to significantly boost this sector. The 5-year TIPS yield fell 2bp on the week to 1.43% and 10-year 17bp to 1.72%. Aside from a huge correction on Thursday, mortgages generally extended a recent trend of outperformance versus Treasuries on the week. But with Treasuries sinking as hard as they are, that still sent MBS yields much higher on the week to their worst levels since the first part of December. At their best closes on January 7 after the Fed began its open market MBS purchases on January 5, 4% MBS yielded 3.77% and 4.5% yielded 3.92%. A significant, but gradual sell-off from those lows for a couple weeks significantly intensified over the most recent week, leaving 4% yields near 4.15% at Friday’s close, up around 38bp from the low, and 4.5% near 4.28%, up 36bp. With the persistent and unusually wide spreads seen recently between mortgage rates and MBS yields, this latest week’s sell-off will likely send average 30-year mortgage rates up towards 5 1/4% in coming days, up from lows earlier in the month below 5% and far away from the 4.5% that’s generally believed to be the Fed and Treasury’s intermediate goal. In addition to the Fed’s targeted quantitative easing policy showing signs of losing traction over the past week, the broader impact of flooding the system with excess reserves also seemed to be showing a fading impact on interbank markets. Although spot 3-month Libor was little changed on the week at 1.18% and the spot 3-month Libor/OIS spread also about flat at 91bp, forward rates and spreads saw substantial upside. The forward Libor/OIS spread to March rose about 5bp to near 94bp, June 11bp to 87bp, September 14bp to 85bp, and December 17bp to 88bp. So almost no improvement from current levels is now expected throughout this year after a substantially pessimistic repricing over the past month. With focus on supply and trying to figure out the levels at which the Fed might intervene, along with not paying a whole lot of attention to economic news for the most part, the Treasury market ignored a volatile, but ultimately mixed, week for risk markets. Stocks saw some big day-to-day swings, but ultimately didn’t do much, with the S&P 500 losing 0.7% on the week. Financials, in a recent rarity, did relatively well, with the BKX banks stock index rising 1% on hopes for the imminent announcement of some combination of a bad bank structure and a broader application of the loss guarantee backstops provided to Citigroup and Bank of America. Credit was somewhat mixed. In late trading Friday, the investment grade CDX index was 7bp tighter on the week at 200bp. This latest week’s trend was consistent with a big performance divergence for the month between equities and credit. The S&P 500 recorded its worst ever January, sinking 9%, while the IG CDX index saw some significant weakness at times but only widened a few bp on net for the month. The high yield index, on the other hand, was on pace to end worse on the week after sinking 7/8 of a point on Friday following a 10bp tightening through Thursday to 1385bp. The HY index closed 2008 at 1143bp, so its January performance was a good bit worse than IG and more in line with stocks. The volatile leveraged loan LCDX index far outperformed the HY CDX index, tightening 232bp on the week to 1471bp through midday Friday. This followed a terrible run during which this index had widened almost 600bp in two and a half weeks. The commercial mortgage CMBX market made good further gains early in the week on the bad bank stories, but gave back a lot of ground Thursday and Friday to end mixed. The AAA index tightened 48bp to 594bp and junior AAA 56bp to 1530bp, but the A, BBB, BBB- and BB all ended wider. The subprime ABX market was also receiving support through the first part of the week from bad bank anticipation, offsetting a negative reaction to mortgage “cramdown” legislation, but fell hard Thursday and Friday to end weaker, with the AAA index off 2.45 points to 34.13, a three-week low. Real GDP declined at a less-than-expected 3.8% annual rate in 4Q, but only because of a much higher result for inventories, which added 1.3pp to growth instead of subtracting 1.6pp as we expected. This presents significant downside risks to 1Q as economy-wide inventory/sales ratio ended 2008 highly elevated. The inventory boost came from an unprecedentedly large positive swing in the inventory valuation adjustment, a price adjustment applied to the inventory figures. A more than $300 billion rise in the IVA added an astounding 11pp to annualized GDP growth. Underlying demand numbers were much weaker, with final sales down 5.1% and final domestic demand down 4.9%. All components of private sector final demand − consumption (-3.5%), business investment (-19.1%) and residential investment (-23.6%) − showed severe weakness. Also of note was that with domestic prices down sharply, nominal final domestic demand plunged at a 9% annual rate − easily the biggest rate of decline since the Great Depression. Such a large collapse in nominal demand has clear and major implications for underlying inflation. The durables report provided no reason for hope that the plunge in business investment in 4Q would ease any time soon. Durable goods orders fell 2.6% overall in December, and underlying results were similarly weak, with nondefense capital goods ex aircraft orders − the key core gauge − falling 2.8% after a big downward revision to November (+1.7% versus +3.9%). Core capital goods orders have now plunged at a 28% annual rate over the past five months, with huge weakness in machinery (-45.9%) and high tech (-18.9%) over this period, pointing to continued weakness in equipment investment in 1Q. The one notable positive for investment coming into 1Q is that Boeing’s deliveries ramped up substantially in December after being severely depressed for several months by the strike, so the aircraft sector should provide a significant lift to both investment and exports (Boeing is the country’s