Saving Backlash
Feb 24, 2006
Stephen Roach (New York)
The United States continues to struggle mightily with globalization. China bashing is on the rise in Washington once again, even as the national unemployment rate falls below 5%. There is a political firestorm over a proposed acquisition by Dubai Ports World of a UK operator of five East Coast container terminals in the United States. This backlash and the protectionist debate it has spawned reflect the dangerous mixture of macro and politics. America’s saving shortfall has triggered a classic political blame game. Ever-complacent financial markets could care less.
Notwithstanding the understandable concerns over matters of national security in a post 9/11 world, there is a very simple and extremely powerful macro point that is being overlooked in this debate: America no longer has the internal wherewithal to fund the rapid growth of its economy. Suffering from the greatest domestic saving shortfall in modern history, the US is increasingly dependent on surplus foreign saving to fill the void. The net national saving rate -- the combined saving of individuals, businesses, and the government sector after adjusting for depreciation -- fell into negative territory to the tune of -1.3% of national income in late 2005. That means America doesn’t save enough even to cover the replacement of its worn-out capital stock. This is a first for the US in the modern post-World War II era -- and I believe a first for any hegemonic power over a much longer sweep of world history. Faced with a shortfall of domestic saving, countries basically have two choices -- to curtail economic growth or borrow from the rest of the world. The first option just doesn’t cut it in the land of abundance. America, in general, and its consumers, in particular, treat rapid economic growth as an entitlement. That leaves the US with little choice other than to pursue the second option -- drawing heavily on the pool of surplus global saving as the means to fund economic growth. Once the US started consuming beyond its means, it left itself beholden to external funding and production. And that’s how China and Dubai have entered America’s macro equation. That underscores a key attribute of the saving-short, deficit nation: It has no choice other than to run current account deficits in order to attract the requisite foreign capital. And in the case of the United States, where external funding needs are so massive -- now closing in on $800 billion per year -- most of the current account imbalance shows up in the form of a huge trade deficit. In 2005, for example, the trade deficit in goods and services accounted for fully 93% of the total current-account gap. With that external funding imperative comes key geopolitical tradeoffs. Thank to China, America actually got a rather extraordinary deal for its trade deficit dollar in 2005 -- a net balance of some $200 billion of low-cost, high-quality Chinese goods that expanded the purchasing power of US consumers. If, however, Washington politicians now choose to close down trade with China by imposing high tariffs or forcing a major Chinese currency revaluation -- precisely the tact of a bipartisan coalition headed up by Senators Schumer (D-NY) and Graham (R-SC) -- those actions could well backfire. Absent the China supply line, the trade deficit for a saving-short US economy wouldn’t shrink as the politicians seem to imply. Instead, due to America’s outsize external funding needs, the trade deficit would remain large and merely gravitate to a higher-cost producer -- imposing the functional equivalent of a tax on the American consumer. Similarly, if Washington were to kill the bid by Dubai Ports World, another source of capital inflows would be required to fill the external funding gap. But maybe the next investor would ask for tougher financing terms. The current political boil raises a critical question: Can the United States select its lenders and dictate the terms of its external financing program? The simple answer to the first part of the question is, “yes” -- targeted protectionism can, indeed, redirect the sources of external commerce. Through tariffs a la Schumer-Graham, or non-tariff restrictions on Dubai-based investors, the US could attempt to shift the mix of its trade and capital inflows. Such actions would do nothing, however, to address the basic problem. America’s trade deficit and concomitant capital surplus will simply shift elsewhere in the world. As long as the US economy is locked on a subpar domestic saving path, it is hooked increasingly on the “kindness of strangers” to provide the sustenance of its economic growth -- both in terms of capital as well as goods. There’s an even darker side to the recent outbreak of protectionist backlash in the US -- the crass politics of scapegoatting. It’s not hard to figure out why. It stems from the ongoing angst of middle-class American workers -- an undercurrent of discontent that has not been tempered by a sub-5% unemployment rate. A US labor market