Dealing with Abundance
June 12, 2007
By Gray Newman | New York
The month of May brought with it one of the most pronounced gains in the Colombian peso, pushing it to the strongest level in more than seven years, and prompted the authorities on two occasions to introduce new controls designed to slow the pressure on the peso to appreciate. Perhaps the only thing more surprising than the pace at which the Colombia peso gained ground in May was the reaction of the currency markets to the controls introduced last month: the peso market appeared to shrug off the measures from both the central bank as well as the finance ministry. By month’s end, the peso was trading at 1,890 — a level not seen since January 2000 — compared with 2,100 at the beginning of the month.
Despite the respite in early June as the pressure for the Colombian peso to appreciate has abated thanks to a global bout of jitters, we suspect that the peso will resume its appreciating path this year to at least 1,850. And that indeed could bring with it calls for more controls of the type seen in May. But we doubt that the measures announced in May to freeze a portion of dollar borrowing by locals and a portion of portfolio inflows by foreigners is the beginning of even more draconian measures. Instead, the authorities appear to have shifted tactics — reducing spending even while targeting modest subsidies to those exporters most hit by the strengthening peso and reiterating the primacy of the central bank’s commitment to control inflation over any currency target. Both measures should do more to provide Colombia with the macro foundations for good growth in the years to come than attempts to manage the exchange rate with new controls that often have little effect in limiting inflows, but that could begin to damage Colombia’s reputation.
Important Disclosure Information at the end of this Forum
Living with Gorillas
June 12, 2007
By Serhan Cevik | Doha
Financial globalization brings more benefits than challenges to emerging economies. Greater openness and closer integration throughout the world in the post-war period have brought tremendous benefits to all countries. However, these far-reaching gains come in waves over a long period of internalization and are not necessarily distributed equally, at least in the early stages, across the global economy. Just like productivity improvements from the proliferation of electricity in the 19th century and telecommunications in the 20th century, the full effect of synchronized business cycles and financial innovations may take decades to come through. Of course, in the interim period, all the countries face a variety of economic and financial imbalances created by structural changes in progress. Beyond social and political consequences, one of the pressing challenges is the issue of absorption, especially for emerging economies. Take, for example, the much-debated case of global liquidity. Whichever way you measure it, global liquidity has kept expanding at a rate much faster than asset creation. Consequently, the overwhelming cycle of liquidity-driven flows has pushed real interest rates lower across the world and fuelled economic activity well beyond the trend growth rate of the global economy. Even today, despite the US slowdown, the state of the world economy is much better than expectations just a few months ago and keeps risk appetite intact. However, although the benefits of globalization outweigh its challenges, abrupt, exaggerated adjustments are still a threat to financial stability. Global economic fundamentals are strong, but a tightening of market liquidity is a risk. The global economy is going through a — very — gradual rebalancing phase, as the US economy underperforms relative to the rest of the world. There is of course a high degree of uncertainty about the dynamics of rebalancing in today’s world, and a possible deepening of consumer retrenchment in America would still have significant spillover effects. Therefore, as our chief economist Stephen Roach has long argued, the game is not over yet. Indeed, judging from the behavior of current account imbalances, there is little evidence of a meaningful correction at this stage. America’s current account deficit kept widening from 0.5% of global GDP in 1997 to 1.3% in 2000 and 1.8% last year, while the cumulative current account surplus of oil exporters and Asian countries (including Japan) surged from 0.5% of global GDP to 1.7% over the same period. Although there are some signs of adjustment, the process of global rebalancing is slow — mainly because of the complex nature of imbalances arising from structural changes as well as cyclical excesses (see Can the IMF Tame Gorillas?, October 3, 2006). However, the risk is not so much about economic fundamentals but stems from the self-reinforcing cycle of liquidity-driven flows, in our view. In the post-2001 period, starting with ultra-low interest rates, the recycling of current account surpluses has led to an extraordinary accumulation of ‘foreign’ assets around the world (see Pumping Money, May 22, 2007). As net foreign assets of oil exporters and Asian countries increased from 3.7% of global GDP in 1999 to 9.5% last year, we have witnessed the emergence of a new, liquidity-driven risk culture with lower home bias and greater appetite for ‘exotic’ markets and instruments. Emerging economies stand on stronger footings, but capital flows still create excesses. You can spin anything anyway you like, but globalization has largely been a boon for the developing world. With prudent policies and structural reforms, emerging economies have maintained a rapid pace of growth and even become creditor to the rest of the world. However, having a current account surplus does not necessarily stop the inflow of foreign capital, which soared from US$50 billion a year in the 1980s to US$700 billion in 2006. Although financial globalization eases financing constraints on growth and brings dynamism to corporate sectors, the pool of global liquidity also comes with serious challenges, especially considering the funding structure of capital flows. For example, the outstanding notional amount of derivatives increased from US$5.7 trillion (or 26% of global GDP) in 1990 to US$415.2 trillion (or 789% of global GDP) last year (see Deriving Liquidity, June 4, 2007). These complex, structured instruments certainly help to distribute risk more broadly across financial systems, but have also become a major source of market liquidity for leveraged bets in search of higher returns in a world of low real interest rates. Of course, lacking adequate financial depth and sophistication, emerging economies remain vulnerable to excesses created by the overpowering cycle of capital flows. Global rebalancing requires exchange rate as well structural adjustments. There are hints of rebalancing in the global economy, like America’s slowly narrowing current account deficit, China’s attempts to cool the pace of economic expansion, and even an increase in real interest rates. As a result, ‘excess’ liquidity — measured by money supply growth minus GDP growth in G5 countries and China — eased from an average of 4.3% between 2002 and 2005 to 0.5% at the end of last year. However, we believe that the explosive growth in derivatives has weakened the link between monetary aggregates and market liquidity. Therefore, the world economy still needs structural adjustments as well as proactive policy updates (like currency revaluation in Asia and oil-exporting countries) to stay on a sustainable growth path.