single biggest exporter) in 1Q. New home sales plunged 14.7% in December on top of significant downward revisions to prior months to an all-time record low of 331,000 units annualized. Even with homes available for sale plunging 10.1% to a five-year low, the months’ supply of unsold new homes rose to a record 12.9 from 12.5, more than double a more balanced level of 5 to 6 months. A key problem for homebuilders is difficulty competing with a flood of foreclosures hitting the market at fire sale prices. Indeed, single-family existing home sales gained 7.0% in December to a 4.26 million unit annual pace, with the National Association of Realtors reporting that a substantial portion of the activity during the month was in distressed sales. So even with a big decline in prices and hopes that the Fed’s MBS purchase program will eventually gain more traction in bringing down mortgage rates, foreclosure mitigation efforts − which the Obama Administration has said will be a significant part of the second wave of TARP spending − remain a key component of stabilizing the housing market. The upcoming week has a very busy calendar, with the key early round of January economic data and the Treasury’s refunding announcement. After $78 billion in coupon issuance the past week in 20-year TIPS, 2s and 5s, we look for another $75 billion in new supply to be announced for the refunding − a $32 billion 3-year, $25 billion 10-year and $18 billion 30-year. These would all be record sizes. We also think that there is decent chance that Treasury will revive the long dormant 7-year note for auction in non-refunding months, as it looks for additional ways to plug the enormous financing gap that it faces over the next couple years. Given this financing gap, we were somewhat surprised that the discussion topics for the pre-refunding primary dealer meetings suggested that elimination of the 5-year TIPS remains under consideration. Even after the recent outperformance, though, TIPS inflation breakevens (barely above zero at this point for the current 5-year) are so low relative to what actual inflation is likely to be that TIPS issuance at current levels will prove to be expensive for the government over time. Key data releases due out include personal income and spending, ISM and construction spending Monday, motor vehicle sales Tuesday, nonmanufacturing ISM Wednesday, productivity and chain store sales Thursday and the employment report Friday: * We look for personal income to fall 0.3% in December and spending to plunge 0.9%. The labor market and retail sales figures for the month of December point to outright declines in both income and spending. Meanwhile, our translation of the CPI data points to a 0.0% outcome for the core PCE (+1.7%Y versus +1.9% in November). The headline PCE appears likely to slip 0.5% which tempers some of the downside in nominal spending but still leaves real consumption in negative territory for both the month and the quarter. * We forecast an uptick in the January ISM to 34.0. The results from the regional surveys were pretty much split down the middle this month, with half showing some further slippage and the other half registering modest gains. However, the Morgan Stanley Business Conditions Index (based on a survey of our equity analysts) posted one of its sharpest gains on record – though it remains at a very depressed level. So we expect to see at least a slight uptick in the ISM gauge relative to the post-1980 low of 32.9 seen in December. * We look for a 1.5% decline in December construction spending. The housing starts data pointed to another very steep slide in residential activity for the month of December. And we look for modest declines in the nonres and public categories (note: it is far too early for any of the infrastructure spending associated with the fiscal stimulus plan now working its way through Congress to show up in the construction numbers). * We forecast January motor vehicle sales of 10.4 million units annualized. Preliminary indications from industry sources have been somewhat mixed. Stepped up incentive offerings – mainly in the form of low interest financing − have provided some sales support of late. However, fleet sales are collapsing as rental companies and other large volume buyers deal with their own liquidity issues. The bottom line is that we expect the monthly sales pace to be little changed relative to the 10.3 million unit rate seen in December. * We expect 4Q productivity and unit labor costs to both rise 3.0%. Hours worked posted a much sharper decline than output. So productivity should show a solid gain in Q4 – which is a bit unusual at this stage of the economic cycle. Meanwhile, compensation per hour appeared to register one of the sharpest advances seen in the past few years. This points to some elevation in unit labor costs even after factoring in the strong productivity gain. Still, unit labor costs should remain quite low on a year-on-year basis (+1.1%). * We look for a 550,000 plunge in January nonfarm payrolls. The pace of job loss is expected to be close to that seen in recent months and would likely be worse were it not for an expected uptick in the retail trade category that is related to a quirk in seasonal adjustment. Specifically, there was much less seasonal hiring than usual in this sector during late 2008 which means that there are proportionately fewer seasonal workers who will disappear from payrolls after the holidays. Also, we had thought that construction jobs might hold up a little better than in recent months due to a large add from seasonal adjustment, but the latest government figures show that average temperatures across the US plunged during the survey week – in stark contrast to the experience in January of both 2007 and 2008, when weather conditions were much milder than usual across the U.S. Finally, the unemployment rate should register another significant rise this month to 7.6% and appears headed toward 9.5% by year-end.