that was once trapped in a jobless recovery is now mired in a wageless recovery -- an extraordinary stagnation of real wages even in the face of strong productivity growth. At the same time, the US is suffering from a record trade deficit, whose largest bilateral piece is with China. Bingo -- the politicians are quick to point the finger at China as being responsible for the trade-related pressures bearing down on beleaguered US workers. But who is really to blame in all this? At the end of the day, America’s saving shortfall -- the origin of destabilizing capital and trade flows -- is a by-product of conscious choices made by the US body politic. The Federal budget deficit, which has accounted for the bulk of the plunge in national saving over the past six years, is made in Washington -- not in Beijing. The negative personal saving rate is an outgrowth of pro-consumption tax policies -- again made in Washington. US politicians are the source of resistance to tax reforms, such as a consumption tax, that might address the deficiencies of private saving. Of course, politicians never want to admit that they are the problem. Instead, they prefer to pin the blame on others -- in this case, China and Dubai. Washington needs to be very careful what it wishes for. In effect, the UAE is being told that it is fine to re-cycle its petro-dollars into Treasuries -- just don’t buy American ports. China is getting the same message -- curtail your exports to the US but don’t dare stop gobbling up dollar-based financial assets. Meanwhile, the United States does next to nothing to address the macro root of the problem -- a staggering shortfall of domestic saving. The longer the US avoids the heavy lifting of fixing its saving shortfall, the greater the risks that America’s current-account funding problem will end in tears. In the end, the answer to the question posed above is “no” -- the US cannot carefully select its lenders as well as dictate the terms of its massive external financing program. The harder the protectionist push, the greater the risks of a financial market backlash that hits the dollar and US real interest rates.
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How Big a Payback?
Feb 24, 2006
Richard Berner (in Princeton, NJ)
Try as I might, I can’t seem to avoid analyzing the weather to understand the economy’s direction. My son, now 23, recognized my occupational hazard when at age 5 he painted a picture that hangs in my office. The legend: “This is my Dad. His job is to be an economist. It means he has to get the weather right.” That’s been especially true over the past nine months, when unprecedented weather events wrenched the economy first far below and more recently well above what otherwise would be its growth trajectory. Volatile data are making it difficult to track the economy’s current underlying growth path. January’s events are a case in point: Record warm weather in that month — fully 8ºF above the norm —boosted housing and retailing activity unsustainably, and most investors now understand that a “payback” for this weather-assisted growth spurt is coming. Less widely appreciated, at least lately, is that a vigorous rebound in economic activity from the hurricane-cum-energy-shock depressed levels of late-summer 2005 has also contributed unsustainably to the first-quarter growth surge. Like the boost from warm weather, this post-hurricane recovery will also fade, and the combination could exaggerate the coming deceleration, once again fueling suspicions that the long-awaited slowdown has arrived. In contrast, taking that volatility into account, I see the economy’s underlying growth trajectory at 3½% and rising. Like it or not, it’s important to assess just how big that payback will be to make that call. Unfortunately, at this point, it’s mostly guesswork. What to do? One simple approach is to smooth out the effects of the shocks by averaging growth over the affected quarters. Given our current estimates for revised fourth-quarter (1.6%) and first-quarter (5.6%) growth, the average of 3.6% certainly fits the first part of the script. And thus the dip to a slightly below-trend 3.2% growth rate in the second quarter fits the payback story. Of course, this approach makes the heroic assumption that the shocks and the rebounds or downdrafts from them neatly cancel each other out. As important, both are currently just estimates; there’s a lot we don’t yet know about coming revisions of past data and the way that the payback will shake out in the next few months. The good news is that the assumptions behind our estimate of 3.2% growth in the second quarter are conservative. For example, given January’s weather-boosted level of housing starts, activity will have to fall by 16% in February and stay there to realize our first-quarter estimate. Likewise, we assumed light vehicle sales would fall to 16.3 million units in February; auto analyst Jonathan Steinmetz tells us that the tally will likely come in closer to 17.2 million. The potential for a smaller