Important Disclosure Information at the end of this Forum

Disclosure Statement
The information and opinions in this report were prepared or are disseminated by Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated and/or Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc and/or Morgan Stanley Japan Securities Co., Ltd. and/or Morgan Stanley Asia Limited and/or Morgan Stanley Asia (Singapore) Pte. (Registration number 199206298Z) and/or Morgan Stanley Asia (Singapore) Securities Pte Ltd (Registration number 200008434H) and/or Morgan Stanley Taiwan Limited and/or Morgan Stanley & Co International plc, Seoul Branch, and/or Morgan Stanley Australia Limited (A.B.N. 67 003 734 576, holder of Australian financial services licence No. 233742, which accepts responsibility for its contents), and/or JM Morgan Stanley Securities Private Limited and their affiliates (collectively, "Morgan Stanley").
Global Research
Conflict Management Policy
This research observes our conflict management policy, available at www.morganstanley.com/institutional/research/management_policies.html
Important Disclosures
This report does not provide individually tailored investment advice. It has been prepared without regard to the circumstances and objectives of those who receive it. Morgan Stanley recommends that investors independently evaluate particular investments and strategies, and encourages them to seek a financial adviser's advice. The appropriateness of an investment or strategy will depend on an investor's circumstances and objectives. This report is not an offer to buy or sell any security or to participate in any trading strategy. The value of and income from your investments may vary because of changes in interest rates or foreign exchange rates, securities prices or market indexes, operational or financial conditions of companies or other factors. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance. Estimates of future performance are based on assumptions that may not be realized.
With the exception of information regarding Morgan Stanley, reports prepared by Morgan Stanley research personnel are based on public information. Morgan Stanley makes every effort to use reliable, comprehensive information, but we do not represent that it is accurate or complete. We have no obligation to tell you when opinions or information in this report change apart from when we intend to discontinue research coverage of a company. Facts and views in this report have not been reviewed by, and may not reflect information known to, professionals in other Morgan Stanley business areas, including investment banking personnel.
To our readers in Taiwan: This publication is distributed by Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc, Taipei Branch; it may not be distributed to or quoted or used by the public media without the express written consent of Morgan Stanley. To our readers in Hong Kong: Information is distributed in Hong Kong by and on behalf of, and is attributable to, Morgan Stanley Asia Limited as part of its regulated activities in Hong Kong; if you have any queries concerning it, contact our Hong Kong sales representatives.
This publication is disseminated in Japan by Morgan Stanley Japan Securities Co., Ltd.; in Canada by Morgan Stanley Canada Limited, which has approved of, and has agreed to take responsibility for, the contents of this publication in Canada; in Germany by Morgan Stanley Bank AG, Frankfurt am Main, regulated by Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin); in Spain by Morgan Stanley, S.V., S.A., a Morgan Stanley group company, which is supervised by the Spanish Securities Markets Commission (CNMV) and states that this document has been written and distributed in accordance with the rules of conduct applicable to financial research as established under Spanish regulations; in the United States by Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated, which accepts responsibility for its contents. Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc, authorized and regulated by Financial Services Authority, disseminates in the UK research that it has prepared, and approves solely for the purposes of section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, research which has been prepared by any of its affiliates. Private U.K. investors should obtain the advice of their Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc representative about the investments concerned. In Australia, this report, and any access to it, is intended only for "wholesale clients" within the meaning of the Australian Corporations Act.
Trademarks and service marks herein are their owners' property. Third-party data providers make no warranties or representations of the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of their data and shall not have liability for any damages relating to such data. The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) was developed by and is the exclusive property of MSCI and S&P. Morgan Stanley bases projections, opinions, forecasts and trading strategies regarding the MSCI Country Index Series solely on public information. MSCI has not reviewed, approved or endorsed these projections, opinions, forecasts and trading strategies. Morgan Stanley has no influence on or control over MSCI's index compilation decisions. This report or portions of it may not be reprinted, sold or redistributed without the written consent of Morgan Stanley. Morgan Stanley research is disseminated and available primarily electronically, and, in some cases, in printed form. Additional information on recommended securities is available on request.

|
|
|