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Recent Rapid Bank Credit Expansion Not Sustainable
February 03, 2009
By Qing Wang | Hong Kong
A Bank Lending Tsunami? After a strong month in November (Rmb477 billion), Chinese banks extended Rmb772 billion in new renminbi loans in December, a 14-fold increase over a year ago, bringing the year-on-year loan growth to 19% and the year’s total new loans to a record Rmb4.9 trillion, or 36% above the annual target of around Rmb3.6 trillion before the authorities loosened macro tightening measures on the economy. The loan growth rate in December 2008 is the fastest since April 2004, a significant jump from the 16% rate in November. Moreover, we estimate that the rapid loan expansion may have continued in January 2009, with about Rmb1 trillion of new loans likely to have been created, or over 20% of the target new loan amount for 2009. This has made some market observers wonder whether a bank lending tsunami is now in the making, as the Chinese government seems to be pulling out all the stops to prevent a deep and prolonged economic downturn. The rapid bank credit expansion has become perhaps the only bright data point, as a stream of bad news about the economy hit the wires in recent months. Indeed, the rapid loan expansion, if sustained, would have profound implications on the timing and strength of a potential rebound in economic growth. In this context, questions have been raised about: a) where the loans have been extended; b) whether credit expansion is sustainable; and c) the impact on the real economy. The Devil Is in the Details Where has the lending been extended? The PBoC appears to have made an unspecified backward revision of the loan data in October 2008, rendering the data after October 2008 non-comparable to the previous one. (We suspect that the data revision may have to do with loan write-offs related to restructuring one of the large state-owned banks.) However, since the loan data for November and December 2008 use consistent definition and the bulk of the new loans was made in December 2008, we choose to examine the loan breakdown by type for December only. Over 50% of the Rmb772 billion worth of new loans extended in December 2008 were short term, while the medium- and long-term loans only accounted for about 30% of the total. In particular, the short-term loans in the form of bills financing increased by 12.5%M, accounting for 28% of the total new loan creations. We estimate that, out of the nearly 19%Y increase in total outstanding loans in December 2008, about 2.5 percentage points were contributed by bills financing. The rapid expansion of short-term loans may have reflected the unwinding of pent-up demand for short-term working capital, which was artificially created by tight credit controls in 1H08. When the tight monetary policy was initially carried out in 4Q07, provision of short-term loans in the form of banks’ discounting commercial bills was the first to get hit. The amount of bills financing contracted by nearly 36% by April 2008 from the previous peak reached in April 2007. Not surprisingly, when the administrative controls over bank lending were scrapped at the beginning of 4Q08, this category of bank financing was the first to recover, as pent-up demand unwound. Interest rate arbitrage by the enterprises that have access to the discount commercial bill market may be another reason for the strong pick-up in bills financing. As interest rates are cut and the RRR lowered aggressively, the discount rates on commercial paper fell as low as to around 1.5%, while the 3-month and 6-month rates on enterprise time deposits still averaged at 1.8% and 2.1%, respectively, in November- December 2008. This creates an arbitrage opportunity: those enterprises that have market access could choose to discount their commercial paper at low discount rates and then put the borrowed funds back to the banks as short-term time deposits to earn the spread between the time deposit and discount bill rates. The rapid increase in short-term financing helps to improve the overall financing conditions facing enterprises in general and their access to working capital in particular; however, it may not necessarily translate into strong capex, especially in the short run. Moreover, to the extent that the strong increase in bills financing has reflected the unwinding of pent-up demand and interest arbitrage, this rapid expansion will unlikely be sustainable either, in our view. Not Sustainable Putting aside the issue with the composition of bank lending, we do not expect the extraordinarily strong loan growth to be sustainable through 2009. The experiences during Asia’s financial crisis and the internet