payback in those data makes us more confident that the second-quarter deceleration won’t be sharp. A second approach is to compare today’s experience for affected activity such as construction with weather-related shocks from the past to judge the likely payback. But the results are hardly conclusive, because factors other than the weather aren’t constant. For example, a warm winter in 1990 pushed the thermometer about 6ºF above the norm in January of that year, or 75% of the January 2006 deviation. But housing starts jumped by 300,000 units, or 24% in January 1990, compared with “only” 14.5% in January 2006. Despite continued warm weather, a recession was brewing, and declines in starts in February-April 1990 erased the January jump. Similar patterns obtained in construction outlays and employment. Using weather shocks in the past to assess today’s payback isn’t exact because, courtesy of reporting lags, the effects may take time to show up in the data. For example, a warm winter in 1982-83 began in earnest in December, but the pop in housing starts was delayed until January of 1983. Unwinding the effects of a weather-related shock may take even longer; especially if the weather anomaly persists. And the effects on discretionary income and spending of collateral energy-price swings will magnify those moves. The upshot is that no foolproof method for parsing the effects of weather shocks on the economy exists. The shock from the hurricanes and the subsequent rebound were both larger than expected, but at least partly offsetting. Only careful attention to the fundamentals and the unfolding data will tell the tale. In my view, neither 5.6% growth in the first quarter nor 3.2% growth in the spring quarter represent the economy’s sustainable strength. As we see it, risks are still tilted towards 3¾% growth in the second half of 2006, or slightly above trend (see “Betting on Sustainable Growth,” Global Economic Forum, February 6, 2006). It’s worth remembering that the difference between growth below and above trend is critical: The former would help contain inflation. But because slack has dwindled in both product and labor markets, and capacity is growing slowly, growth above trend will intensify pressure on resource utilization and tend to boost inflation risks. For investors, these differences are also critical. Market pricing suggests a move by the Fed to a 5% funds rate no later than June. We’re not so sure, given the likely spring deceleration in the economy, the still-slow upcreep in inflation, and the notion that policy lags are uncertain; as a result, the full extent of policy firming may take time to unfold. By comparison, the persistent inversion of the yield curve beyond two years implies that the Fed will reverse course soon after the tightening campaign ends. In contrast, we think that upside inflation risks and rising term premiums will re-steepen the Treasury yield curve, sending 10-year yields towards 5%. A supply-driven energy price spike or a meaningful surge in inflation pose the biggest threats to our upbeat scenario. The former would sap discretionary spending power. The latter would promote a more significant tightening in monetary policy, which would be bad news for both housing and consumers’ financial-market net worth, and would raise the odds of a significant consumer ‘ARM squeeze’. Contrariwise, if energy prices stabilize or revert to long-term levels, the risks of a stronger-growth, higher-inflation outcome are not insignificant.
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North by Northeast - Next Steps in Industrial Reorganization
Feb 24, 2006
Robert Alan Feldman (Tokyo)
Are Jitters Justified? The new volatility in Japanese equity prices shows that investors are of two minds. On one hand, there is significant buying on dips. Investors see Japanese corporate earnings and economic prospects as good. However, there is also significant selling on spikes. Investors also see valuations stretched. Are Japanese equities in a box? Or is there a chance that the equity market may break out, either down or up? My view is that an upward move is more likely. As my colleague Naoki Kamiyama says, the market is likely underestimating earnings for F2006, because companies have been conservative in their guidance. In light of our strong GDP forecast for F2006 and F2007, based in part on falling oil prices, the macroeconomic background for earnings growth is strong. In addition to macro-based arguments, however, there are some micro-based ones that are gaining importance. A large part of investor interest in Japanese equities has stemmed from the restructuring of Japanese industry. To the extent that such restructuring is over, then investors may lose passion about Japan. True, restructuring has gone a very long way in many industries, as evidenced by record high profit margins. However, the restructuring story is not dead. Rather, it is molting into a new theme, industrial reorganization. A Bit of Ratio History The transformation of Japanese industry is seen in the Ministry of Finance’s Corporate Statistics (which is a good proxy for listed non-financials). In the first half of the 1990s, there was a sharp drop of margins, and only a very minimal drop of leverage, resulting is a major drop of RoE. In the second half of the 1990s, margins recovered, but leverage remained high. In the last five years, margins have continued to rise quickly, more than offsetting the negative impact of sharply lower leverage on RoE. Indeed, despite the sharper decline of leverage in 2001-05, RoE rose more in that period (1.79 %-pts) than in the previous five years (1.60%-pts). This history is encouraging, but it is only history: What happens next? A look at the dispersion of performance among industries gives a hint. Comparing Clouds The difference of levels and dispersion in margin/leverage combinations give hints for the next steps. In a diagram with margin on the horizontal axis and leverage on the vertical axis, the cloud of data points is in the northwest in 1995, that is, high leverage and low margin. Moreover, there is much dispersion — mostly toward industries that have even higher leverage and even lower margins (for example, the hotel industry, HT, where the margin was negative). By 2005, however, the entire cloud of data points had moved to the southeast. Moreover, the dispersion had switched sides. The outliers now have higher margins and lower leverage. Looking for Opportunities The opportunities in the equity market exist in the industries that can move northeast, that is, those that can move past higher RoE levels. This can be accomplished with different combinations of leverage and margin changes. What NOT to do is illustrated by the history of the 1960s and 1970s, when Japanese firms raised RoE by sharp increases of leverage, despite dropping margins. Thus, opportunities today exist in two varieties, (a) firms with very low leverage but relatively low margins, and (b) firms that need to lower leverage more and thus must raise margins a great deal. Low leverage does not imply high margins. Indeed, four of the industries in this group (please see full report for exhibits) fall below the overall average margin of 4.88%. Thus, if management in these industries becomes aggressive about improving margins, it can do so based on debt financing, and enhance the returns to industry reorganization. Firms with moderate leverage ratios (between 1x and 2x) may also be attractive in this regard. In this group, found on lines 17 through 30, the majority have sub-par margins. In contrast, there remain a few industries where old-style structuring remains necessary. There are industries with high leverage (2x to 3x) , nearly all of which have low margins. Large improvements of margin have occurred in the hotel and agriculture industries, but the absolute levels remain low. The construction industry has shown virtually no improvement of margin, even though leverage is down a lot. The final group, heavily indebted industries, show a broad different in margins, from 2.71% for personal services to 10.44% for real estate. In some cases, the nature of the business dictates low margins, and hence high leverage is the only way to achieve a good return on equity. In these cases, applications of new technology could be the key to raising margins. If so, then a period of restructuring — where debt is lowered as margins are raised — will be needed. What About Turnover? The above analysis concentrates on margin and leverage, with no mention of turnover. In fact, as I have pointed out in an earlier piece, rising turnover is one other method by which RoE could rise. Indeed, there have already been some increases in turnover. The problem is how to achieve further ones. Asset reductions may seem like an easy way. After all, say some investors, Japanese companies are so cash rich that they could easily shrink balance sheets, either by a joint reduction of cash and short-term liabilities or by stock buy-backs. However, the share of cash in total assets is now at a historical low, only 6%, while equities held for investment (that is, those classified as liquid assets) have been cut to nearly zero. While cash cuts or stock buybacks might be relevant for some companies, in the aggregate they do not appear likely to drive a rise of turnover. Hence, as my colleague Naoki Kamiyama points out, if turnover is to rise further, the rise must be driven by increasing sales, without proportional rise of the balance sheet. As the economy turns from deflation to inflation, such a rise is likely. Companies are now more wary of taking new assets onto balance sheets, and thus should raise asset efficiency. Moreover, the natural tendency of book value of assets to lag price movements in the economy should provide at least an accounting-based rise of turnover. Most important, however, will the more efficient asset use, that is, squeezing more sales out of each new investment. The track record of the last few years — even while deflation has continued — is encouraging.