bubble burst should be of useful references. China’s monetary policy stance started to ease in the beginning of 1998, as it had become evident that the regional financial crisis had already taken a toll on the Chinese economy. The loan growth started to pick up in January 1998. The acceleration in loan growth lasted through October of the same year before starting to decelerate rather significantly over the following 12 months. Meanwhile, China’s export growth declined sharply and stayed in negative territory for nearly a year. However, loan growth did not bottom until November 1999 when strong export growth had resumed. Loan growth during the external downturn in the aftermath of the internet bubble burst in 2000-01 demonstrated a similar pattern. The internet bubble burst was officially dated in March 2000. The acceleration in loan growth continued between March-November 2000, during the same period in which export growth declined from a peak of 40%Y in March to 20%Y in November. However, bank lending growth turned south after November, as export growth continued its rapid decline. The deceleration in bank lending lasted for over 12 months and did not bottom until early 2002 when export growth had well recovered. We think that a key reason for the unsustainable credit expansion during previous external downturns is the lack of appetite for investment among potential investors in the manufacture sector, which already suffered from the problem of over-production capacity when support from external demand was gone. It has now become clear that the negative shock to China’s external demand is of a much larger magnitude in 2009 than that during either the Asian financial crisis or the internet bubble burst. We forecast a negative export growth of 5% for China in 2009 (see China Economics: 2009 Outlook Downgrade: Getting Much Worse Before Getting Better, January 18, 2009). If history is of any guide, loan growth will likely peak in the coming months on the back of deteriorating economic fundamentals, as was the case in the previous rounds of policy stimulus during Asia’s financial crisis in 1998-99 and the bursting of the internet bubble in 2000-01, in our view. We expect loan growth to slow to mid-teens toward year-end, driven primarily by demand for investment in infrastructure projects under the fiscal stimulus program. In the same vein, we believe that it is highly unlikely for a repeat of the credit-fueled investment boom and inflation in 2002-03. Note that the surge in bank loan growth in that period took place against the backdrop of a significant improvement in global economic environment and the accession of China to the WTO. Barring a miraculous turnaround in G3 economies during 2009, China’s policy stimulus alone won’t be able to engineer a homemade credit boom, in our view. The Chinese economy has changed profoundly, and the era of a policy-induced ‘great leap-forward’ is long gone, in our view. Impact on the Real Economy The current episode of credit expansion should help the Chinese economy to rebound in 2H09. Past experience indicates that bank lending tends to lead investment by five to seven months, suggesting that it takes time for easy credit conditions to translate into an improvement in real economic activity. We would become more confident with this call if the current rapid credit expansion had been primarily driven by medium- and long-term loans. Since we expect bank lending growth to peak in the coming months and moderate thereafter, we caution against turning too bullish on the outlook for investment growth based simply on the strong reading of loan growth in recent and coming months. The envisaged recovery also hinges on a tepid recovery in G3 economies by 4Q09. Without bottoming and recovery of external demand, bank lending may slow further and not be able to drive investment growth as effectively as expected. Market Implications The rapid loan growth offers evidence that banks are responding to the authorities' policy stimulus and should improve the prospect for an early growth recovery in the Chinese economy. However, we caution against getting too excited as to interpret it as representing the beginning of an endurable credit boom in China. In the months immediately ahead, the economy will likely be characterized by a mix of weak fundamentals and policy-induced abundant liquidity, in our view. This will likely be a macroeconomic environment conducive to high market volatility, in our view. If loan growth were to moderate to a more reasonable level as we expect, it should help ease investors’ concern about potential deterioration in the banks’ asset quality, which is invariably associated with too rapid credit expansion.