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Goldilocks Says 'Just Right' (Part II)
Feb 24, 2006
Takehiro Sato (Tokyo)
Decoupling of the economy and prices While we are maintaining a highly bullish outlook for Japan’s economy, prices are the area where we are most guarded. As we expect deregulation and efforts to trim government spending to reignite downward pricing pressure for broadly-defined public service charges, our forecast for the core CPI inflation rate in F2006 is +0.2%, and +0.2% in F2007. The outlook for inflation to be low and stable in an environment of roughly 3% real economic growth has been made possible by the improvement in productivity that reform efforts by the public and private sectors over the last several years have spurred, mainly in non-manufacturing and public or quasi-public sectors. Such low inflation is not to be interpreted as negative. To gauge the temperature of the economy more accurately, we hone in on the baseline (core of the core) price trend that filters out extraordinary factors. The baseline CPI hit the bottom in the first half of 2001, and has been consistently giving readings of about zero growth YoY in the most recent seven months. Given the consensus expectation for real GDP growth to sustain a 2-3% clip over three years and for the output gap to close commensurately, this price trend is oddly stable. We think this implies not simply that productivity has improved, but also that we should consider the possibility of an upward shift in the economy’s potential growth rate. The outlook for the economy and prices of the BoJ assumes that the potential growth rate of the economy is about 1%. Even using a standard Cobb-Douglas production function model, we come up with a potential growth rate of 1% plus. Measuring error in such calculations is significant, making it hard to say whether the real rate is 1% or near to 2-3%. Implications for prices thus differ markedly depending on whether the potential growth rate is 1% or nearly 2-3%, but with actual price levels trending stably in a very strong economy we have come to believe that the potential growth rate is variable to a surprising extent according to the state of the economy. So we cannot exclude the possibility that it is rising in response to overall economic improvement. Productivity holds the key. It is hard to find any convincing explanation other than improved productivity why corporate profits and employee incomes have been rising at the same time and while the prices of final demand goods have remained stable. The bottom up outlook for prices (core CPI inflation) does not look like entering a sustained uptrend due to falling public service prices, but this form of decline in charges is a symptom of better productivity in the quasi-public sector keying off government expenditure cuts and deregulation. A quiet productivity revolution is still under way in Japan centering on these types of public services, and this creates a macro environment that is not conducive to a sustained price uptrend. But to put this another way, the implications for asset markets are by no means negative. GDP deflator improvement slack due to productivity gains The GDP deflator is the sum of unit labor cost (employees’ income/real GDP) and unit profit (corporate profit/real GDP). Under asset deflation, with the economic growth pie limited, the GDP deflator has remained low since even if the former rose, there was no guarantee that the latter would also rise. However, with the real GDP pie growing thanks to strong domestic demand, the increase in corporate earnings looks to kick off a positive cycle, leading to an increase in workers’ income. The increase in employees’ income would normally lead to a decline in corporate margins (a decrease in productivity), and also to an increase in prices for final demand goods/services (higher goods prices) as firms attempt to counteract this margin decline. Therefore, we look for the GDP deflator to rise over the medium-long term, and for the position-switch between the real growth rate and the nominal growth rate seen recently to reverse itself. In reality, however, employees’ income is continuing to rise, corporate margins are improving and prices are stable. In this environment, even with wages rising, we think total factor productivity (TFP) is still improving thanks to improved facility productivity etc. This is working to blunt the pace of GDP deflator improvement. Also, quite apart from these fundamental reasons, the Oct-Dec 2005 GDP deflator was pushed down by two technical factors: (1) the rise in the import deflator caused by the rise in landed crude oil prices; and (2) the decline in the PCE deflator caused by the plunge in fresh foods prices. Although (1) pushes up the core CPI, it also pushed down the GDP deflator by causing a rise in the import deflator. We look for 2006 crude oil prices to remain high, at the $64/bbl level, so we think the GDP deflator could see slack growth in 2006. If we assume a weakening to the $50/bbl level in 2007, this should give a lift to the GDP deflator in 2007. (2) is the result of the widening margin of YoY decline in fresh food products, especially fresh vegetable produce. In other words, despite the improvement in the core CPI, the decline in fresh vegetable prices is actually causing the headline CPI to decline faster. A side-effect of this is that it pushes down the GDP deflator, via a weakening of the personal consumption deflator. So due to in part to these recent technical factors, we now look the improvement we had expected in the GDP deflator to show up around Oct-Dec 2006, rather than Jul-Sept 2006. As a result, it frankly seems unlikely that the correction of the position-switch between the nominal and real GDP growth rates on a YoY basis will cause the economy to normalize. However, on a quarterly basis, we expect the deflator to turn positive for the first time in the 9 years since 1997 around the end of 2006 in real terms, in the 12 years since 1994, and for this to turn positive in YoY terms in 2007. The shift by the GDP deflator to positive territory would signal an increase in the nominal growth rate greater than the pace of real growth, which would improve corporate sales and profit trends. Although corporate earnings in manufacturing industries are already trumping forecasts with help from yen depreciation, non-manufacturing industries are likely to benefit most from the pickup in nominal growth.
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