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NBP Cuts, as Credit and the Economy Grind to a Halt
February 03, 2009
By Pasquale Diana | London
The NBP cut rates by 75bp to 4.25% (Morgan Stanley: -75bp, consensus: -50bp), and maintained an explicit easing bias, which leaves the door open for further easing. The statement was dovish, with the bank noting that the slowdown in Poland’s trading partners is gaining momentum, lending conditions have tightened and inflationary pressures are diminishing due to declining employment and wage growth. Among the factors that may slow the decline in inflation, the bank notes the “significant” zloty depreciation observed in the last few months, though it adds, as it did a month ago, that its impact on CPI might be limited against the current economic backdrop. The NBP also mentions the upside risk to CPI coming from regulated prices, though we note that even with these increases (around 10% on electricity), inflation should still comfortably fall below target already by April/May. Surprisingly relaxed about PLN, for now: While we had thought that the macro backdrop justified another aggressive rate cut, the fact that the MPC still sounds remarkably relaxed about PLN weakness (-7% versus EUR since the December meeting) is a little surprising. The December minutes showed that the majority of the Council thought that aggressive easing might actually boost growth and ultimately benefit PLN. Judging from post-meeting comments by dove Nieckarz, this seems still to be the case. More rate cuts, but watch PLN and fiscal policy: Given the tone of the statement and our view that CPI is likely to slow in the coming months, further cuts appear likely to us. Rates could well trough below our 3.50% base case – indeed, this is already priced into markets. While the NBP’s tone does not show preoccupation with PLN weakness, we would caution against interpreting this as a sign that the NBP is indifferent to the zloty at any level. First, with unemployment on the rise, wage growth falling sharply and CHF/PLN up over 40% from last summer’s lows, we believe that it will not be long before FX borrowers feel the pinch. True, Swiss Libor rates have dropped dramatically, but the official data from the NBP (through to November) do not suggest that this is being passed onto CHF borrowers in Poland, much like in Hungary. There may indeed be a point where the advantages to exports from a weaker PLN (note that Poland is a relatively closed economy in CEE) are outweighed by adverse income effects for households and corporates who have open FX positions. Second, while the CPI backdrop is still favorable, the FX pass-through from a weaker currency is lower than during an economic upswing, but it is not zero. If the zloty depreciation continues at its recent pace for much longer, some board members may have to re-assess their views that rate differentials do not matter for the currency, and aggressive easing will ultimately boost PLN. Also, it is worth keeping an eye on fiscal policy. PM Tusk said this week that weaker growth could result in a PLN 17 billion shortfall in the budget, and that savings had to be found. Fiscal tightening in a downturn may prove too costly, however, and the budget may come under pressure this year, making the NBP more cautious about rate cuts. 2008 Slows, Economy Likely Entered Recession in 4Q The Stats Office released full-year GDP growth data for 2008, which showed that the economy expanded by 4.8%, in line with our forecast. It is not technically possible to back out 4Q08 from the annual figure (previous quarters could have been revised). Assuming no revisions, the annual data suggest that the economy slowed sharply in 4Q, to around 2.5%Y from 4.8%Y in 3Q. Note that this implies a contraction of around 0.5-1.0%Q, sa, which means that the recession has started in earnest. The 4Q details, released in full on March 2, are likely to show a sharp fall in investment. Given how sensitive to investment data the MPC has shown itself to be over recent years, these data are only likely to reinforce the MPC’s dovish tone. Beware of the Stats: FX Credit Is Slowing The headline credit data for December continued to show runaway growth in credit aggregates, with household credit in particular accelerating from 37.7%Y to 44.3%Y on the back of a sharp acceleration in FX loans (from 77.2%Y to 104.2%Y). However, these data can be very misleading at times when the exchange rate moves a lot (as it did in December). Here’s why: the credit data are reported in PLN; a given pool of FX mortgages will automatically be inflated in value when expressed in PLN following zloty depreciation, even if no new mortgages were granted during that month. For this reason, we prefer to convert the stock of FX household loans into a foreign currency (CHF makes most sense) and then look at these dynamics. The story is a very different one. According to this series, the monthly rise in FX loans to households in December was just over CHF 500 million, the smallest increment in almost two years and one-fifth of the monthly increments at the peak. We believe that this will only continue into 2009, with new credit effectively grinding to a halt in 1H09. The consequences will be falling asset prices, contracting real estate activity and construction, and a drop in imports which will ultimately cause the current account deterioration to come to an end and then reverse.
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As required by the Capital Markets Board of Turkey, investment information, comments and recommendations stated here, are not within the scope of investment advisory activity. Investment advisory service is provided in accordance with a contract of engagement on investment advisory concluded between brokerage houses, portfolio management companies, non-deposit banks and clients. Comments and recommendations stated here rely on the individual opinions of the ones providing these comments and recommendations. These opinions may not fit to your financial status, risk and return preferences. For this reason, to make an investment decision by relying solely to this information stated here may not bring about outcomes that fit your expectations.
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